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PENINSULAR EUROPE

SOME GEOGRAPHICAL PEREGRINATIONS
ANCIENT AND MODERN

BY

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EDITORIAL FOREWORD

FOR more than a quarter of a century Professor Lyde has been a source of inspiration to successive generations of students. In the early days of the development of modern geography he played an almost lone hand in University circles, but he has lived to see Departments of Geography firmly established in every University of this country, and his own students carrying on his work and traditions in the farthest corners of the globe.

Only those who have been his students can ever really appreciate to the full the breadth and depth of his influence: it remains with them, though it may be unconsciously, as a guiding *motif* throughout their work. It is unquestionable, however, that Professor Lyde's influence has been out of all proportion to his published work, even when his "Continent of Europe" and "Atlas of Economic Geography" are considered. True, his early textbooks paved the way for later developments, and he expressed ideas in "The Teaching of Geography" twenty years ago which are only being discovered by others at the present day. But he is alone in having evolved what some of his students have called a philosophy of geography. To the dullard it is meaningless; to the active mind it is fraught with intuition and suggestion.

At long last a little of that philosophy has been put on paper, and forms the substance of this book. In it one may follow to some extent his active mind: here one may agree, here one may disagree, but in a mere sentence he opens up vistas of thought which the adventurous may follow or the coward shun. If this book stimulates thought and imagination amongst its readers as the spoken word has done amongst generations of students, its purpose will have been well served.

L. D. S.

December, 1930

AUTHOR'S NOTE

SOME of the following pages illustrate my dislike and distrust of a certain type of politician, and of the Prussian racial type. Mailed fists and rattled sabres are contemptible as well as dangerous, and complacent ignorance and crass stupidity (such as he behind the figures quoted on p. 162) are equally contemptible and almost equally dangerous.

My likes and dislikes, however, are not responsible for the emphasis laid on these sources of danger, though I do think that people—especially if sincere lovers of peace—ought to be kept aware of such danger. Some of the vital problems in Political Geography that I have tried to tackle have been complicated from both sources; and nowadays, if one does not explicitly condemn things offensive in themselves and dangerous to international peace, *e.g.* humbug and tyranny, it is assumed that one implicitly condones them.

But I wish to add that I have a sincere respect and regard for the true German, as found in Austria, South Germany, and even in much of Prussia; and I have always greatly envied the man with a long enough head, a deep enough heart, a gay enough courage, and a firm enough will, to be the real, rare statesman.

A second apology may be pertinent. When for nearly half a century one has been persistently trying—without deviating an iota from the facts—to reduce teaching material to forms and formulas *incapable of NOT being provocative*, so that one's audience could not remain just flabbily passive, but must actively agree or disagree, one's ideas are apt to take naturally forms that may seem dogmatic when that is the very last thing that one wants to be. If any legacy from this sound teaching habit haunts the written word here, I am sorry.

I must thank Dr. Stamp for invaluable criticisms and suggestions, Miss Fisher and Mrs. Witts for the art and the patience with which they converted my crude ideas into the diagrams, which speak for themselves, and my wife for the care and the time which she spent on the proofs.

L. W. LYDE.

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BERKS.

October 13, 1930.

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PENINSULAR EUROPE

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTORY

CONDITIONS AND CONTROLS

PENINSULARITY is the differentiating feature of Europe as a continent. Even if we include the whole "Russian" area, *i.e.* all north of 50° N. and east of 25° E., over 25 per cent. of the continent is peninsular in the narrowest sense of the word; and, if we exclude that area, reducing our continent almost to the size of the so-called "sub-continent" of India, itself another peninsula of Asia, the percentage rises to 65.


The total length of coast, measured as a generalised line and with no attention to the detailed articulation, was calculated by Figuier at about 20,000 miles, or one mile of coast to less than 200 square miles of area. Australia, which is more than three-quarters the size of Europe, has not half as much; Asia, as a separate continent, with four times the area, has only twice as much; Africa, which is not much less than three times the size, has one-fifth less. Even the Tatra mass, the geometrical centre of Europe, is within 300 miles of three seas,—the Baltic, the Black, and the Adriatic.

Ritter, with rather different figures, came to the somewhat similar conclusion that, relatively to its size, Europe has three times as much coast as Asia and four times as much as Africa. And, again, if we ignore the definitely

continental and un-European region, the superiority is very much greater. Particular areas are phenomenally articulate ; even Italy has a proportion of coast to surface as high as 1 to 30, and Norway has one of 1 to 10. At the same time these figures must be interpreted with discretion, for they have quite different meanings. Italy has 4,000 miles of coast, and no place is 150 miles from the sea ; but this is due primarily to the narrowness of the peninsula, and not to any remarkable articulation such as that of Norway.

It can scarcely be doubted that we are fully justified in making this clear distinction between the continental or Asiatic and the peninsular or really European halves of the area, even if it involves us in the difficulty of dividing the continent into three, not two, sections. For the link—or divide—between the two is a transitional belt, the isthmus between the Baltic and the Mediterranean as represented by its Black Sea and Adriatic pockets ; and the eastern edge of the belt puts a fairly definite climatic limit to the transition, because it marks the eastward limit of the beech—killed by the excessive evaporation.

This isthmian triangle, bounded roughly by lines from the mouths of the Danube and the Isonzo to the mouth of the Vistula—the wedge between non-Roman Germania and Byzantine Muscovy—was the great bastion of Europe. On it all inroads from Asia converged, whether they came by the lowland steppe of the horsemen or by the plateau steppe of the camelmen. In this zone Greeks and Romans, Magyars and Poles, came to grips with the invaders ; Austria and Prussia owed their existence to the need for holding these Eastern Marks or Marches. For centuries it has been consistently a zone of political instability ; and only since the Great War have the isthmian States, and their northern neighbours from Finland to Greece, had a fair chance of expressing themselves nationally.



THE ISTHEMIAN TRIANGLE.

The brunt of Asiatic invasions was borne by the peoples within the marked triangle, especially the Poles and the Magyars, the one from behind the Carpathians; and, as the invasions in these higher latitudes, unlike the Persian attack on Hellas, were unorganised, they were very much influenced by physical features, and tended to move round rather than across the Carpathians.

Movement round the Carpathian arc southward was relatively easy because there is an almost unbroken belt of real steppe *via* Bessarabia, the Dobruja and western Wallachia to Buda-Pest, and it was this southern route that was followed by the Huns, the Avars, and the Bulgars. The immense importance of this route to all western Europe was that the Danube valley gave an easy Parkland route on westward round the whole Alpine system, while the Save and the Drave led directly to the most vulnerable shoulder of the Adriatic coastland—behind Trieste, while the upper valleys of the Vistula, the Oder, and the Elbe provided easier approaches to the North European Plain than that between the Carpathians and the Pripet Marshes.

It is important to remember that, though Attila's personal possessions lay in what we call Hungary, the Huns were in no way ancestors of the Magyars, and when the latter conquered the area (c. 900 A.D.), it was in the possession of Slavs. These Magyars entered the area not round the Carpathians, but by the Vereczke Pass, and so penetrated to the heart of the Theiss basin, thus cutting the Northern Slavs from the Southern, and the Eastern from the Western.

The Magyars, as magnificent cavalry, were not only much better fitted than the Poles to tackle Tatar and Turkish invaders, but also forced on the attention of the Germans (Henry I) the importance of cavalry, and thus cavalry became the typical arm of the Empire.

It was also of importance to Western Europe that, when the Magyars became Christian, they were alienated by the political Hellenising of the Eastern Church, and were driven (Stephen I) into the arms of Rome. Unfortunately, this led indirectly to the Banates, established to guard the Lower Danube steppe, eventually developing into violently anti-Magyar principalities, especially in Serbia and Bulgaria, with their old memories of centuries of empire in the area.

Indeed, we may say that the War itself was largely due to the unfortunate accident that Asiatic or continental patriarchalism had intruded into an environment of European or peninsular particularism,¹ somewhat in the same way as the roundheaded continental Alpines intruded between the Nordic and the Mediterranean longheads of the European peninsulas. It was natural that the three great inter-continental railway routes across the zone in 1913 should all be spoken of as "Berlin-Baghdad" routes, and that the storm should break in the core of the peninsula nearest to Asia; for all three routes—Munich, Villach, Agram; Prague, Vienna, Budapest; Breslau, Troppau, Budapest—converged on Belgrade for Salonika and Constantinople. And, except for Serbia, they ran through a series of States all three of which were artificial, and so almost forced to be reactionary internally, and apt therefore to be forced to be aggressive externally simply to divert attention away from domestic problems. As all three were non-national and even anti-national, they were dangerous to Europe if linked together—by alliance and by mobile railways; and their defeat led to an outburst of nationality in the zone. But this was a reaction, not a natural evolution; and the zone itself and the areas of continental patriarchalism west of it do not really belong to peninsular Europe.

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But what do we mean by peninsularity, and what values do we attach to it? Literally, of course, we mean that the given area has "almost insular" conditions; and this literal interpretation of the word seems to have coloured—rather unfortunately—much that has been taught recently as Political Geography, especially with regard to Europe. In a discussion of frontiers, it is not only legitimate, but

¹ This seems the best word to describe a political individualism which is practically free from the typical risk of developing into anarchy.

even essential, to apply the title of peninsula to any area the land boundaries of which are shorter than its coast, *e.g.* France; but in any discussion of the influence of environment we are wiser to regard a peninsula simply as an enlarged promontory, for the vital factor is the direct attachment to a larger body of land.

From the climatic standpoint this is immediately and universally recognised; the peninsular is definitely not insular. Our islands, for instance, are not oceanic structurally, but stand well on to the continental shelf; and yet innumerable flocks of rooks, pigeons, peewits and other farm and forest birds migrate *westwards* across our Narrow Seas in late autumn—from lands where there is ice, floating or fast, on the rivers for 100 days every year, and where snow lies on the fields for at least as long, to lands where neither is normal for even 10 days.

Few of these birds travel as much as 1,000 miles, while many of them do not travel 500; but they exchange the peninsular for the insular, for our island is oceanic climatically, and they are probably nearly as numerous as their friends whose *southward*¹ tracks they cross before landing in East Anglia. This may be quite obvious, but it needs to be pressed, because we often use such words as, *e.g.* “temperate,” without consciously realising their precise connotation. What, indeed, do we mean precisely by that word “temperate”? Obviously, we mean that the climate is seldom too hot or too cold. Yes, but for whom, and for what? Surely, for Man—to be at his best, and to think with a view to *immediate* action.

If the peninsular is so clearly not insular in one vital relation, it is possibly and even probably not so in some other relations; but there must be much in common. All over the world islanders, of most dissimilar races,

¹ These southward migrants are travelling much farther—to get beyond the risk of even temporary cold.

seem to acquire similar habits and traits, developing what can only be called insular characteristics; and, from a comparison of islanders with landmen of the same race and the same major region, it would seem probable that they are differentiated by the inevitable contact with the sea, which is the strongest of all stimuli to Man.

To some extent peninsulas must, in this connexion, share the advantages of islands; and, undoubtedly, their peoples almost everywhere seem to have certain characteristics in common, especially when other geographical conditions are relatively uniform. For instance, in Europe, the control exercised by the peninsular forms is relatively uniform, even though these stretch over two very different climatic zones; and one claim of Europe to be recognised politically as a separate continent can be based on the peninsular unity of its peoples.

This is true of all Europe if we are looking at the problem from the World standpoint. Regionally, we may, and even must, distinguish between the climates of western and eastern Europe; and we may call that of eastern Europe definitely continental, but it is better to call it a *windward* continental climate. And, from the World point of view, it is probably better still to call it a *leeward* oceanic one.

But while this unity may be asserted of all Europe, it is specially true of peninsular Europe, defined in Political Geography as the historic sphere of the Roman Church, while continental Europe was the historic sphere of the Greek Church. And, if we limit the "historic" to the areas actually held by Rome, as Republic or Empire, the significance becomes clearer; for it was to the west and the south of the Rhine-Danube frontier of the Roman Empire—reinforced as a frontier for a Mediterranean Power by the mid-winter isotherm of 32° F.—that the idea of a Nation-State sprang up in the natural units of

the articulated peninsulas. East and north of that line the incoherent spaces of continental Europe knew no such idea until international interdependence, political and economic, had made it—in its old form of isolation and with its original suggestion of flat antagonism to others—quite out of date.

Of course, the same frontier divides the Nordic from the Mediterranean type of Man—the organisers from the thinkers; but it is reinforced and made effective by a broad belt of Alpine workers. The latter, even on the Dalmatian coast, are never real mariners, though they have made good marines, and are successful fishermen—for such inactive organisms as coral and sponge—in the almost tideless sea. And the Mediterranean type itself had to be invigorated by the Nordic (and the Alpine) before it gave us the inspiring art and literature of Greece¹ and the enduring political organisation of Rome.

The peninsular has, of course, several points of close and obvious similarity with the insular. All peninsulas must, *ipso facto*, have that inevitable contact with the sea, must experience the stimulating control—climatic, economic, strategic—exercised by the sea, must be made by the sea into actually and clearly defined units. Many peninsulas, too, are linked with—or separated from—their continent by rough and difficult country, with high-relief or adverse climate; and they tend, therefore, markedly to isolate, to concentrate, to differentiate, to individualise, to undergo a “premature” saturation which involves expansion or emigration, or both combined.

But we must not allow the Mediterranean peninsulas to mislead us here. For the sea itself was so truly the real core of the Old World that its peninsulas were historically

¹ While most of the goddesses were of Mediterranean type, nearly all the gods were Nordic (or Alpine), and so were all the great Homeric heroes, except “the wily”—and short-legged (cf. *Iliad*, iii, 210)—Odysseus. Apollo was golden-haired, and his favourite fruit was—the *apple*!

somewhat lacking in what might be called typically peninsular independence and isolation. Indeed, this very fact was largely responsible for the ease with which they were incorporated in a single empire—one based on the physical and climatic unity of the Mediterranean region and with its centre in the central peninsula of the Mid-Land Sea. But the compelling approximation to unity had been lost long before the days of Henry the Navigator, Diaz, and Columbus.

Perhaps one may add that this is not the only problem on which Mediterranean data may mislead any people whose evolution has not been adapted to a well-marked environment of summer-drought. Even in such a trifle as the modern obsession about “green” foods, we may usefully look at primitive facts. Summer-rain Europe was always rich in fuel—wood and peat, then coal and oil—even if its two main uses at first were only for warmth in winter and for torturing enemies; the habit of eating cooked food was easy to acquire, the cooked food kept good for a considerable time, and children were largely free from intestinal infections. But even where goats were too few to cause any wholesale and widely-spread destruction of young trees, summer-drought Europe was poor in fuel, and did not need it much for warming purposes; food was eaten raw—whether salads and fruits to the south, or uncooked meat to the east. The result was a dreadful death-rate in the south and Mosaic taboos in the east; and the evil was exaggerated because in the transition belt between the Trades and the Anti-Trades, between grassland and forest, the presence of an orchard environment meant excess of rich fruit, while the absence of meadow meant a definite lack of milk.

In trying to discuss such topics as a necessary part of Historical Geography, we are much hampered, even where we have abundant historical data, by the extent to which

Man has altered his environment in the course of centuries. Indeed, in most areas it is impossible now to be precise about the exact conditions of the original environment. The course chosen here is to try to take a wide survey, to emphasise the more permanent features and phenomena, to estimate the influence of these on the people at different epochs. For instance, if we cannot estimate the rate at which, or the extent over which, forest in Europe has been moved by man or goat, we can at least feel fairly certain that, so far as it has been moved by periodic droughts, such movement has been mainly one from east to west.

Differences between insular and peninsular controls are, however, more important than similarities, especially when we are dealing with the phenomena of early days and primitive areas. The vital difference is that the peninsula has, the island has not, direct connexion with a land mass. The one is, therefore, marginally dependent; the other is marginally independent. The one can be, the other can not be, in various ways "detached" from its continent in peace and war, as Britain and Japan have been for centuries. The complete severance means, or has meant hitherto, more independence, easier defence, greater differentiation.

We may attach special significance to two—possibly three—ways in which the difference is shown, both of them associated with the degree of isolation. In the first place, the island boundary is quite definite and inevitable; islanders must recognise and respect their territorial limitations, and they do so automatically. No ruler of England, however absolute, ever longed to push his boundary ten miles farther west or farther east; but the same could not be truly asserted about some rulers of France and of Germany. To recognise one's limitations, even in a literal spatial sense, is valuable; and national genius

tends to correspond in this respect, as in others, to the *genius loci*.

In the second place, the island boundary is not only inevitable and unmistakable, but also immediate and almost catastrophic. One reason why the shore-line is so stimulating to Man is precisely because it is the sharpest of all lines in the differentiation of life. The frontier here is a line, not a zone. There is no transition area in which elements from both sides may meet and mix; there is no debatable land from which undesirables can easily step into the protection of foreign jurisdiction; and, as islands tend to be much smaller than peninsulas, refugees from the arm of authority tend to be less remote. Of course, too, the smaller unit—*ceteris paribus*—is the more easily known; nationality, even if intensely narrow, matures earlier; and yet the organism is more plastic, with individuality as well as independence, initiative as well as imagination.

Again, while the island capital tends to obey, as regards its foreign neighbours, the laws demonstrated by Dr. Vaughan Cornish,¹ the real centre of Man-power and Money-power need not be, and often has not been, in the same place. No doubt, the two coincided in the typical city-state of the ancient world, and do so to-day in the nearest approach that we have to that typically Mediterranean product—in the southern States of Australia; but there are many obvious exceptions, based mainly on the distribution of mineral wealth, especially in the form of fuel. This has now become a factor of unique importance, with a direct and very delicate bearing on the problem of conditional contraband in time of war. For the lands most likely to be rich in minerals are unlikely to be suitable for agriculture, and *vice versa*; and yet both mineral and agricultural products have had their uses so widely extended

¹ In *The Great Capitals* (Methuen).

that they overlap in a double way. For instance, even twenty years ago no one would have associated bread and explosives; but in the War cereals gave us both bread and acetone for cordite. Indeed, nine-tenths of the minerals necessary for the emergencies of war are also necessary for the activities of peace; and the same can almost be said for non-mineral products, *e.g.* cereals and cotton.

In the case of a peninsula, however, the conditions are different, mainly just because of the land-link. For nearly all peninsulas are broadest where they are linked to their continent, *i.e.* they are most continental in area and climate and other physical respects just where the political and other human influences of the continent are nearest. If the relief here is high and rough, as in the Pyrenees, it tends to encourage traits typical of the frontiersman; if it is low and smooth, as in the Lombard plain (with 62 per cent. of its rain in the *summer* half of the year), it becomes the seat of a dense population, and tends to develop traits typical of the middleman. In either case it probably becomes, politically or economically, the most important part of the peninsula, and looks landward—for adventure, or from fear, or in trade—rather than seaward. This is the land of the bilingual, the double-tongued; and the double-tongued are seldom single-minded. Venice acted as transport-contractor to *both* sides in the Crusades.

. If this presentation of these link-lands seems to be rather contrary to the actual experience of Europe, especially in modern times, we may find some explanation in the contrast between northern and southern Europe. Though the Peloponnese hangs to the Balkan core by a low isthmus, all the great Mediterranean peninsulas, including the Balkan, have mountain bases, which have formed real barriers at least to movement northwards; but the Scandinavian peninsulas hang to the core of the whole


continent by a low isthmus and narrow straits, which have been no barrier to movement southwards. The Sound is narrower than the Isthmus of Corinth, and even Britain has been less isolated by the Channel than Iberia has been by the Pyrenees.

Further, when the Mediterranean was the real core of the Roman Empire, these southern peninsulas obviously faced the core of what was then their regional unit, instead of turning their backs on it, as they do towards their present unit; and so they were able to maintain more "detachment" from the continent than the northern peninsulas ever could, though they were much less "detached" than Arabia and India have been from the Asiatic core.

* * *

The exaggerated importance of the base tends to increase the political disunity which is inherent in the configuration and the relief of the typical peninsula. So far as the configuration is concerned, both the shape and the attitude of the area encourage disunity. Nearly all the important peninsulas of the world, whether large or small, not only lie—like the great continents themselves—practically north and south, but also taper southwards. There is, therefore, often considerable difference of climate and its controls between the northern and the southern extremities; it is the narrow and restricted south, not the broad and spacious north, that is nearest to insular conditions and maritime influences, and the extremity of the peninsula tends naturally to be articulate and more accessible by sea than any other part.

The relief still further emphasises the tendency to disunity. For the typical peninsula, *e.g.* Shan Tung, "Eastern Mountains," is a remnant of a highland area, the rest of which has been submerged; and in its ideal or genetic form it should have a spine of maximum elevation running through it from end to end, *i.e.* generally from north to



THREE TYPICAL PENINSULAS.

south, as in Italy and Kamchatka, Korea and Lower California. From this spine human activities, like any running waters, are diverted into opposite directions; population becomes marginal; and the difference, especially in climate, is often almost as great between the eastern and the western margins as between the northern and the southern extremities. Ancona and Leghorn are in exactly the same latitude and only 150 miles apart, but the temperature range at the latter (45° – 76° F.) is 25 per cent. less than at the former; and it is of special interest that it is precisely the variety of relief and of articulation that gives this valuable variety of climate, and that the varied relief often supplies features which make natural boundaries to the minor climatic regions.

Of course, variety of relief, such as is implied in the normal origin of a peninsula, is in itself a favourable feature in any human environment; but, in this particular form, it does not favour political unity, especially as the peoples of peninsular coastlands are apt to be suspicious and apprehensive of their hinterlands. This fact by itself suggests how vast a difference there is likely to be between insular and peninsular controls.

When, too, we remember the considerable length of the typical peninsula and its steadily narrowing width, it becomes obvious that such a unit must tend to be “too” long for its width—too long, that is, to be easily ruled from any single “centre,” even if there is no elevated spine, as in Jutland and Florida. This was true at least of early Europe, even in the experience of the greatest of road-makers, and the Historical Geography of Europe is largely concerned with illustrations of the truth.

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But the specific articulation of Europe must not be divorced from its regional body, the Eurasian mass, with its 5,000,000 square miles of inland drainage and its leagues

upon leagues of steppe. In such a mass population must be marginal because high humidity is marginal ; and—in days before the development of scientific agriculture—tillage, like forest, tended to be marginal. But tillage has always been a basis of economic strength, even in such a commercial area as medieval Flanders, though till recently it has been divorced from mobility except in a few small areas—noted for horses—such as Flanders and Philistia. The steppe, on the contrary, has always been a scene of mobility, most mobile in earlier days under the conditions most adverse to land mobility elsewhere, *i.e.* the snows of winter, which made the sledge the most efficient medium of land transport in winter known to Man ; but this mobility, till recently, was divorced from economic strength, and even now economic development depends directly on distance from rail.

In our own times, however, the ocean has been both the stage of greatest mobility and a basis of economic strength, direct and indirect. World trade is essentially not land trade ; there is no really transcontinental trade in bulk even in the United States, and there never will be on such a route as the Cape to Cairo railway. The same underlying conditions help to explain why sea wars, especially in days of wind-power, were so much cheaper than land wars.

Of course, the introduction of steam-power is not the only vital change. The pivot of history in any region must alter with the aggregate geographical conditions, natural and artificial. Medieval Europe was divided into two main regions, northern and southern, by a line meandering from the Strait of Gibraltar¹ round the west of the meseta to the strip of steppe between the Urals and

¹ Though there are three months of marked summer-drought at Gibraltar and in Portugal, the rainfall for the other nine months, and so the conditions of plant-growth—like the human note—are definitely Atlantic except in the purely Mediterranean Andalusia.

the Caspian—*i.e.* roughly parallel with the prevailing wind, a region of summer-rain and forest to the north-west of the line and one of summer-drought and grassland to the south-east of it; and in those days the pivot was, no doubt, where Mackinder puts it, in the Ural-Caspian gate—perhaps better defined as the landward junction of grassland and forest in Europe. Modern Europe is also divided into two main regions: to west and north an industrial region of complex relief and heavy rainfall (cyclonic and orographic) based on coal or water-power, and to east and south a region of uniform relief and low rainfall; and in these days the pivot is on the coal-flanked, forest-cleared meadows at the seaward end of the summer-rain belt, where it faces the Narrow Seas.

It was by these Narrow Seas that the European grasslands, themselves in earlier days more or less inaccessible, reached the mobile ocean, and so contributed to the importance of Britain, lying just inside the ocean, as Moscovy lay just inside the forest. And the lands round these Narrow Seas expanded easily over the ocean because the narrow Atlantic, with its favouring wind-system, was physically a cheap and easy medium of transport, and was politically devoid of circumferal peoples able and willing to obstruct the expansion. Thus peninsular Europe took its mother continent in the rear by the Cape route to the margins of Asia; and at the critical moment the pivot paused at the ocean end of the Gibraltar-Ural line, where Henry the Navigator's observatory at Sagres stood roughly between summer-drought and summer-rain, between the Midland sea and the open Atlantic.

But again we must distinguish between the World and the Regional standpoint, and must not anticipate. From the World standpoint the vital movement was that of the real pivot of power from the summer-drought south-east to the summer-rain north-west—ultimately, from the

Levant to the London basin ; but Europe itself was most conscious of the pressure, at once patriarchal and periodic, from the mobile steppes. The patriarchal character of the steppe tyranny was based on the isolation and the self-sufficiency of pastoral nomads, forced by circumstances to be both mobile and predatory ; but the pressure was only periodic, because the unrest and the consequent inroads were largely the direct or indirect result of prolonged drought, drying up the water-sources, parching the familiar pastures, and irritating human nerves by persistent exposure to very bright light.

But the real trouble to Europe, and its relation to the World expansion, were due largely to the fact that this periodic patriarchal pressure from the eastern steppes was supplemented and complicated by a permanent particularistic pressure from the western seas ; and the latter was predatory and mobile as well as permanent because in his fiord home the particularist was *always* on the verge of starvation.

Thus, early Europe was exposed to the danger of a double attack—from land raiders and sea raiders, the one patriarchal and the other particularist, but both threatening essentially from the outside, both predatory as well as mobile, and both really dangerous only because mobile as well as predatory. Naturally, when the periodic pressure supplemented the permanent, the danger was at a maximum ; but, whether particularists or patriarchalists, they were never either numerous or rich, and so the danger was less than it seemed, though their excessive mobility made them seem to be ubiquitous. They could over-run, but not overwhelm ; and in the end they proved an amazing stimulus, stimulating the self-assertion of each threatened people and the co-operation of all the threatened peoples, thus at once favouring nationalism and internationalism, especially where the pressure was permanent.

This was, of course, almost wholly in peninsular Europe ; and, as the permanent pressure was maritime, raiders and raided had much in common. This may help to account for the ease with which the Northmen conquered, even in the Mediterranean ; the conditions were at least markedly different from those where the Asiatic horseman met the European forester.

It was under such circumstances that the sense of nationality grew up amongst the Angles and Saxons of the United Heptarchy and amongst the Goths and Franks of Martel's France, whose foes included the Horsemen of the summer-drought south-east as well as the Seamen of the summer-rain north-west ; and both in England and in France the geographical conditions were very favourable. Both had marked natural boundaries, with an adequate minimum of fertile soil and a really temperate climate ; and inside each its people had much unity of experience and fair ease of intercourse, so that they had—and realised that they had—a certain identity of interest, as of speech, and were naturally disposed to take common action against common danger.

This is the essence of the problem. Each natural region has its own specific features, topographic and otherwise, its own *genius loci*, to which the human group corresponds naturally. This correspondence implies a certain unity of sentiment and outlook, which is the basis of the political coherence ; and, when this is not a mere veneer, but a conscious activity of the group, nothing can be more democratic, and few things are more necessary or more helpful for progress. And this sentiment, as the expression of real democracy, has always been stimulated by danger from outside the region and the group.

Similar results, therefore, as we have seen, followed the Great War ; and they were made easier and more certain in modern eastern Europe, as in medieval western Europe,

because the danger was obvious and at a maximum. In still earlier times there had been permanent pressure on southern Europe from the Levant, and the human type—like the geographical conditions of the Levant—was eminently suited to the distribution of *ideas*; for the conditions favoured easy intercourse between the three continents of the Old World, but did not favour dense population. There was considerable unity of environment, and this favoured similarity of development and outlook in a variety of types drawn from all three continents; and this variety seems to have been reflected in a marked versatility, though this was always being strained—especially in the bright light of the rainless and cloudless summer—into definite instability. Thus, location, mobility and intelligence (as specially the power of seeing relationships) gave these Levantines, in spite of their small numbers, great and widely-spread influence.

Amongst such a people, then, ideas were apt to be more honoured than conduct; and their pressure on Europe came in the form of ideas, not people. The ideas were indestructible, but—like the microscopic flora and fauna of disease—they were not obviously dangerous; and so they did not necessarily stimulate the sense of nationality. Besides, the Levantine, especially when he spoke Greek, as St. Paul did, was not obviously a “Barbarian.”

To Eastern Europe before the Great War the danger was both obvious and at a maximum, for the threat was from inside, not from outside,—from the core, not from the circumference; it was both by land and by sea; it was based on an immense accumulation of economic resources, with a unique mobility on interior lines. In earlier days this eastern belt, when not all included in a single strong power, such as Poland at its prime, had been almost negligible, because it was a scene of constant turmoil

between east and west ; and so it was socially backward, economically weak, strategically immobile.

Even when nationality had come into being, conditions kept the " national " groups apart, not because nationality in itself is a bad and anti-social influence, but because they were engrossed and overstrained in struggling to express and safeguard their existence, and so were not able to contribute their useful regional quota to the common good.

In any case, too, the contribution from this eastern belt was bound to be less clearly differentiated and less individualised than those from peninsular Europe. For the eastern belt is essentially transitional, with monotonous relief and no individuality of climate ; but the five great peninsulas are relatively isolated, and have considerable variety of relief. Indeed, their advantages in the way of varied relief are almost unique, and are emphasised by the variety of climate and location. The differences of relations, of relief, and of climate have naturally favoured differences of occupation and of products, of environment and of evolution, through which specific habits and customs have crystallised into social and political factors. Each peninsula, therefore, had a different and distinct contribution to make to the common good of Europe. That is the main reason why the originality of Europe is political.

✓ * * *

From the standpoint of Political Geography these five peninsulas may be called secondary or subsidiary, for they are grouped round an old axial peninsula of Asia, which is no longer obviously peninsular in configuration. They are, therefore, easily linked to, or even more easily separated from, one another across and by this axial peninsula.

A significant comment on the political relations involved is supplied by the boast attributed to Bismarck that he had separated Russia from both Austria and England, England from both Russia and France, France

from both England and Italy, and Italy from both France and Austria, and that *therefore* Germany was safe and dominant. *Divide et impera!*

If there is any truth whatever in this canard, judgment on the unattractive picture presented by it must be suspended until we have studied the other side of it—the influence of the underlying geographical conditions throughout the centuries in making Germany relatively incoherent and impotent. For instance, only in a central area would we have expected to find such a mixture of racial elements—German, Prussian, Wend, Lett, Finn, Polish, Dutch, Scandinavian, etc.—or such intrusion of foreign control, with many of the 300–400, heterogeneous political units ruled or directly influenced by foreigners or the nominees of foreigners, especially Papal and Russian. This control was not unbroken, and the units concerned, especially the Papal, were mainly small; but they were widely scattered, and the larger areas did not become really German simply because brought inside the political frontier of Germany. In any case, for far more than a millennium after Christ this frontier was not effectively east of the Elbe; that is to say, it had not one-third of the longitudinal extension of Germany in 1913—from 6° E. to 24° E.

It was largely through this foreign influence that Germany came to be associated with so many aspects of European affairs; but it was perhaps natural that, when political unity was at length imposed upon her peoples, they should come to think of her as “the pivot and inspirer of European thought” (a perfectly appropriate rôle for a core land),—to forget that the foreigners had been her rulers, not her subjects,—and to advance some very pretentious claims, “racial” and political. At the same time, in her happiest epochs and in the areas most open to cultured outside influences—Norse, Roman, Atlantic—she had produced some lovable types of Man, able to absorb and to

reflect these influences and to repay the debt by some remarkable contributions to the comity and the culture of Old Europe.

We may leave any detailed analysis of this German region in the meantime, but must press at once two points suggested by this preliminary survey—the particular character of the historic development of Peninsular Europe and the geographic relation of that to the world.

In the history of Peninsular Europe, especially in western Europe, there has been a connected story of a—mainly “Latin”—central authority in each national unit, and the almost inevitable sequel to this has been a clear distinction between Home and Foreign affairs. But in the history of Central Europe there has been no real permanent nucleus, and so no connected story, and therefore no clear distinction between Home and Foreign affairs. So long as German history meant little more than the relations of Prussia and Austria, it was impossible to distinguish between internal and external troubles, and the “external” was more important than the strictly “internal.” That, of course, favoured the growth of petty parochialism in the internal affairs, especially in Prussia, and divorced them entirely from their proper relation to external affairs; and this, in turn, no doubt encouraged the growth of a great contempt for small internal units in modern Germany. But the small national States of modern Europe, *e.g.* Belgium and Servia, have had nothing in common with the “comic opera” States of old North Germany.

The other point is that there is only one real unit in geography—the Globe; and that is why all geographical teaching which is not based primarily and organically on the Globe, is relatively futile, or at least infertile. But, if the Globe is the one great unit, we are committed to a world attitude in our study of regions. The present

condition of the Globe, as the home of Man, is the result of the interaction, during countless ages, of innumerable natural forces, features, and phenomena, distributed over the individual fractions of the composite whole. We must study, therefore, the specific phenomena of each fraction and the interactions of all the fractions, and then must try to co-ordinate the values of all the types in working-models so as to find out the relation of Man to the Earth.

Indeed, if Man's existence and condition depend on that relation, his progress depends on full understanding of the relation ; and he must study the best model working under the best conditions. But each group is related to its own particular region, its own complex of structure and relief, location and climate, flora and fauna ; and this region must be sufficiently small to be comprehensible—for him to be able to study it easily, and understand it at first-hand. Then wider and sounder knowledge of the particular, the Region, will give wider and sounder knowledge of the general, the Earth, of which the particular region is a part.

Thus each region should contribute something special to help Man in his effort to come, *via* the particular (Region), into proper touch with the general (Earth), both in material or economic and non-material or spiritual development. And one of the few compensations for the urbanisation of the world is that cities are probably the best junctions for interchange between regions.

When we ask what has been the specific contribution of any region, we have to consider the non-human situation and the human decision ; and we may venture at least so far as to say that, if Nature's question had been different, Man's answer would also have been different. But, if we deny any direct influence, we must at least recognise a remarkable series of coincidences.

The first of these in the case of Peninsular Europe

would be that the theory and practice of centralisation, at once the crown and the curse of Latin politics, came to us from the central peninsula of the oldest Europe. Italy was the main source, or the great medium, or the radiating centre of our social heritage of civilisation, as the art of living together ; and Rome is everywhere in our political evolution. Those parts of the continent which were non-Roman (*e.g.* what we call Prussia), or only semi-Roman (*e.g.* what we call Russia), suffered greatly. For instance, the one did not become Christian till Christianity had lost its early purity and simplicity, and become political ; the other received Christianity in a debased Byzantine form.

Scandinavia is obviously the least central of the five great peninsulas, for its actual land link with the continent is almost wholly within the Arctic Circle, and it has no natural centre of its own. In the isolated and incoherent area, too, relief and climate have made life very hard ; men have been forced to fight for their own hands. It is, therefore, a supremely suitable area to have given Europe its creeds of individualism—based on fiord life. Ibsen's imagination and his characters—if also as profound—are as narrow as a fiord, where “ you have to lie on your back to see the blue sky,” and even then it is not blue.

The same sort of “ coincidence ” meets us everywhere. We shall see presently how the Balkan peninsula was the channel of inflow for men and ideas from the Oldest World into primeval, primitive, and medieval Europe—so that Judæa is behind all our religious, as Greece is behind all our intellectual, activities ; and how in modern Europe the Iberian peninsula became the first natural channel of outflow for men and ideas over a whole New World.

Throughout, at the back of our minds, we must have the consciousness of peninsularity as meaning particularity and individuality, as stressing shape and form, as being indifferent to area and bulk. It is incredible that people

reared in the articulated peninsula of Greece should not have more sense of form (*e.g.* in language and art) than those reared on the endless leagues of the continental platform of Russia. It is surely credible that, if we can find a peninsula well-defined and with land and sea elements in equilibrium, we should find in it an almost ideal miniature of Europe, a great state, a great nation, a great world centre in history and in contemporary life. That is one reason why we begin our studies with France.

But there is another reason, and it is one which has determined the whole character of these chapters, especially those on the Hellenic area. We wish to exclude from our purview any and all areas which, even if they *look* more peninsular than France, and are constantly spoken of as peninsulas, are not peninsular in essence or genius. Mentality, if it reflects environment at all, reflects its essentials, not its accidents. The racial legacy may show different aspects of itself under the provocation or the prohibition of different environments; and peninsularity, if effective, will bring out special responses. No part of Europe that is not sufficiently conscious of peninsularity to have anything essential in common with the other peninsulas, should be recognised as peninsular; and this is specially important when the particular area is not even conscious of being European. When Yugoslav or Bulgar people who are able and desire to "travel," can speak of going to *Europe* when they are actually going to Paris or even to Vienna, it is time to stop calling them truly European; and, if they are not truly European, still less can they be peninsular. Relationships which are too narrow are as dangerous or as futile as those which are too wide; and, in any case, it is towards the too wide, the abstract Internationalism, that modern thought is tending.

CHAPTER II

FRANCE

PEASANT AND PAYS

EARLY Man was specially prosperous and progressive in latitudes where the winter day was fairly long, and where the summer day was not excessively hot, conditions found, *e.g.* in the Mediterranean latitudes of western Europe and in the "temperate monsoon" latitudes of eastern Asia. The two regions are alike in having their climatic year divided into two marked seasons, one wet and the other dry; but in the one case the wet season is associated with high temperatures, in the other with low temperatures. In the one region, therefore, extreme temperatures are associated with the dry winter, which makes the conditions of human life healthy but hard, whilst the combination of heat and moisture in summer compels—and rewards—continuous labour under conditions that are still hard, but without being healthy.

All this is, of course, reversed in Mediterranean latitudes, where the extreme temperatures are associated with the dry summer, and where the wet winter is warm enough to favour vegetation, but too moist to be bracing for Man. Here, however, the dry season is "workless"—sufficiently so for him to have leisure, one of the fundamental conditions of Art. The other condition is energy, which is more likely to be associated with a bracing than with a soft climate; but at least northern intruders into the Mediterranean lands, bringing energy with them, would be

immensely stimulated by the bright light of the "leisure" season. Naturally, there would be a danger of *over-stimulation*, involving collapse for those who could not escape from it, and possibly its effect would follow refugees from the Mediterranean basin, and show itself in typical "hysteria"—even as far as Wales and Ireland; and in such a region we may almost expect to find a story of rise and fall in the history of both Man and his Art which could not be paralleled from, *e.g.*, Chinese Asia.

Both regions were probably peopled from the great mid-world belt through which they are now linked, or separated, by two zones of historic nomadism—the relatively infertile steppes to the north, where the nomads travelled by day, and the actually barren deserts in the south, where they travelled by night, star-guided to the various little Bethlehems of their daily work. Both types, when they moved *en masse*, moved naturally towards water, *i.e.* towards the great source of rain in the Atlantic; and as they approached the ocean coast, they were forced to converge, in person or in influence, on the narrowest isthmus that crosses Europe between the northern and the southern seas, thus linking lands of summer-rain and summer-drought, forest and orchard.


Probably the best name for this belt, with all that it has meant for Europe, and especially for France, is the Lotharingian Corridor. It is not a single master valley, any more than the Appalachian Valley or the Californian Valley is, but a series of valleys, lying north-and-south and leading from lands of seasonal leisure and luscious fruit (where life was easy for adults) to lands of constant labour and abundant milk (where life was easy for children). These valleys—of Rhone and Saône, Moselle and Meuse, Scheldt and Rhine—became the natural frontier between Roman and non-Roman Europe, between wine-drinkers who collected round a forum, and spirit-drinkers scattered

through a forest ; and the entrances and the exits came to be of immense importance. The Partition of Verdun gave all of them to the Kingdom of Lothair, the vital gates of Modern History being all in Lotharingia, though even the Burgundy Gate was relatively unimportant in early days because it was an entrance only for people, not for ideas. It was the Arles or Provençal Gate, masquerading then as Burgundian, *i.e.* as materialistic,¹ that was at once a window of outlook and a door of inlet. It was through this gate that, from the days of the Phœnicians and Phocœans onwards, priceless influences worked their way northwards, especially after Rome had hacked her way through the Burgundian forest ; and in the passage, as in the Hudson valley, the diverse elements were blended into something like unity, and so emerged as a single influence at the farther end. Thus there came into North-Western Europe the Classic Tradition ; and France had to absorb the science and art, the reason and discipline, the religion and philosophy, before she could distribute them. Her facilities for distribution depended on her location : exactly where is France ?

POSITION

The first answer to the question should be the obvious answer, for it is the obvious and indisputable rather than the obscure and debatable that is usually ignored or underrated ; and the obvious facts about the location of France are of world significance. Half the surface of the earth is covered with the Pacific Ocean, and the centre of the other half is in the London-Paris basin ; France south of that basin lies across the central parallel of the Northern Hemisphere. Climatically at least, if in no other way, such facts must have significance ; and therefore they are worth emphasising, however obvious they may be.

¹ St. Bernard and Bossuet, though both of Dijon by birth, lived and worked in the Paris basin.



Vienne marks the northern limit of summer-drought, and was an *Ultima Thule* for exiled Romans, including—according to Eusebius—Pontius Pilate.

On this parallel one of the six great ports of France looks across the narrowest ocean in the world from the edge of the most advanced continent in the world ; and Bordeaux has played its part as a gateway between that continent and that ocean. Cf. p. 55.

On the same parallel in the Rhone funnel, Valence was an intellectual centre 2,000 years ago, which made it an admirable site for the Colony of Augustus near the most northerly confluence in summer-drought France ; and it was precisely the Mediterranean climate that was most favourable to this Roman base for the conquest of Gaul. But this summer-drought valley is only part of the great Lotharingian Corridor, which spans Europe from north to south ; and so France has been in direct touch with both core and margin, continental and peninsular Europe, and has had more opportunities than any other country for sharing the common experiences of Europe. This should have helped her to see things as they really were, as it helped her to collect within her boundaries a full representation of the three great racial types of Europe ; and this, again, should have helped her to form sound judgments of Nordic or Mediterranean or Alpine problems elsewhere, and to give her own speech to Europe as an appropriate *lingua franca*. It is also the geographical key to the different destinies "over seas" of France and England ; for France always thought, and had to think, first of her European position and relations, whereas England—especially after the loss of her "New England" territories—had no such pre-occupation, and could concentrate all her attention and energy on the immediate problem, e.g. in Canada or India.

SURROUNDINGS

Shape is a factor often neglected in geographical analysis, especially by political geographers ; but it is precisely

in political geography that it seems to deserve most attention. The importance of the Nile in Egypt, of Roman roads in peninsular Italy, of the Rhone valley in France, may be directly associated with the shape of the containing unit; and it may even be admitted that in such lands of "length without breadth" the problem is obvious. But the influence of shape may be vital in areas where the problem is not so obvious, and France is one of such areas.

For France is a peninsula—not because considerable sections of it are obviously peninsular, *e.g.* the Provençal, Breton, and Cotentin peninsulas, but because more than half its total frontier is sea, because the unit as a whole is peninsular. This peculiarity, indeed, underlies its significance to Europe; for the Europe that is really European is, in essence as well as in form, peninsular. It is also a separate continent as well as an appendage of Asia; and no component part that is not itself typically and normally peninsular could appropriately represent the continent as a whole. At various times and under varied circumstances the Greek, the Italian, the Iberian, the Scandinavian peninsulas have appropriately represented and spoken for Europe; this has never been possible for Germany, still less for Russia. For centuries the countries of Europe spoke their own native languages and Latin; so, for centuries they have spoken their own languages and French.

In each case the second language has been obviously the language of Europe as a continent, and in each case it has been a peninsular language; in each case, too, the *lingua franca* could spread widely only in proportion to its success in getting rid of every form or function that was not clear, not logical, not appropriate. To-day even in commerce the language of such an uncommercial country as Spain is probably more useful outside Europe than that of such an important commercial country as

Germany ; and inside Europe to-day French is the most important language politically, and France is politically the best representative of Europe to the world. She is even the best representative climatically. One half of the continent has its typical rains in the winter 6-months, and the other half in the summer 6-months ; the 50-per-cent. line runs through France. So far as rainfall is concerned, Paris is *less* continental than London—with only 28 per cent. of its annual rainfall in the summer 3-months.

Obviously, a peninsula must be terminal, and France is terminal in a double sense, between continent and ocean and between continent and continent. Iberia was greatly favoured by its wind-system for exploring the Atlantic, with N.E. Trades outwards in summer and S.W. Anti-Trades homewards in winter ; but it was neither a starting-point nor a goal for Europe, neither a *dépôt* nor a gateway between the ocean and the continent as a whole. Structurally and climatically Africa begins at the Pyrenees, and the Pyrenees isolate Iberia from Europe. So France has been terminal in a double sense.

Apart, too, from a shape that gives her special facilities for commercial access to sea routes north-westward and north-eastward, south-westward and south-eastward, she has had a political asset in the character of her seas. The choppy Channel, the stormy Bay of Biscay, the Gulf of “Roaring Lions,” have again and again been a natural defence ; not only so, but seas of such a character off a coast poor in harbours and rather poor in fish were favourable to the development of a fine type of seaman. Except in the extreme north-east the seas were not rich enough in fish to tempt the people out to fish, as we were tempted ; and except in the extreme north-west the land was so fertile that they were not forced out, as the Norsemen were. The result was that many of those who took to the

sea, did so as adventurers ; up till the Revolution, indeed, the navy was the aristocratic service, officered by men who had chosen the sea, as their ancestors for generations had chosen it, from love of it. This throws some light on the differences between the type of officer who fought against Hawke, and the type that fought against Nelson, and perhaps on the absence from France of any "Hanseatic" trade-unions. These men paddled their own canoes.

But what about the rank and file ? Here, too, France was favoured, for after as well as before the Revolution these were men from the great peninsulas of France, the Provençal, Breton and Cotentin peoples, bred to the sea for centuries. For these salients had, from the earliest times, attracted seafarers—Phœnicians, Greeks, Vikings ; and the environment had only deepened the original aptitudes. These natural seamen and their salients justified the decision of France to fight Spain for the trade of the New World in the 17th century, and then to fight England for the sea-power of the whole world in the 18th.

Further, the importance of this sea frontier was even emphasised by the character of long stretches of the land frontier, which saved them from some of the disadvantages of land frontiers. For most of the land frontier is mountainous, and the ranges at once isolate and protect, protecting both by the difficulty of access and by the type of frontiersman they breed. And this valuable type has been more widely spread than at first sight one might expect, for there is a considerable amount of poor land just "inside" the frontier ; and while the actual mountain-line made a natural defence, the barren inner belt tended to consolidate a nation by flinging the population inwards—from where life was hard to where it was easier, easier very largely because nearer to the climatic and other advantages of the ocean. In modern times, too, when the mechanical base has been the essential condition of warfare, this old

barren rock in the most critical part of the eastern frontier has been found rich in iron-ore and salt, and its agricultural poverty has encouraged its industrialisation.

Lorraine gives a good illustration of nearly all these points, especially for those who prefer such a mountain frontier as the Vosges to such a river frontier as the Rhine ; but in discussing its geography as a frontier land we must not forget its history as a passage land. For both Lorraine and Alsace were sections of the Corridor which linked Rome and the Roman with Aix and the Holy Roman, and which—as we have seen—was a series of valleys, with a series of small states, “ free ” cities, bishoprics, all sharing a certain unity of religious sentiment and of intellectual culture and a similar experience as passage lands between south and north. They were also frontier lands between western or Roman and central or non-Roman Europe, and by their various “ Gates ” were bound to become passage lands also between east and west ; and so presently they became great cross-roads between north and south, east and west. This made them unsuitable for independence as political units ; and, as the north-and-south passage became less important, the frontier position became more important. This was specially true of Lorraine, with its difficult soil and widespread forest ; for it was not easily brought under the control even of a great neighbour, such as Burgundy, that had easy access. France, too, had fairly easy access, but from the east access was very difficult ; and even Charles the Bold failed—and met his death—in his attempt to link up his Rhine lands and his Rhone lands across Lorraine.

Under these circumstances, the accepted “ connexion ” between Lorraine and Alsace perhaps deserves some attention. As a matter of fact, they turn their backs on each other geographically, Lorraine being an annex of the Paris basin. In his sheltered garden, too, between

the forested Vosges and the scarcely navigable Rhine, the vivacious Alsatian had little in common with the stolid Lorraine farmer even before the latter was industrialised ; and the spinners of the humid Alsatian valleys are not necessarily dependent on the weavers by the running streams of Lorraine. And yet the connexion is as fundamental as it is ancient. Both received the basis of their civilisation from Rome, with Rome in her frontier attitude ; both were vital parts of the Corridor, with its freedoms and franchises ; both imbibed the civilisation of France while she was centuries ahead of Central Europe and its Holy Roman Empire ; both learned the more or less legitimate devices of the frontier and the thoroughfare. When Germany began to be civilised, and her influence spread westward, Alsace was the more influenced by the double culture, but she was nearer to the princelings and the prelates beyond the Rhine ; and when these were of Hohenzollern type, they were not attractive. So long, then, as their religious and regional liberties were safe, even the Alsatians " fought in French."

Napoleon might have added that, in spite of their speech, they were more typically French in character than many other units of France ; and this curious phenomenon may, perhaps, be associated with the frontier environment. For the character of a people is often affected by proximity to a frontier. In the natural development of independence, suspicious reserve, foresight, willingness to take responsibility, and such other virtues as are essential to successful survival on a frontier, the essential elements in the national character come out in their full value and significance ; and national character can probably be judged best as seen along a far-flung frontier. Unfortunately, of course, the less urbane traits are likely to be exasperated along disturbed or dangerous frontiers. Did the early rulers of Hohenzollern catch nothing from living in the most

important angle of the Roman frontier in Europe—where Rome was most military? Are not the personal independence, the suspicious reserve, the little economies of the Lorrainer simply essentials of the French character slightly exasperated by frontier experience?

Under such circumstances how can we venture to speak of any generalised “French” character? The answer to this, so far as geography is concerned, must be that in one vital detail of physique France is not typically peninsular; and that detail is the relief. For the typical peninsula, as we have already seen (*cf.* p. 12), is a semi-submerged highland, especially a mountain range; and this tends to be straggling even to incoherence, as in Greece and Malaya, or to have a very distinct spine, as in Italy and Korea. In such an area all the normal human activities are almost certain to be diverted by a water-parting into two opposite directions, and population becomes marginal—along two margins separated by the highland backbone. There may be, therefore, external isolation; but there can scarcely be internal unity.

But France is neither straggling nor incoherent, and yet is peninsular. It is, therefore, clearly and securely demarked; but its relief is favourable to unity, and its size is sufficient for strength and not too great for coherence. It was an area in which the Roman heritage was easily preserved,—in which the House of Capet was for 300 years free from outside interference,—and in which, therefore, there was leisure to develop the unity that the relief favoured. It made a natural home for a nation, but for only one nation; it allowed that nation to reach unity with relative ease, and so to mature early; and centuries of unity gave an epitome of world experience—of Rome, of Feudalism good and bad, of dynastic tyranny, of the strife of creeds. This is a great source of strength.

One question should, however, be asked. If the geo-

graphical circumstances of this land favoured the development within it of a single, strong, united people, forming both a great state and a great nation, where do the favourable conditions end? In other words, how far are the frontiers of France "natural"?

The answer to this question depends, of course, on what you mean by "natural," and what functions you expect a frontier to fulfil; and there can be little doubt that the 2,500 miles of the French frontier that are composed of sea-coast and young folded mountains made natural limits within which the French people in all essentials, as we know them politically and historically, did actually evolve. If you could remove one section of that frontier, *e.g.* substitute the Cevennes-Côte d'Or for the Alps-Jura line, you would have a markedly different people—entirely devoid of the direct Provençal element. And, if we press the word "natural" in this way, and press it in connexion with the word "limits," we are indifferent to what foreigners live beyond the seas or the young folds. We are thinking nationally, not internationally. If we are thinking, however, of the association of a political frontier with a geographical feature, we must think also of the people beyond that line. For the appropriate position for a frontier is along a line which divides peoples of markedly different types, differing especially in race and tradition; and it is of vital importance that the character of the line should help, and not hinder, friendly intercourse between such types. If it hinders such intercourse, it encourages the military attitude towards frontiers, the delusion that a frontier should primarily defend, and even be strengthened to make it a better defence, *i.e.* should keep the peoples apart.

This is the fundamental objection to mountain frontiers. We may admit that mountain limits have been historically of immense importance, perhaps essential to the security

on which survival depends, and have even favoured differentiation into natural types; they prevented intrusion, and so helped to concentrate attention on the full use of all resources inside them and to produce the inbreeding that tends towards a marked physical type and a marked group-consciousness. The point needs no illustration.

But we have grown out of the old conditions—or ought to act as though we had. We may be able to effect equilibrium along a frontier without assuming that no nation to-day will intentionally push its ascendancy across frontiers by any means, fair or foul. But the feature used as a frontier must suggest peace, not war—development, not defence; and we would rule out uninhabitable areas, whether mountainous or not, as only minimising chances of friction instead of multiplying friendly contacts. On the other hand, of course, mountains are beginning to be very clearly associated with development—based on hydro-electric power; and this has knocked the bottom out of the military theory, for to use a range as a frontier now will only mean placing the source of power under the immediate supervision and within easy reach of a possible enemy!

What geographical “line,” then—apart from a coast-line—is most calculated to multiply friendly contacts? Obviously, a navigable river—the most universal and the most important land-line along which peoples of all latitudes tend to meet naturally in peace, and at the same time most obvious, quite indisputable, and costing nothing to delimit. Along such a line the most discordant and most uncongenial elements will have normally a *maximum*—however small—tendency to concord and peaceful intercourse; it is the best possible feature for a political frontier except a sea-coast, which is a better defence than most mountain systems and a better medium of intercourse

than the flattest plain. Nearly 60 per cent. of the French frontier is sea-coast, and to the north and the south the seas are the most important in Europe. What of the land frontiers ?

Here at once we must distinguish between the sections represented by the young folds and those represented by the old blocks. From the Basque to the Burgundy Gate the line, whether crest or coast, must be considered satisfactory from the standpoint of geography—physical and economic, historic and political. For instance, the narrow Pyrenean isthmus between the Atlantic and the Mediterranean is occupied by parallel lines of sierra—geographically parallel if geologically in series, not in parallel—which make it naturally the least accessible mountain system in Europe. The history of Navarre¹ or Roussillon shows that the barrier has not been quite insurmountable ; but the length (nearly 300 miles) of the system, its breadth (40–80 miles), the extreme narrowness of the terminal lowlands, the great average height—so typical of sierras—with even the Roncevaux col over 3,000 feet and the Perche over 5,000, have made it a real differentiating barrier, dividing distinct types of state and nation, as of relief and climate. The only natural route across it—by the Têt and the Segre valleys—was too circuitous and too difficult to break down the essential barrier ; and the two tunnels recently cut, however direct, are equally harmless from the strategic point of view. Further, from the historic standpoint, such a frontier could only be regarded as military, and its defensive value to France was increased by the very inhospitable character of the Languedoc and the Landes coasts.

The Alps, if more accessible than the Pyrenees, are only

¹ When the ancient county of Navarre was made into a kingdom (858 A.D.), it included some lands on the French side of the water-parting ; and when Castile seized the kingdom (1512 A.D.), the king retained the French drainage, but retired to Pau, the capital of Béarn.

so from the French side ; and Mt. Blanc is in France. On the Italian side the passes converge down a precipitous slope ; and this means that French armies have had a series of routes for invading Italy, all bringing them nearer to one another as they got nearer to their exit from the mountains. Conversely, Italian armies must get farther apart as they get farther from their base. On the French side, too, there is a sequence of longitudinal valleys, forming a sub-Alpine depression between the Alps and the Pre-Alps and giving an almost continuous route of no real difficulty parallel with the Rhone valley ; and from this route other valleys strike off transversely to the heart of the Alps, mainly along the upper valleys of the rivers whose middle valleys form the longitudinal route, especially the Isère and the Durance. The economic value of this route may be illustrated by the old—otherwise inappropriate—occupation of horse-breeding round Annecy and the ease of collecting skins for a glove industry at Grenoble. This great Alpine wall divides France from Italy and Switzerland for nearly 200 miles ; even inside the French frontier it is never less than 60 miles wide, and in places it is twice 60, and its fall in height southward is compensated by almost chaotic relief.

Near Chartreuse the Pre-Alps divide, and the western range expands into the Jura. Here, again, the relief greatly favours France. Along the west are the hills of the “ Vineyard,” from which the “ Plateau ” rises eastward in tiers to the “ Mountain,” with its precipitous descent to the Swiss plain. The poor soil of the flattened folds of the Plateau and the severe climate made this annexe of the Alps a real barrier, though the height is seldom over 5,500 feet, and though the narrowness (30 miles) has allowed railways to be constructed across it—at great expense—by transverse valleys deepened by ancient Alpine glaciers.

To this Alpine (Alps-Jura) frontier. as to the Pyrenean,

there is really no alternative, nor is there any need for an alternative. The suggestion that the Massif Central (Cevennes-Côte d'Or) scarp might have made a good line is about as valuable as some of the "perfect" map-projections that have been devised by mathematicians. It ignores both the Carcassonne Gate, the oldest entrance from the Mediterranean not only into France, but into north-west Europe, and the very close connexion between the Loire and the Rhone valleys, especially by the Furens-Gier (St. Etienne) and the Dhence-Bourbince (Creusot) routes; even in 1,000 A.D. the Kingdom of Burgundy held the Forez plain, and the Charblais canal to-day is significantly called the *Central* Canal. A Cevennes-Côte d'Or frontier would break up the most natural political unit in Continental Europe. Cf. pp. 37 and 68.

The perfect and perpetual neutrality of Switzerland minimises the protective value of the Jura to France, but immensely increases the political importance of the Burgundy Gate; and with that gate the real problems of the French frontier begin. The gate itself is much less important than it was in the centuries when Huns and Goths, Alamans and Vandals, were pouring southward through it; it is less important than when the relations of Saône and Danube, of France and Austria, were more vital than those of Seine and Rhine, of France and Prussia. And this loss of importance as the great *central* line of exit and entrance on the corridor between the North Sea and the Mediterranean is rather suggested by the recent tendency to call it the "Belfort" instead of the "Burgundy" Gate. This strikes a wrong, if not actually a false, note. No doubt, it is due to the fact that the tiny Belfort Territory was the only part of Haut-Rhin left to France by the Treaty of Frankfort, and left simply as a tribute to the very gallant and successful defence of the fortress in 1870-71; but the place has not a tithe of the

historic interest and importance of Besançon—the Roman Vesontio, Colonia Victrix Sequanorum under Marcus Aurelius—and to substitute the name of a fortress that has been of relatively little importance even in the last 200 years for that of a thoroughfare famous for 2,000 years shows a lack of the sense of proportion. How the French, themselves the chief offenders, would smile at any one who systematically spoke of the Moravian Gate as the Brunn Gate !

Of course, to-day the new Belfort fortress at the foot of the old Vosges block is much more important than the old Besançon fortress at the foot of the young Jura folds ; for we have left the line of towering young folds, with their relatively simple problems, for the line of wasted old blocks with some very intricate problems. Ages of weathering have worn them down, reducing them in height and length and breadth ; the intervening gaps have been widened and levelled up ; and the association of mineral wealth with the old rock has introduced fresh complications. The gaps, too, give access more or less direct to some of the most fertile areas in France ; and the total result has been to focus the great wealth of the country here within easy striking-distance of the frontier. This has proved an irresistible lure to the greedy and aggressive Prussian, though his experts were profoundly mistaken in advising him that the Treaty of Frankfort gave him “ the totality of the ferruginous deposits ”—of Lorraine.

It is to these same “ gates of ingression and aggression ” that France owes, from the geographical standpoint, some part of her most typical social development. For through them, especially in the 9th and 10th centuries, came raid after raid of barbarians, who swept over and decimated the fertile lowlands of the Paris basin. Those of the inhabitants who escaped took refuge on moor and mountain, in fen and forest—in groups so tiny and incoherent that only

one focus of cohesion and survival remained, the Family. Two centuries with this as the core and the controller of all the social life left it imprinted for ever on France ; in the *mesine* the seigneur had only a large family, in the fief the baron had a larger, and in the realm the king himself was still *pater familias*. Thus geographical accident and circumstance revived and crystallised, in a largely Latin people, the essence of the Roman outlook ; the virtues of imperial France—*gravitas*, *pietas*, *simplicitas*, *i.e.* clear thinking, especially about duty and responsibility—are, like those of imperial Rome, the virtues learnt round the hearth and in the home-tract. Cf. p. 71.


But, before paying further attention to any such details, we may make one general statement about this north-eastern, or “ old block,” section of the frontier. The Paris basin is much the largest and the richest natural region in France, and much the most representative of the country as a whole ; but its name was decided less by political accident than by geographical necessity. And we may claim that any and every area which in structure and physical history belongs to that basin, should be linked with it politically. It is even possible that in one case the same claims may be based on political history and close similarity of relief, though associated with differences of physical history and structure. And there are two reasons for such a suggestion, one connected with the Meuse and the other with the Rhine.

The Meuse is the only geographical feature in the region that is “ ideally ” suited for a political frontier. It is a lonely line of waterway (navigable from above Verdun), robbed of all its tributaries by Marne and Moselle, and so divorced from its natural relations westward and eastward. This should make it in itself an ideal frontier feature, and the importance of the route may be suggested by the history of Verdun and Sedan (the birthplace of Turenne) ;

but the waterway in France is a poor one, and the Paris basin extends far to the east of it.

The Rhine is less suitable for a frontier than the Meuse only because it has important tributaries, drawn from east and west ; but its great importance as a commercial route far more than compensates for this, and its status now as an International waterway makes it wholly suitable, especially as so-called progress in the art and science of war has made it of little real military value. In the days when the Romans carried their roads to Strasbourg and Mainz, a river at least 100 yards wide and with a minimum depth of 3 feet even between Strasbourg and Bâle, unbridged and unused for commerce, made an ideal frontier—for soldiers whose heaviest “artillery” could not carry more than *c.* 400 yards, even with only a 1-cwt. “charge” ; and so the Roman bank inherited a belief in the rôle of the river as a “Romance” frontier. Because it had been at once a natural defence and an indisputable line needing no demarcation, it tended to become an ethnic frontier in sentiment, though not in fact. Lothair retained, with the imperial title from the east, the “French” bank in the west ; in the Duchy of Lorraine the post-Reformation acquisition of the sees of Metz, Toul, and Verdun, made people of alien race and alien speech into devoted citizens of France ; in Alsace the barefaced robberies of Louis XIV, while they did not change the speech or the creed of Protestants descended from the bitterest enemies of Rome, left the Alsatians willing to “fight in French.” Much must be credited to the attractive personality of Old France, but something to the physical and historical geography. Such “natural” behaviour, especially when it seems at first so unnatural, surely reveals the response of instinct and heritage to environment.

The dominance of this sentiment may be referred partly to the marked naturalness of France as a political



THE EAST OF THE PARIS BASIN.

unit, and it was this unity that forbade even the Burgundy section of Lothair's kingdom to persist as an independent unit. The clear individuality of parts of the Corridor, especially Burgundy, did raise political difficulties, even in such "external" details as the passage of Spanish troops northwards; but it did not justify independence, still less make it possible. The shape of both the Middle Rhine and the Middle Rhone valleys, and their physical relations westward, were entirely adverse to either of them forming a stable political unit.

As to the suggestion that, if the Rhine is a frontier from Bâle to Strasbourg, it must be also from Strasbourg to the sea, one might as well suggest that, as it is a frontier between Schaffhausen and Bâle, it must be also from Bâle to Strasbourg; and there is no more—or no less—justification for the lower "basin" of the river being partitioned from south to north than from east to west. Indeed, the historic environment in Alsace included—and still includes in spite of the embanking of the river—a belt of riverine swamp, which made a hostile crossing even in these shallow reaches almost impossible; and this frontier marsh isolated Alsace from Baden and the rest of South Germany, and was a real defence to the Burgundy Gate, while the belt of dry gravel to westward—which carried the Roman road from Besançon to Strasbourg—ensured easy communication within the protecting swamp. After all, Strasbourg is on the Ill, and its *genius loci* is akin to that of the Paris basin, for it is the extreme eastward home of pure Gothic architecture.

Further, if one visualises the essential France, one can scarcely suggest that the north-eastern frontier should diverge from symmetry with the concentric Côtes of the Paris basin. Nancy marks the extreme eastward bulge of the Côtes de Moselle, and it is in the same latitude that the Rhine takes a distinct north-eastward

trend. Indeed, one would—for that reason—prefer the Zorn to the Lauter as the line of the French frontier here, and from the Col de Saverne it should run almost due north-west to the neighbourhood of Sedan, keeping always below, *i.e.* south-west of, the 1,000-foot contour. Extension north-eastward would only mean the inclusion of land less and less conformable with the Paris basin and with the peninsular personality of France. To be convinced of this one has only to consider the size, position, and relief of the Ardennes—the strategic and economic antagonism between the north-eastward trend of the Middle Rhine and the north-westward trend of the Lower Rhine—the history of such foci as Sedan and Metz, even when capitals of independent principalities, which itself suggests that they do mark effectively the natural meeting-place of more or less separate national types.

North-westward from Sedan any frontier would be satisfactory that included all the cretaceous country in France, and that came to the sea—as the actual frontier does—where the midwinter isotherm of 36° F. cuts the midsummer isotherm of 63° F. The fundamental idea of France as a peninsula, which would obviously be impaired by any extension of frontier up on to the Ardennes or the Eifel, is obviously confirmed by such non-continental temperatures, as also by the “maritime” length of spring and autumn.

There are, of course, interesting historic events behind the vagaries of all this north-eastern frontier; and some of its features have a strategic value very different from what a casual glance would suggest. For instance, the flattest and most open stretch is occupied by the swampy lowland of Flanders, where water can neither run through the sticky clay nor run off the dead level, and where the thick *bocage* offered endless cover. On the contrary, the

absurd detour of the frontier down the Meuse valley below Mézières is a trap only to France, not to her foes.

Along the whole of this section of the frontier, however, there is no alternative to the general line actually adopted ; and even in the extreme east no plausible case can be made out for any alternative to the Rhine between the Burgundy Gate and the Col de Saverne, for the Vosges massif would be the type of feature which actually fosters ideas of war. But it is unsuitable quite apart from this. For, though it differs totally from the scarplands of the Paris basin in structure and physical history, it resembles them closely in arrangement and relief. It has the same relatively gentle slope inward and Paris-ward, and the same steep face outward and foeward. Rising eastward in rolling terraces to parallel lines of crystalline crests, concentric with the Marne-Meurthe section of the Côtes de Moselle, it is—though not actually reaching 5,000 feet—high enough to be drenched with rain and crowned with long-lingering snow ; and so it is covered with fine forest, except on the highest levels, and associated with a School of Forestry at Nancy. From the west there is easy penetration to the heart of the massif and up to the pastoral summits, while the deep and dangerous glens of the eastern face form natural refuges ; and to them in 1871 thousands of German-speaking Alsatians retreated because they were not prepared to live under the German flag.

These industrious and virile people at once began to develop the abundant water-power and the spruce forests—in cotton and paper industries ; and to-day the density of population is well above the normal for France—a conspicuous exception to the rule that highland areas in Europe are being depopulated. A large percentage of the people are the descendants of the Alsatian refugees, and their busy industrial centres—like the great iron-field below them—are entirely dominated by the crest of the

massif. Even before the War, in the face of all kinds of opposition and disabilities, the French tongue had worked right across the water-parting, and there were pockets of it along the whole line, representing from c. 25 to c. 65 per cent. of the total population. Under such circumstances, however much one preferred a line where men do *not* naturally meet in peaceful intercourse, one could not adopt the crest of the Vosges as a frontier.

Unfortunately, the relative "weakness" of this north-eastern frontier, its nearness to Paris, and the racial characteristics of the Prussian, exposed the lands just within it to terrible devastation in the Great War; and then lack of native labour—due partly to the steady decline of the French population and partly to the appalling losses in the war—necessitated the importation of foreign labour, at the rate of fully 200,000 persons a year, for two or three years. The result is seen in solid segregated blocks of aliens, especially Poles, *e.g.* in the Nord; and this is raising a frontier problem of a novel and somewhat serious kind, as the cheapness of the new labour is causing some actual displacement of French labour.

A similar problem is found in the south-east, but more serious, as there political factors as well as economic are at work. Freedom and security have attracted refugees, especially Anti-Fascists, to this frontier area, as steady wages and the high standard of living have attracted labour to the north-east; and again the native population has suffered, there has been a pernicious segregation of Italians, and the relations of France and Italy have been complicated. But it must be remembered that this is not the first influx of aliens into Provence. Phocceans built Marseilles; Rhodians built on the site where Constantine "founded" the Trinquetaille suburb of Arelate (Arles); and there was close Greek settlement up the valley as far as Avignon 400 years before the Romans appeared. This

no doubt explains why Classical ideas in art and administration were so easily understood and so readily accepted by the "Provençals," and why Provençal poetry was so largely Latin in meaning and in manner.

SURFACE

We have already noticed, incidentally, that the French peninsula is not straggling in shape, and has no typical spine to divide it into divorced halves facing in different directions and having different aims. If we now examine the relief in detail, we shall see what lies behind this mere absence of drawbacks.

The most significant single feature of the country is the four-sided core of barren old rock that forms the so-called Central Plateau. It is composed mainly of very old rocks, granite and schist and gneiss, broken in the Auvergne by recent volcanic action, which has greatly affected the scenery of the heights and the fertility of the dales; it rises irregularly from about 1,500 feet in the north-west to over 5,500 feet in the south-east, where the Cevennes make a steep wall to the Rhone corridor; it is relatively small, covering only one-sixth of the country—whereas the Spanish meseta covers four-sixths; and it is not really central, being almost entirely east of the central meridian (2° E.) and south of the central parallel (47° N.). At the same time, it is widest towards the north—in the latitude of the greatest Alpine uplift (Mt. Blanc) and of one of the narrowest parts of the Rhone valley (Vienne); and below its northern face, at an average height of perhaps 1,200 feet, along the line now followed by the railway from Lyon to Limoges, ran the natural northern frontier of the Langue d'Oc, "repeated" in that of the Droit Ecrit and that of the Pays Etrangers, *i.e.* the area of complete Romanisation and yet the nursery of revolt against the Roman Church.

The ex-centric location of the massif has been of supreme importance, because it gives access for the winds and rains of the Atlantic to five-sixths of France, and so sends a fan of rivers radiating back to the Atlantic over fertile plains open to the climatic, the commercial, the civilising influences of the ocean; and by its proximity to the Alpine and Pyrenean systems it has defined very precisely the character and the destiny of the Rhone corridor and the still older route of the Carcassonne Gate.

Round this old four-square core there is an almost complete ring of lowland, expanding into four basins—two large ones, once sea-gulfs, those of Paris and Bordeaux, and two small ones, the two halves of a rift-valley, those of the Saône and the Lower Rhone; and this ring of lowland is flanked by four uplands—the old blocks of Brittany and the Ardennes, on the north-west and the north-east, and the young folds of the Pyrenees and the Alps, on the south-west and the south-east. The relations of the four basins to the four uplands, as of the basins to one another, depend on the character of the four-sided core, especially on the fact that, except in the south-east, it does not drop abruptly to the surrounding lowland, but sends out tongues of upland—Montagne Noire, Limousin, and Morvan—towards the outlying uplands—Pyrenean, Armorican, Ardennes; and this narrowing of the lowland ring gives us the Carcassonne, Poitou, and Langres Gates. Two of these are purely lowland strips, once sea-straits, very accessible as well as narrow; and so river and canal, road and rail, bourg and battlefield, are all forced on to the one narrow strip—at Poitiers and Carcassonne. Changes in the media of transport have made no real difference; the fundamental controls were the same in kind and in strength in the days of Clovis and Charles Martel, of Simon de Montfort and the Black Prince.

The Langres Gate is not a lowland route, for even the

Burgundy Canal is never below the 1,000-foot contour, while the railway from Paris is above the 1,500-foot before it reaches the "Dijon" tunnel; but both the Seine and the Marne rise on the Langres sill, and river-dissection has been carried to a point at which it leaves no real obstacle to easy communication. The route is now immeasurably more important than those *via* Poitiers and Carcassonne, for the Dijon Gap in the Côte d'Or flanks either the Burgundy Gate or the Pontarlier Gorge, and faces the feature which it does not flank.

Obviously, then, there is in France enough variety of structure and relief to form the basis of seven or eight distinct regions, associated with differences of natural resources and so of human occupations and interests; and these regions are grouped round a natural core in such a way as to make a compact and easily "comprehensible" unit having both very easy internal communications and an adequate minimum of size—large enough to be strong, small enough to be coherent. No doubt, the compactness is slightly marred by the ex-centricity of Brittany and Alsace; but it is long since the isolation of Brittany was any danger, and—even if we depreciate the value of the Rhine fairway as a frontier—Strasbourg is nearer to Paris than Carlisle is to London.

If this is a correct presentation of the essential features of France, it would appear that the relief and the regional relations make the country a complete and almost organic unit, and so most favourable to the development within it of all kinds of centralisation. The Romans grasped at once the fact that it was almost ideally suited to their theory and practice of road-making, and the development of France for nearly 2,000 years has been closely associated with their road system and its legacies; and that is precisely why it was so significant that they thought little of Paris. Amiens and Langres, Troyes and Bourges, Orleans



and Tours, were all more important; still more so were Bordeaux, Lyon and Reims—which has remained to this day, ecclesiastically, a Roman capital. In other words, the Romans realised that the essential characteristics of the country were regional variety and regional virility; and these are so strong that monotony and uniformity have always been impossible, and so human reactions have always been vivid and sometimes violent, *e.g.* in the Hundred Years' War and the Wars of Religion. But the regions and their types grade so easily into one another that nothing could prevent eventual unity; and the inter-relations were so organic that love of *le pays*, the little home environment, has been love of a distinct and essential part of the great motherland, *la patrie*. This is the geographical background of French patriotism and of French cosmopolitanism; for he that loveth not the little land that he hath seen, how can he love the big world that he hath not seen?

But we may look at France from a different angle. Whether we limit the number of natural regions to six or seven, or expand it to nine or even ten, they can all be classified under three categories (belts of European relief): the great plain to the north, the young folds to the south, and the intervening old blocks; and in each case there is a specific and differentiated response to the geographical control. For instance, the deforested plain, as the main source of necessary food, is also the main source of manpower; the physical history of the blocks associates them directly and indirectly with the mineral wealth; the sunny orchards and nursery-gardens of the Mediterranean hinterland can be irrigated from snowy slopes that guarantee unfailing supplies of the precious "white-coal."

The human note shows the same threefold division with the same tendency towards coalescence. The tall, fair Longhead, in his adventurous wanderings, followed

his plain, even when deforested, westward and southward to the foot of the Pyrenees ; with increased distance from the forest and from the Frozen North he became more sunburnt, and began to mature more rapidly and did not grow so tall. The short, dark Longhead, overstrained by bright light, crept westward and northward along the Atlantic margin, where higher latitude did not bring the dreaded continental winter ; with increased distance from summer-drought and southern desert he became less sunburnt, and slower growth to maturity added something to his stature. Both Nordic and Mediterranean, therefore, became less true to type and more like each other. The Alpine Roundhead, who owed some lack of stature to the poverty of the barren uplands of his race-home, clung to the "familiar" upland in his migration westward till he was led through the Burgundy Gate up to the Central Plateau. There life was hard, and he had to fight for his own hand—to feed the numerous offspring of his vigorous stock ; and eventually the surplus population of these industrious individualists was forced or tempted down to the richer lands and easier life of the plains. There they intermarried with the Longheads, fair and dark, and again there was modification of type ; and so to-day, racially, the typical Frenchman is probably the nearest approach to a European mean. This is another source of strength.

It is easy to under-rate the historical importance of this old, high, unfertile core, if only because different writers have emphasised such contradictory aspects of it. The Bronze-Age nomads left, over the barren Causse limestone and round the bare western edge of the massif, a solemn trail which became later a Pilgrim Road ; and the pilgrims must have formed, and handed down, a very unfavourable opinion of the region. For at first sight it is unattractive and even repellent ; and yet it must always have had some attraction for such lovers of uplands as



NATURAL REGIONS OF FRANCE.

It is not easy to suggest a good name for the East-North-East region, partly because of its complex character (*cf* pp. 34 and 35). There are almost as sound reasons for not perpetuating the political and historical associations of "Alsace-Lorraine," as for not calling it the "Nancy-Strasbourg" region. Perhaps the best thing is to call it simply "the North-Eastern" region, even if this seems to deny it any personality of its own.

It has a distinct, if subtle, personality; but it is one which probably would be suggested only by the introduction of a purely racial term, Keltic (Alpino-Nordic). No latitudes and longitudes in the world could be more truly called Alpino-Nordic—from both the historic and the prehistoric standpoints; and it is a pity that the label here would seem out of date as well as out of place.

The inset illustrates points on pp. 28, 30, and 50.

the Alpine Roundheads, and in times of danger must have attracted—and did attract—refugees of all sorts. In times of peace, on the contrary, it repelled; and the steady drift of surplus individualists down from it to the richer lowlands has left a permanent mark on the character of French industries and on French history.

For the individualists were so in politics and religion, as well as socially and artistically; and, like refugees everywhere, they were *ipso facto* devoted to personal liberty and political equality, and so to democratic beliefs and republican forms. This made them a real danger to the unity of France. For here was a veritable fortress, manned by a people able and determined to think for themselves, and forming a natural barrier between summer-drought lands, where forum and senate, free speech and spontaneous activities, were Græco-Roman legacies, and summer-rain lands, where castle and cathedral, loyalty and confession, encouraged no heresies, political or religious.

Fortunately, there were some geographical factors which tended to keep the Central individualists—who had most opportunities for influencing France as a whole—more averse from anarchy than those of the outlying Breton and Midi corners of the country. In the light rainfall of the vulcanised region to leeward of the Auvergne crest the Allier has worn out a cañon-like valley, at once profoundly fertile and almost inaccessible to enemies, and leading by the straightest of bee-lines from the Languedoc coast and Narbonne to Paris and the Channel. When the Arverni were at the height of their power, Vercingetorix had his capital in the widest part of this safe and fertile valley, the old lake-floor of the Limagne—at Augustonemetum (Clermont); the Romans considered the whole valley one of the great natural arteries of Gaul; and to-day it carries the shortest railway route from Paris and Nevers *via* Vichy to Nîmes and the Mediterranean, with the

Moulins and Alais coalfields at the two ends of the valley, where the gradient rises above the 1,000-foot contour.

Over the whole of this massif, then, with its great thoroughfare, its fertile valley (an unfailing source of food-supply and man-power), its safety and its centrality, its constant surplus of "heretics," the *Langue d'Oc* spread; and in the lee of the steepest and loftiest scarp the artists and the scientists, the poets and the politicians of the Midi could preach and practice personal liberty and political independence. It was well for France that one heretic of the South thought "Paris worth a mass."

The height (over 3,000 feet) of the col between the Margeride and Velay "gables" of "the Roof of France," and the abrupt descent southwards (2,000 feet in 50 miles), have made it impossible for this direct Allier route to compete, even by rail, with the circuitous lowland route between southern and northern France, especially as the Carcassonne Gate—unwooded, thanks to summer-drought, even in the Bronze Age—led the Mediterranean immigrants into a genial climate and a rich basin. Indeed, the traffic round the massif was so easy that any unnatural delay in the unification of France was obviously not due to any serious physical obstacles. At the same time the mere fact that the route was circuitous meant, in earlier times, that movement and settlement were slow; and this was an almost unmixed advantage, for it guaranteed a gradual adjustment between people and place. This was important not only because it made for coherence and permanence, but also because the differences of environment were considerable. The pre-historic movements of population were "clockwise" from the south-east; and so Mediterranean migrants kept within the mild influence of the Atlantic; but the historic movements, *e.g.* the Franks', were "anti-clockwise" from the continental north-east. The different racial elements might be found,

therefore, in all parts of the country, but were adjusted to the varying environments; and eventually all races and influences were fitted to meet and blend in the Paris basin. Of course, as both the Nordic and the Mediterranean movements worked first round the western face of the Central Plateau, "Burgundy" was likely to be the least and the last touched by these two influences; and the effect of this may, perhaps, be traced in the relations of France with the Duchy and the County of Burgundy, especially in the lateness of their final union. Cf. p. 28.

But whatever the direction of these movements of population, and though the purely geographical changes were relatively slight (area, relief, rainfall season), the economic results were marked, because the change was really from extensive to intensive, or *vice versa*. This change, of course, was a somewhat difficult one originally, for the Roman occupation of France was an agricultural occupation. The individual occupier was a land-hungry colonist, who was first and always a farmer (*colonus*); that he was also a citizen (*civis*), who had been, and was still potentially, a soldier (*miles*), was merely incidental. His prime aim was to provide himself and his household with the various necessities of life, and this made him essentially a tiller of small plots. This is still absolutely true of France, but the truth is rather obscured in agriculture as distinguished from horticulture.

In the north an approximate uniformity of relief, and so of climate, over a large area favoured the production of a few crops on a large scale, and the crops obviously needed on a large scale are the necessities of life, especially bread; but in the south variety of relief, and so of climate, over a small area favoured the production of many crops on a small scale, and under such conditions it is natural and most profitable to produce luxuries. To-day these luxuries, with great value in small bulk, can bear the costly railway

transport from the Mediterranean to the Channel, and form typical exports ; but the necessities of the Paris basin are essentially for home use, and—if moved at all—they are best moved by water. But, of course, though wheat is as typical of the Paris basin as wine is of Languedoc, wine is produced locally in the one, and wheat locally in the other ; and the wine is of very high quality precisely because the vineyards are localised. For Reims is just within the northern limit of viticulture for wine-making in France ; and the high latitude involves the long summer day and the slow passage of sunlight over the vineyards which are so favourable to perfect ripening of the grape, while it has climatic disadvantages which necessitate special care and skill in the culture, *e.g.* in the choice of sites having the right slope (30° – 45°) and the right aspect (S.E.). Even the apparent disadvantages may be only apparent. For instance, a short winter day is a main factor in enforcing on plants the “proper” rest, which may be—and in the case, *e.g.* of wheat is—so conducive to their subsequent development. Similar conditions lie behind the fact that the best crops of so many valuable plants besides wheat, *e.g.* rice, are produced near the extreme distance from the Equator at which they can ripen at all. Some 450,000 tons of Italian rice, grown in latitude 45° N., are described as “super-Carolina.”

The political results of these population movements and their sequels were as important as the economic results. The physical continuity of the lowland ring was broken for ages by English domination of the Bordeaux basin, the south-western half of the great Atlantic plain ; and this reacted directly on the destiny of the Paris basin, the north-eastern half. For the ring was thus converted into a horseshoe, with the open “heel” in the south-west ; and so all communications between Atlantic and Mediterranean France were forced round the north of the Central

Plateau, and no other focus could compete with Paris as a natural centre of the horseshoe. Regionally the city controlled the best waterways in the country, and inter-regionally it was the natural objective of Mediterranean migrants both east and west of the Central Plateau and of Euro-Asiatic migrants both north and south of the Ardennes.

No doubt, this natural centralisation encouraged political centralisation; it certainly made it difficult for outlying units to threaten the King of Paris, and easy for Paris to be regarded (*e.g.* in the Hundred Years' War) as the saviour and not the conqueror of such units, and as the unifier of the whole number of them. At the same time provincial feelings remained so strong that unity could never mean uniformity—never much more than the agreement that no internal contrasts were so great as that between France as a whole and the outside world. But from some stand-points France as a whole did not mean much more than the great Atlantic plain. Almost from the earliest days of deforestation it seems to have been peopled more or less densely and evenly; it soon became essentially self-contained; everywhere the general type of human life was the same—the prosperous, sedentary farmer; and everywhere easy communications meant relatively close intimacy. Obvious dangers could be met by the building of castles at critical foci, and the conditions were very favourable to the use of mounted troops; mobility and a technical base were as vital to medieval Feudalism as to a modern army or navy.

CLIMATE

From the purely geographical standpoint the strength of provincial sentiment seems to have been associated more with climatic controls than with any other factor, but in such a way that it is difficult to isolate and to estimate

precisely the particular influence. Over seven of the eight natural regions in the country there is the fundamental unity of an essentially temperate climate ; and in such conditions we almost certainly find the White man at his best. In this particular case, too, they imply some approximation to unity of human type and occupations over a very large proportion of the area. But, as we have seen, relatively slight differences of climate may involve considerable differences in economic development ; and there is in France sufficient variety of climate to suggest, if not actually to illustrate, every phase of European climate, and the differences are distributed in such a way as to emphasise and reinforce the influence of structure and relief in differentiating natural regions. For instance, the rugged surface and the thin soil of the old, hard Armorican block are not favourable to agriculture ; but the constant rain and the small temperature-range, the fineness of the rain and the mildness of the winter, are very favourable to pastoral industries, especially the production of butter. But under such conditions viticulture for wine-making is obviously impossible ; the constant rain would ruin the grapes, and the mild winter would interfere with the maturing of the wine.

In the same latitude, but between 300 and 400 miles farther from the Atlantic, the circuitous eastern scarp of the Ile-de-France rises to some 600 feet above the Champagne plain. Much of the soil in "dry" Champagne is very poor, if not actually sterile, making a mere solitude for sheep ; and the winters are cold—even Paris has a colder midwinter than London, and frosts come early. But the chalk is porous, as well as easily caverned—for cellars ; the steep slopes face south-eastward, getting a maximum of autumn sunshine ; the vineyards are so tiny that every vine can have close personal attention ; and the vines are of a hardy, dwarfed type. Reims, too, is one of

the great historic transport-junctions of Europe, in a region within easy reach of capital, skilled labour, cheap chemicals (manures, insecticides, etc.), and large markets, especially London. There is, of course, a general "wine interest" in France; but the Champagne interest is an element in it distinct from, *e.g.* the Claret interest and the Burgundy interest. The differentiating factor is almost wholly climatic.

Somewhat similar climatic differences emphasise the structural and physical differences between the other natural regions of France, so that regional individuality is very marked; and this must have coloured human sentiments and activities—*e.g.* (to take a trivial example) directing the special interest of the ubiquitous "gardener" to vegetables in Brittany, to fruit in Normandy, to flowers in Touraine. Of course, the fundamental unity of an essentially temperate climate has unified, but not much further than to give to all the regions conditions fairly favourable to the practice of energy, the possibility of leisure, and the persistence of the Roman small-plot attitude to agriculture. Even the large farmer has the mentality of a market-gardener, and regards his farm as a garden—sacredly private; and La Belle France is simply the aggregate of these farm-gardens, and her soil is private and sacred. The whole basis and much of the superstructure of education in France are concerned with strenuous and persistent inculcation of love for France.

These are the attendant circumstances which have made culture both possible and widely spread, based on a strong social sense and on much intellectual equality. This may have been won at the cost of a scarcity of genius, but at least it has not been in France that "the mother of invention" has demanded fool-proof machinery; and talent and tenacity go a long way towards making up for what is only a *relative* scarcity of genius.

Moreover, the regional culture has been all the more valuable both to France and to Europe because marked by some racial individuality. For even the regions most similar in their physical geography, *e.g.* the Armorican and Ardennes blocks or the Paris and Bordeaux basins, have had different racial elements on which to act, with consequent differences of human reactions. To-day the north of the country is still relatively Nordic, the south relatively Mediterranean, the centre relatively Alpine; and even the link-lands have linked in different ways, for the influence of Central Europe tended to make the Burgundy link political and materialistic, while Mediterranean intellectuality and spirituality could survive in the seclusion of Aquitaine. *Cf.* p. 28.

Some such survey as the above convinces some of us that the harmonious tendencies of structure, relief, and climate in each region must have produced a certain equilibrium between the Man and the Place, with the result that the vitality of the regional consciousness has been in each region the best proof of and justification for similarly vital consciousness in other regions. And surely this made it relatively easy for France to learn not to try to dominate local conscience or consciousness at home or abroad, and so to solve the very difficult problem of the relative value of localisation and centralisation, of patriotism and cosmopolitanism.

THE APPLIED GEOGRAPHY

If this presentation of the essential geographical factors is sound, it would seem that we have in France one of the best defined and best balanced units on the face of the earth—a peninsula with equilibrium of land and sea influences, a complex distinguished equally by the presence of unity and the absence of uniformity. The unity can be

related to primary conditions of position, shape, surface features, and climate, while the secondary conditions of marked variety of region, race, and human reactions have forbidden uniformity; but the values attached to the various factors that have been important in the evolution of the unit, may differ according as we try to look at it from inside or from outside.

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Behind all that is suggested by the name "France" there is, of course, a Roman background, and the continuous development has been mainly "Latin" in character; but all the steps forward have not, at first sight, seemed to tend towards unity. For instance, the first step to formal unity may be seen in the overthrow of Roman rule by Clovis; but he was not indifferent to the menace of the Alamanni in the Lotharingian Corridor, any more than to the creed of his Christian wife. And, in becoming the champion of orthodox Christians in Gaul, he became naturally a subject of the Roman Church, and so made France, in one sense, more Roman than she had ever been.

It would be premature to apply the actual word "nationality" to these earlier stages, and it is better to reserve it for the generations of the Hundred Years' War, with their Franco-Scots and Anglo-Portuguese alliances, their Anglo-Flemish wool trade, and Anglo-Gascon wine-trade; but nearly all that we mean by nationality was already present and active, largely because France was the only member of the Holy Roman Empire "trinity"—as decided by the Partition of Verdun—that had both natural frontiers and national unity. Later this enabled Louis XIV to fight both the land-power of "Prussia" and the sea-power of England when he wanted the old title and its shadow of land-power from the Hapsburgs of Austria and a new trident and the substance of sea-power from the Hapsburgs of Spain.

Of course, a sense of nationality cannot be roused merely by nominal union against external dangers *if* there is no real internal coherence ; but there was the needful coherence in France, and it really dated back to Roman days. For the separate political provinces were based essentially on Roman subdivisions, and this implied a traditional equality, which was a strong safeguard against separatism. Undoubtedly, the corners of the country except in the north-east were far from Paris, and so could snap their fingers at weak kings ; and this enabled semi-foreign Anglo-Norman kings to intrude, especially in Aquitaine. But the intrusion was possible only so long as they spoke French, and married French wives. The moment that Normandy, Anjou, and Aquitaine came under an English king who spoke English, and whose wife was not French, the fundamental unity of France was roused into consciousness—to be led by men like Bertrand du Guesclin.

No doubt, regional feeling was so strong in the thirteenth century that it was not possible to avoid regional parliaments ; but the real importance of this was that all these free regions were equally trained in normal experiments in government, and their freedom and their equality were calculated to encourage fraternity. Thus, out of strong provincial feeling there emerged strong national feeling, and this must have helped to make French thought disinterested as well as passionate, rich in individualism and yet poor in racialism.

No doubt, too, the fact that there was only one king while there were several parliaments, strengthened him and weakened them ; but it did not destroy the regional vitality, and it did ultimately solve the language question—in favour of “the king’s French.” And so there was sufficient community of speech—once the single great antagonism between summer-rain France and summer-drought France,

between the Langue d'Oc and the Langue d'Oil, was removed—to encourage a widely-spread feeling of unity and even some belief in kinship amid a triple variety of racial elements. This is a further source of strength. Cf. p. 54.

But the problem must also be studied from the other standpoint. Strong regional development presupposes regional leaders, even regional tyranny; and this meant at first the absence or the weakness of any central authority, even in the regions nearest to the Isle of France. In regions farther afield the position was naturally still more critical, especially in the Bordeaux basin, which was nearly as large and as fertile, and therefore as populous and as strong, as the Paris basin; and this adds a further interest to the English occupation of the basin. For it was precisely in England that the geographic factors were unlike those of France. South-east of the Exe-Tees line there is really only one natural region—a low, flat, fertile region, the race-home of John Bull, the farmer; and the region has its indisputable focus in the London basin, and evolved naturally one speech and one parliament.

The destinies of the two countries could scarcely have been alike. In France, while the strength of regional tyrants depended on the relative weakness of the king, their subjects wanted above all else some protection from local tyranny; and so most of the peace-loving and freedom-loving people actively or passively supported the king. Thus, gradually the House of Capet—at first weaker than some of its own vassals—added castle to castle, and then province to province, until Louis XIV could reasonably claim to be *le grand monarque*. In England, on the contrary, the king had been so strong that nobles and burghers had combined to reduce his strength to more or less “constitutional” limits.

The king of Paris, however, in the earlier days had an immense asset in the distribution of fertility in the Paris

basin. This increases steadily towards the centre, until it is at a maximum in the Isle of France and its immediate neighbourhood. The loam-covered limestones of Brie and Beauce have always been the richest wheat-lands of France, and they merge westward into damper lands where magnificent pastures have raised great numbers of cattle and horses (*cf.* Camembert cheese and Percheron horses), and southward into drier lands, where Berry has been famous for sheep for centuries. Round and inside the Isle of France itself there was always easy navigation on Oise and Aisne and Marne, on Eure and Loir and Loiret, even on Loire, the mass of it feeding the Seine, so that Paris never need lack bread and meat, man-power and horse-power. And on this foundation the kings of Paris could, and did, build up a royal domain rich enough to leave them usually quite independent of any Parliamentary purse except in time of war.

Moreover, in France there was never quite a "Henry VIII." On the one hand, Church and Crown were natural allies; and, on the other, the king had a host of officials. These were in no sense Feudal vassals, but strictly State officials, who travelled so widely up and down the country that they became fully conscious of serving France; and they made a class which was at once the chief strength of the Royal power and a real check on it. We may say, then, that the normal government of France was not autocratic, nor aristocratic, still less democratic, but bureaucratic, tempered only by the facts that the bureaucrats came from the middle classes,—that all classes had something of the same standard of culture,—and that the passive resistance of the ubiquitous peasant was invincible.

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The mass of France, as we have seen, is a summer-rain Atlantic land, with an almost ubiquitous abundance of

bread and butter ; only a corner is a summer-drought Mediterranean land, with a modicum of cheese and oil. The different environment, emphasised by the legacies of forum and agora, involved a certain natural separation from the rest of France, a certain natural unity within the narrow limits of the Roman Province. This was a unity not only of economic products and interests, but of political training and religious evolution ; and there was enough variety of the economic products to make the region self-contained, and enough variety of historic inspiration—Greek and Roman, Phœnician and Moorish—to guarantee immense powers of practical self-expression, artistically and otherwise.

The vital “ control ” here was position. This made it a window of light from the east and a door for entrance from the south ; and the movement was almost wholly in the one direction, “ nothing ” coming from the vast summer-rain into the alien summer-drought. The little Province just survived and persisted in its isolation and independence, with its own proud tradition and its own Provençal speech. It was never conquered by Goth or Frank or Burgundian, but ceded freely by Justinian as a Roman yeast to leaven the lump of France ; and, though the *Langue d’Oc*, or Provençal, was not a strict linguistic unity,¹ it was the true child of the Province, which covered even more than we include now in both Languedoc and Provence.

Of course, when an area so self-contained and so capable of self-expression added difference of creed to difference of tongue, the danger of political separatism became acute ; and, as all true lovers of France came to realise, that would have meant an infinite loss to France. They were doomed, therefore, to have to crush the heresy of the inspiring Southernns ; and the Reds of the *Midi* have proved beyond

¹ Nor was Basque at the other end of the Pyrenean isthmus.

doubt that the horrors of the religious wars were not too high a price to pay for the sacred unity of France.

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But, however much it was necessary to discourage separatism, it was equally desirable to encourage individualism. We have already seen how effectively this has been encouraged by the variety and the marked individuality of the natural regions, especially those that are bleak and barren ; but the same conditions which forced every one to fight for his own hand, tended also to keep the region scantily peopled, and this was fortunate for France. For all the difficult areas except the core are marginal as well as scantily peopled, and so their influence on France took the form of stimulus rather than control—a stimulus at once subtle and potent because it was largely a reaction of the Alpine worker upon the Nordic leader and the Mediterranean thinker. Further, as there are numerous small coalfields round the most important blocks, *e.g.* those of Commentry, Blanzey, Aubin, Bessages, and St. Etienne below the Central Plateau, the industrial centres sprang up near the homes of these industrious individualists. This must have favoured that individuality of French manufactures which has put them to some extent outside competition ; and the individualism has been strongly tinged with idealism, for the hard life taught economy and self-denial, forethought and long views, the will to sacrifice the present for the future.

But there has been a second geographical factor behind this industrial individuality. For the wide dispersion of fuel and raw materials in small pockets has been at once definitely favourable to a diversity of products and definitely unfavourable to large-scale production ; and so there has been no obvious temptation to exchange the

artistic and individualised for the mechanical and standardised.

While it is impossible to deny some part to the geographic "Control" in this "Response," it is equally impossible to deny that racial inheritance may have been at least as influential. On the northern plain Nordic man was forester and fisherman, and the forester was always tending to become a boat-builder by lake and stream, if not also a boat-user; on the barren blocks Alpine man was a shepherd, using his leisure to work in and on the—often metalliferous—rocks of his environment; in the summer-drought glens Mediterranean man was a gardener, who learnt to build with—perhaps simply in order to get rid of—the stones which he "cleared" to make his garden. Eventually, the Nordic type, here as elsewhere, produced some magnificent sailors, and the sea-front seemed to be very favourable to the development of outlook, initiative, versatility; and these gifts make a great nation. The Alpines remained landsmen, with a genius for working in metal (as in the pre-Roman coinage, gold and bronze, of French Flanders); and the land-front seemed to be very favourable to the development of organisation, discipline, efficiency; and these are the virtues of a great state. France has the double front, by sea and by land, and has felt the double "control"; and we may believe firmly in the control, even if we are too ignorant to be able to explain it in detail. The individual Frenchman, even if not quite the equal of the individual Briton in this respect, can stand on his own feet without being helped, and can stand in a crowd without being herded.

The success of France in responding to this double control may be attributed perhaps partly to the double asset of the saving grace of Keltic humour that has survived in her people from a prehistoric strain—though they greatly dislike being laughed at—and the power of sound

thinking in her Mediterranean element with its Roman gift for organisation. It was easy access from Rome externally that gave her an early start, and her relief and other internal "accidents" made it easy for her to become very Roman; but in those early days the ocean was an object of dread, especially to dwellers by the tideless Mediterranean, and Rome was essentially a land power. So the first impulse of France was landward, not seaward, and her model was Rome. Her family life reproduced the Roman gens, her esprit was the Roman solidarity of patriotism, her *pays* was the Roman *pagus*—so significantly "a district with *fixed boundaries*"! Trespassers would be prosecuted. But it is not easy to trespass except across a land boundary, a low-land boundary; and France has such a boundary only towards Central Europe.

Incidentally, it seems possible that the "homing" instinct of the French has been a main cause of their failing—or never really wishing—to make permanent settlements abroad; emigrants went to exploit new lands, but with the firm intention of returning to the old land. Further, those who went out were townsmen, and so scarcely suited for settlement in new lands; France has always been a self-supporting country, and insisted on being so, but her rural population has seldom been more than—or even quite—large enough for this purpose, and so could not be spared for settlement abroad.

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From the geographical point of view, what is the conclusion of the whole matter? Perhaps that the two vital controls have been position and regional variety. The position, spanning Continental Europe from north to south and in close touch with Peninsular Europe, where the vastest land-mass in the world faces the narrowest ocean, favoured more intimate knowledge of Europe than any

other of its peninsulas could have, and the taking of longer views than any non-peninsular unit could take—at least 80° W., to Fort Duquesne, and 80° E., to Pondicherry. Of course, though these limits were for a time immensely significant, in the critical years (1713–1715) France was more than 10° farther west in North America, and now she is nearly 40° farther east in Asia.

Relief and climate have naturally affected her internal rather than her external relationships, encouraging unity and coherence in external attitudes and variety and elasticity in internal aptitudes. Thus a regional note has leavened French cosmopolitanism; and the French cosmopolitan does not feed on sickly and self-righteous disbelief in his own country and countrymen, but is patriotic as well as cosmopolitan, largely because he is regional as well as centralised. It is this regional curb on the disintegrating influence of cosmopolitanism that makes him cosmopolitan only in his contempt for race-prejudice, in his hospitality to non-French ideas, and in his conviction that common humanity and eternal truth are of more value than the accidents of place and birth.

It may be that the Family basis of French life had been so much modified in the seventeenth century that it was completely obliterated by the Revolution, and that in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries we must not look for the natural human responses to the original geographic controls; but at least one feature remains unchanged—the logical attitude of mind, *i.e.* the one characteristic which makes the logical type incomprehensible to the practical type, and *vice versa*. The French are still fundamentally logical, and therefore consistent; they mark an end, and go straight for it, translating thought very quickly into action because there is no doubt as to the line of action—it must be consistent, *i.e.* really must be predetermined. But this leaves very little margin for the unforeseen!

As a remarkably practical people, we are not logical or consistent, but rather slow-moving amateurs, living from hand to mouth—from the thing done to some justification of it, seldom marking any definite end—which foreigners can neither understand nor believe—and, when we do mark one, generally experimenting, compromising, improvising, over it. We are therefore not consistent, still less logical, but apt, when some conditions that we have treated successfully are repeated exactly, to try some new way of dealing with them—on the chance of that proving still more successful. It must be very difficult, and therefore very generous, for a logical foreigner not to think us “perfidious.” On the other hand, one does not see in England a queue of docile cows tethered together, like beads on a string, so as to eat their way in a straight line, logically and exhaustively and economically, across the crimson clover.

CHAPTER III

IBERIA

METALS AND MOORS

IF we may assume for the moment that it is possible to find in both France and Spain a group of men that could be accepted as reasonably representative of their nation and country, then we may venture on the assertion that the typical Frenchman is half-a-world away from the typical Spaniard ; and, if " half-a-world " seems rather an exaggeration, we can at least insist on " a whole continent." For Spain, in structure and configuration, relief and climate, outlook and attitude, is African ; it belongs to the Black man's continent, not the White man's. Indeed, it was once territorially joined to Africa, and separated—by a Carcassonne strait—from Europe ; its Berber aborigines were Egypto-Africans ; its Moorish culture was Arabo-African ; and the Moors actually employed Negro troops in Spain.

Of course, both Spain and Portugal have had very close and vital associations with Europe generally, especially Central Europe, and with England more particularly ; we habitually speak of Iberia as "*The Peninsula*," while we never speak of France as even *a* peninsula, not even as the base of the Franco-Iberian peninsula of Eurasia. But peninsularity has meant as little to Spain, at least in its internal evolution, as it has meant much to France ; and Iberia is not as European as even Scandinavia, for it has been more isolated.

Historically, Africa has begun at the Pyrenees—in spite

of the closing of the Carcassonne strait and the opening of the Gibraltar strait; the geographical features which have been most dominant are African—the desert and oasis, the scrubland and steppe; and the phenomena most vital to Europe—the Renaissance, the Reformation, the French Revolution—have not meant very much to Spain, and have meant almost nothing in Spain.

This is precisely why the peninsula may be valuable to Europe; her particular contribution to the common good has not been obviously European. With so much akin to Africa geographically and to Latin America historically, she should be able to interpret both to us; and in these days of stress and instability she can show us how little she has been affected by her peninsularity and her extreme occidental location—both of them conditions often favouring flux and change—by giving us a striking object-lesson in political stability and oriental indifference to change elsewhere.

SURROUNDINGS

Why has peninsularity meant so little to Iberia, especially to Spain?

In the first place, the position exercised a control very different in kind and in degree from what one would expect. In the dawn of European history, the peninsula was at the end of the earth, and so made a refuge, or, at least, a terminus, for Proto-Hamites and other primitive wanderers, who wanted to escape and to be left alone. The builders of stone monuments found, or founded, a pre-historic sanctuary amid the rain-drenched mountains of the far north-west, with its grey granite and melancholy mists; but they crept down the west coast into summer drought, and eventually built their finest dolmen (of the Malaga limestone) under cloudless skies. In this south-east corner, too, there were other intruders, who came by

sea. Alybe and Abyla (Gibraltar and Ceuta) were the Pillars of Hercules; and they marked for a time the limit of movement westward even for such seafarers as the Phœnicians and the Greeks.

The landsmen's sanctuary has remained a sanctuary ever since; for Santiago, with St. James's tomb and its Trinity of Towers, became the capital of Galicia, gave its name to one of the great *military* Orders of Spain, claimed for its archbishop the primacy even against Toledo, and attracted for centuries such a stream of pilgrims to its Campus Stellæ, its "Plain¹ of the Star," that the popular Spanish name for "the Milky Way" came to be El Camiño de Santiago, "The Santiago Road."

Such a destiny was not likely to follow the track of seamen, and both the Phœnicians and the Greeks habitually moved by sea. The former were the first to sail far afield, and so got a grip on most of the Iberian coast, while the Greeks had to be content with little more than a footing in "Catalonia"—though they reached Coruña, and called it μέγας λιμὴν, "the Great Harbour." But the Phœnicians were merely traders, and their Carthaginian relations only traders and exploiters, though they had their own "factories" almost all round the coast, and fully appreciated the value of the country as a source of fighting men as well as of minerals.

But even real sailors could make little of Iberia, because the coast is markedly African, and on the whole 15,000 miles of the coast of Africa there are only two natural homes of sailors, and these two produced the Kru "boys" and the Barbary pirates. An old block that has been broken, as Iberia has, from its continental region by the foundering of the rest of the region, must have sharply cut scarps, and be deficient alike in natural articulation and

¹ The suggested alternative for the derivation of *Compostello* or *Compostela*—a corruption of "Jacobo Apostolo"—is not persuasive.

in island fringe. Even where young folded mountains have been thrust up against it, as in the Cantabrian and Nevada systems, there are few natural harbours, for these systems are concordant with the north and south scarps of the block and with the corresponding coasts. Access inland, therefore, up the steep face of the folds is difficult, and railways are as costly to work as they were to build, *e.g.* the freightage on Asturias coal to Madrid being actually higher than the price of the coal; and access to the coast is almost equally difficult seaward. For the little articulations with some shelter from westerly gales have been converted into alluvial plains by ocean and river currents; estuaries have been, and still are being, silted up, especially by the ocean currents which sweep eastward along both the north and the south coasts, so that there is need of constant dredging; and most of the ports are, and have been for 2,000 years, narrowly specialised—for export of minerals, and demand little or no return cargo. In these respects these two coasts are even worse than the north and the south coasts of Anatolia. The busiest port of Spain is Bilbao, *Bel-Vao*, “Good Fortress,” as suggestive a name for a harbour as *Trebizond*, “the Plateau”!

Spain and Portugal, according to Gibbon, were the Mexico and Peru of the Roman world; and, if one is thinking merely of the exploitation of precious metals, the statement may stand. For Rome drew thousands of pound-weights of gold from Iberia every year, most of it from *Tarraconensis*, but much (up to 20,000 lb. in some years) from *Lusitania*, *Gallæcia*, and *Asturia*, the Galician and Asturian metal being largely exported *via Tarraco*. The silver¹ came mainly from the same areas, especially *Tarraconensis*, though also from *Bætica*, where the *Castulo* mines—near *Linares*—were the dowry of Hannibal’s wife. Tin and iron, copper and lead, antimony and mercury, were

¹ The *Sierra Morena* silver was being worked by B.C. 2000.

also mined,—the last two being in special request, as also sory and litharge, for *eye-salves*, a significant proof of the “desert” glare that cursed the land. Another proof is seen in the number of oculists!

But in all this, of course, Rome was just carrying on the work of the Phœnicians and Carthaginians, the former in tin and the latter in silver; and both probably spread false reports, *e.g.* that their metals came from beyond the pathless ocean, in order to deter possible rivals from trying to share the wealth. The Romans were really more interested in Iberian agriculture, as a source of food for the Mob, than in Iberian minerals. Mexico and Peru did not give to Spain what Spain could give to Rome—a Seneca and a Martius, a Lucan and a Quintilian, a Trajan and a Hadrian; but both of them accepted the Spanish tongue, as Spain accepted Latin, until, even in the time of Augustus (according to Strabo), the people of Baetica had forgotten their native speech. Moreover, the Iberians had nothing of their own to compare with the Amerind culture, and had not acquired either Punic or Gothic culture, to hinder them from becoming very Roman.

The Phœnicians, probably influenced by their association with island sites at Arvad and Tyre and Sidon, placed their headquarters in the five square miles of the lovely island of Gades (Cadiz), a centre probably 300 years older than Carthage, hidden—beyond the Pillars of Hercules—by the Atlantic spur of the Sierra Nevada system that we call Cape Trafalgar. The Carthaginians, from their Atlas promontory at Tunis, preferred the promontory made by a Mediterranean spur of the Nevada, where a fine natural harbour, which makes Cartagena the headquarters of the Spanish Mediterranean fleet to-day, was backed by a richly mineralised highland. But neither people wished to colonise or to do anything except exploit the land; and, as both the mineral wealth and—then, as it

is now—the mass of the population were marginal, this was a relatively easy task. Incidentally, it led them to over-rate the importance of the peninsula, as Europeans—for exactly the same reasons—exaggerated “the fabulous wealth” of India in their early relations with it.

Moreover, the Iberian coast, like the African and for a similar reason, is sadly lacking in good harbours, though a harbour might be called “good” from the Phœnician point of view which is quite inadequate from ours. On the specifically Phœnician tract, from the Trafalgar spur of the Nevada to the spur of the Morena which reaches the Portuguese frontier, the coast is simply one festoon of sand-bars; Tartessus was on one, and would have been swept away in time by the Guadalquivir floods even if the Carthaginians had not destroyed the town. On the Carthaginian tract the same is often true except that the practical absence of tide has allowed a wide formation of lagoons, such as the Mar Menor (“Smaller Sea”) “behind,” *i.e.* north of, Cartagena and the Albufera (“The Lagoon”) “in front of,” *i.e.* south of, Valencia.

On this Valencian coast, with its peaceful but inhospitable curves, we can see illustrated in miniature the work of many a great African river or that of the smaller Anatolian rivers. For the Guadalaviar rises—within a mile or two of both the Tagus and the Jucar—on the Albaraccin heights (5,000–7,500 feet), with their heavy “Former” (September) and “Latter” (May) rains; it draws some of its water from at least 6,000 feet; and yet its valley is scarcely 150 miles in length. In its torrential descent it has carved profound gorges in the Jurassic limestone, and the debris, supplemented by that brought down by the similar conditions and régime of the Jucar, has completely filled up the large bay that once washed the scarp of the meseta, and transformed it into the deltaic plain of Valencia.

Another serious drawback to this coast, though an

artificial one, is the age-long specialisation of the ports. This has been a natural manifestation of the "Externalism" which has done even more harm to Spain from one point of view than "Regionalism" has done from another; and, unfortunately, it is quite typical of the Spanish ports to-day. No modern port in the country has the concentrated importance and the widely general trade that the wretched roadstead of Tarraco had under the Romans—exporting its own fine linen (from local flax), its honey and wax and wine, and drawing hams and horses, precious and common metals, from Cantabria, and wool and olive-oil, mackerel-paste and dancing-girls, from Baetica.

Of course, with the increase in the size of tramp steamers, this specialisation has become more and more troublesome, *e.g.* at Sagunto (iron), Huelva (copper), Musel (coal), because it is accompanied by the cost involved in artificial harbours at points where there is a lack of return cargoes. Huelva is actually, like Santander, on a tidal estuary; and so is Bilbao, if not Barcelona. But the two great ports of Spain, tidal Bilbao and tideless Barcelona, are both purely artificial; and much of both the Cantabrian and the Nevada ores is simply shipped from cantilever piers dotted along the coasts. The result is that no port—except, possibly, Barcelona—is really flourishing; even Bilbao does scarcely more than 10 per cent. of the total Spanish sea-trade, while Lisbon does nearly 40 per cent. of the total Portuguese. The one true river port, Seville, is busier than its ocean port of Cadiz.

The only important exceptions to these adverse conditions over any considerable stretch of coast are found where the young folded mountains run out into, and are abruptly truncated in, the Atlantic, *i.e.* at the transverse western end of the Cantabrian system. There the drowned downfolds widen and deepen into beautiful rias, like those of Kerry, which are well sheltered by the upfolds from

gales with any northern or southern component in them, and are well scoured by strong tides ; and, though the absence of fiord ramifications and fiord structure, especially the sill, exposes them to westerly gales, they have always bred a sailor type, and encouraged a fishing industry. Certainly, most of the Roman supplies of salted and smoked tunny (*faber*) and of the mackerel (*scomber*) paste were shipped from the south coast, especially from Carthago Nova ¹ (Cartagena) ; but the fish were mainly caught in the Atlantic. To-day these ria harbours are far the most important for fishing (mainly sardines), *e.g.* Vigo ; and their location gives them easy access commercially to North America—for fisherfolk, who are not afraid to venture over-seas, especially from a poverty-stricken highland. It has also always given them easy access to the British and French coasts of the Biscayan Atlantic—the strategic importance of which may be roughly summed up in the names of Cape Finisterre, the naval station of Ferrol, and Coruña. In early days, however, the remoteness of this north-western corner was more unfavourable to the development of the ria harbours than the extreme paucity of good harbours elsewhere was favourable.

The transverse “ west ” end of the Nevada system has similar features differently disposed, for both coasts of the strait face north or south, not west ; and neither Gibraltar nor Cartagena can be compared geographically with Ferrol as a naval station. Their historic importance has, of course, been much greater, but only because of their inter-“ oceanic ” and inter-continental location ; and Gibraltar is not only much inferior as a naval station to Ceuta, the last possession of the Byzantine empire on the Barbary Coast, but was recognised by the early navigators as inferior even to neighbouring Spanish ports. It was the soldier Tarik who was attracted by the Rock, Jebel el Tarik ; the Carthaginian

¹ Carthage, Kartha-Hadtha, already meant “ The New Town.”

sailors had placed their port of Carteia at the head of the Algeciras Bay, on a site where there was much less exposure to the westerly gales and to the easterly current than at Gibraltar—at a time, of course, when the advantage of the 1,200-foot rock-wall, facing directly towards the saturated west winds, was not appreciated as a medium for obtaining drinking-water for an alien garrison. They greatly preferred—to both of the others—the bay of Mastia, where they built Cartagena (which the Romans renamed Carthago Nova), with its sheltering island of Scombraria, “Mackerel Isle.”

Before leaving the particular point, we may notice that Ceuta is actually nearer than Gibraltar to the middle line of the strait, for Cape Tarifa (36° N.) is farther south than Europa Point. It has a better climate, all the advantages of Gibraltar as a port of call and almost none of the strategic disadvantages, the power of being self-supporting in food, and admirable sites for two harbours. Yet, undoubtedly, the Spaniards would give us the immensely more valuable territory in exchange, if only to get rid of such a monument of Externalism as Gibraltar must seem to them, and to the world at large; and if we could give Helgoland to Germany, as a “friendly gesture”—a most valuable pawn when properly used—in exchange for *nothing which she had the right or the power to give*, surely we could make here another friendly gesture, and one much to our own advantage and without any fear (or even possibility) of the “gift” being misused.

From the beginning of navigation in the Atlantic, Gades (originally Gadeira) held naturally the control of all trade between the ocean and the midland sea; its harbour was sheltered from westerly gales by the island itself (Isla de Leon), which was joined to the mainland by a bridge over a shoal exactly as at Tyre; and the depth of water was always ample for primitive vessels (? up to 500 tons burden).

But except under the Phoenicians—unless the story really refers to Tartessus—when it may have traded as far north as England and as far south as Guinea, Gades, though the natural port of the richest part of the whole peninsula, was not prosperous until the country was developed *by land*.

This was probably owing to three distinct causes. The initial one was almost certainly the jealousy¹ of Carthage, which seems to have strained every nerve to injure the older city. The second was the ease of navigation up the Guadalquivir, “The Great River,” at least up to Seville (*Sephela*, “The Plain”). The main stream, though 375 miles in length, rises at a comparatively low elevation (1,600 feet), and is rain-fed in winter, while its Jenil tributary rises on the snowy shoulders of Mulahacen (11,400 feet), and is snow-fed in summer, so that the main waterway has a relatively constant volume, floods usually not raising the level more than *c.* 8 feet. The third cause was the wish of the Carthaginians, once they had complete control of the city (*c.* 500 B.C.), to have their headquarters as near as possible to the mines, *i.e.* at Seville and Corduba; and it was for this reason that they actually destroyed Tartessus, which stood on a sandy island in the Guadalquivir estuary, and so was a more serious rival to Seville than Gades could ever be. The recent regulation of the river in the interest of Seville involves the same result, though the modern trade² is very different in some respects.

It was the memory of old wrongs that made Cadiz, like “Greek” Saguntum, help the Romans so cordially in the Punic Wars; and when the victors began to develop

¹ She closed the Straits against both friends (? Pytheas) and foes.

² Tartessus (Tarshish), based on the vast mineral wealth between the Anas (*Guadiana*) and the Suaro (*Jucar*), was importing *Guinea* gold and ivory and *Breton*, if not also British, tin by B.C. 1000 (*cf.* 2 Chron. ix. 21); later (*cf.* Ezekiel xxvii. 12), in her palmy days as a bronze-worker (*c.* 600 B.C.), under her king Arganthonus (“Silver”), she paid more attention to necessaries (iron, tin, lead). There are still a Tharsis mine and a Solomon’s hill near Huelva.

the country by land, Cadiz became very important, but as a Roman city rather than as a Baetic port. Consequently, it soon began to decline, and the decline was hastened by the Roman conquest of Gaul, which opened up a much shorter route to the Bay of Biscay at Bordigala (Bordeaux) *viâ* Narbo and Tolosa or *viâ* Tarraco and Pompelo (Pamplona). Certainly, Imperial Rome did more trade with Spain than with any other country, but she was only three or four days' sail from Tarraco, but six or seven from Gades. The Romans, too, like the Castilians later, made themselves into quite good marines, but were never real mariners; and so they could not develop an ocean port properly. Indeed, they gave to the roadstead of Almeria, which till recently was quite inaccessible in stormy weather, the name of Magnus¹ Portus (!)—apparently, only because it had fairly easy access *inland* between the Sierra Nevada proper and the Sierra Baza along the route now followed by the railway from Almeria to Guadix.

The truth was that Spain became too Roman, especially in the south. Not only had the people of Baetica, as we have seen, forgotten their own language by the time of Christ, but *no* troops need be kept in the province; and Iberia as a whole—apart from providing troops—had so little share in Imperial wars, external or internal, and her tiny legacy of old Semitic culture was so alien, that there was nothing to disturb steady Roman development.

Further, though the “nebrissa” drunk in Imperial Rome was probably sherry, and though the great “Augustan” road had its terminus at Gades, Rome wanted little from the immediate neighbourhood of the port; and the safest route for the Baetic staples which she did want, especially the grain and the oil, was not by sea along the Barbary Coast, but by the great road to Tarraco, where

¹ They gave the same name to Coruña, but only as a translation of the Greek μέγας λιμήν.

the same ¹ staples were also being shipped to Rome from Tarraconensis—"the hinterland of Tarraco."

All the time, too, the actual harbour of Cadiz was deteriorating, for the Guadalete, though only "the Little River," brought down, as it still does, tons of mud from the Ronda range, which the inward current from the ocean helps to bottle up in Cadiz Bay—a trouble from which Malaga, if not Seville, was free. Even to-day the precise location of the port is adverse to the development of its trade; for it stands on one of the greatest sea-routes in the world, used by every mercantile marine, and British or Dutch, Norwegian or German, boats can accept Spanish goods as secondary cargo at rates which are unprofitable for Spanish boats taking them as primary cargo and without much prospect of any return cargo.

Both in position and in configuration the Lisbon coast is intermediate and transitional between that of Vigo and Coruña and that of Gibraltar and Cadiz, for Cape Roca is the terminus of the great central series of sierras (Estrella, Gata, Gredos, Guadarrama), which forms the northern watershed of the Tagus; and the terminal serras of Cintra and Analida (which comes to the sea where Cape Espichel shelters Setubal, *i.e.* "St. Ives") face, like the intervening estuary, south-west, while the river flows almost due south below Abrantes and almost due west above it.

In the lee of the Cintra serra behind Torres Vedras and to windward of the "Sloyne lake" of Mar da Palha, Lisbon had as good a chance as Liverpool of becoming a great port except for its hinterland. Its "lake" protects it from floods; its "bottle-neck" concentrates tidal scour; its river-valley enables it to stretch safely north and then strike surely east, and so from the seaward base to threaten the flank of any armies moving, as the French usually moved, north-and-south across the parallel lines of ridge

¹ Lenda is still the chief oil centre in the north, as Jaen is in the south.

and river-valley that cross the meseta from east to west. Indeed, from the first Lisbon was a strategic point. For Olisippo, "the Walled Town," like Gades, "the Enclosed Town," was a typical fortified "factory," where hills on the safe side of the river were almost as good a defence as the Gades island; and the paucity of islands round the Iberian coast no doubt accounts for the number of these "Walled Towns"—half a dozen besides Lisbon, of which Baesippo (? modern Palomas) was the most important.

But the ultimate importance of Lisbon was due rather to its regional than to its local advantages, for locally it shares all and just the disadvantages of Liverpool, with the addition of a poor hinterland. Nearness to the Mediterranean was a great asset in the Phœnician days and even in the Carthaginian; it gave the city an advantage over Turoqua (Vigo), and Brigantium (Coruña), with its Roman lighthouse, for traffic with Rome by sea; it made it the natural rendezvous of Hanseatic and Levantine traders. Distance from the Mediterranean, on the contrary, gave it the advantage over Cadiz when danger, Carthaginian or Moorish, threatened from Africa,—when Portugal was glad to be in touch with the northern Crusaders,—when the pivot of European power began to move northwestward, and even Palos was for a season more famous than Cadiz.

The Romans made the Lower Douro the western boundary between Lusitania and Tarraconensis, and built Portus Cale; and, as they approached Lusitania *viâ* the Douro valley, it was more or less natural that the landward territory south of the river should become Estremadura, "the Lands beyond the Douro," and that the seaward territory should become Portucale. But it remained for the landmen of the eleventh century to give the name of O-porto, "*The Port*," to a place which to-day is not even a port for ocean traffic, and which is approached by large vessels not *viâ* the Douro at all, but *viâ* the purely artificial

“ quadrangle ” of its outport, Leixoes—where each side of the square harbour is 1,000 yards long.

There is no need to elaborate the point further. It is obvious that Iberia is gravely deficient in natural inlets and outlets by sea, such as we might expect to find in a peninsula ; and its coast has been more a barrier to inlet than a base for outlet. In any case, the shape of the peninsula and the absence of articulation involve a minimum proportion of coast to area, so that its people were almost doomed to make a minimum use of the position between ocean and inland sea, while its fairly easy access to Rome by land, as illustrated in the Punic Wars, and the character of Roman development favoured relations by land rather than by sea and by sea rather than by ocean. This was all the more unfortunate because the sea face is relatively short, and inherited a Mediterranean attitude to navigation generally, and specially to ocean navigation. For centuries the Pillars of Hercules marked “ the limit of habitable land,” and the Sacrum Promontorium (Prince Henry’s Sagres and our St. Vincent) was “ sacred ” only because it led mortals from *Land’s End*—through the terrors and the treacheries of ocean—to the “ Isles of the Blessed.”

This is essentially the true Ibero-Mediterranean attitude to the sea, and it is found wherever that racial type has spread, even in lands where the wanderers had to accept an alien Keltic speech ; and so it is often, but quite wrongly, spoken of as “ Celtic.” For that dream of the isle as a retreat—strange, but still safe and sunny and serene—for tired souls and bodies was born of the tideless Mediterranean ; nothing was less Keltic. And even a Mediterranean dreamer—though, no doubt, he was in compulsory exile on his isle of Patmos—could paint a perfect Heaven as having “ no more sea.”

Even the land boundary minimised the chances of the

"Iberians" making effective use of their peninsularity, for the Pyrenees have been one of the most stubborn barriers on the face of the earth—far more absolute than the Alps, as might be inferred from the survival of Andorra as an autonomous unit in the heart of the system. They are only some 250 miles in length, they have an extreme height so low as to justify their name (Keltic *Biren*, "High Pastures"), and they are less than 50 miles wide towards the west and not more than 100 miles in the east; but they lie in a more or less rigid straight line, they have a continuous crystalline axis, and the main crest is pure sierra, notched at the ends of the "herring-bone" wrinkles (N.W.—S.E. and N.E.—S.W.) that crown it. They maintain, therefore, a very uniform and relatively great average height; and the main crest, with one important exception in the Aran basin, makes an indisputable frontier between France and Spain even where it does not coincide with the actual waterparting. The folding up against the meseta (in the marginal latitudes of the Mediterranean climate) left the system with only one-third of its width north of the crest (with dense forest along the northern piedmont), and the two-thirds as a broad belt of uninhabitable sierra to the south. The system made, therefore, not merely a nominal political frontier, but a definite and differentiating barrier—racial, cultural, linguistic,¹ and economic. Cf. p. 298.

The detailed features account for this. The central section (Port de Canfranc to the Aran) includes all the highest peaks—Maladetta (Aneto) and Mamoré, Poseto and Perdu, all in Spain and all about 11,000 feet in height; and all the glaciers (which are quite small, and run parallel with the wrinkles rather than perpendicularly from them), are associated with the snow-line to the north of the crest—at c. 9,000 feet, contrasted with 10,000 to the south of it.

¹ The linguistic barrier is between French and Spanish, the actual montaña, e.g. in Navarre, having been the historic home of Basque.

The northern face, too, is the steeper; but both faces are built of terraces with immense precipices, sometimes 3,000 feet high (*e.g.* Añiselo). No pass in this section is below 6,500 feet.

Westward both height and width decrease—with increase of rainfall, but even there the Betale¹ pass on the main route from Bayonne to Pamplona reaches nearly 3,000 feet, and the famous Navarre pass of Roncesvalles reaches very nearly 4,000; and nearness to the Atlantic means dense forest and heavy snow, which neutralise the relative lowness of the passes. In the dry eastern section, the height remains remarkably uniform, the Col de Canfranc and the Col de la Perche being respectively just above and just below 5,000² feet; the width of the system increases, and the wild granitic surface is very difficult; and the absence of forest is only partly climatic and—so far as it is not climatic—relatively recent. *Andorra* is really *Al-Darra*, “the Forest Land,”; urgent need for fuel in the bitter winter has been responsible for wide deforestation.

When the rarity and the height of the passes are associated with the large number of plunging torrents that have no lakes to check them, with the large number of magnificent cirques that back the southward basins, *e.g.* that of Pineda, and with the height and the abruptness of the terrace walls, it is obvious why the Pyrenean system, as a Great Divide, has been so much more effective than the Alpine, though the main passes in the Alps are actually

¹ The overwhelming importance in early times of the *higher* Roncevaux (Roncesvalles) pass was doubtless due to three causes—the economic importance of the “Dax” saltfield, the need for southward traffic to work *eastward* of the Landes and the Adour marshes, and the natural preference of the pilgrims (*viâ* Carcassone to Santiago) for the *first* pass that they came to. Pilgrims to Lourdes still follow the same route, and the cathedral at Santiago is a copy of one at Toulouse.


² The Col de Perthus is only *c.* 800 feet, but the railway from Perpignan to Figueras tunnels its way along the coast instead of using the pass.

much higher. By such a barrier even Nordic adventurers, who could have made more use of the Iberian peninsularity, were somewhat daunted ; and their natural line of access from the great European plain, *i.e.* between the Pyrenees and the Cantabrians, led them directly to the heart of the meseta, where Spain is no more peninsular than it is pluvial, but continental in both character and climate. Nordic (and Alpine) elements in the population have thus been minimised ; and, though both Goths and Vandals—like the Kelts—entered the area through real Basque country, the Basques were never Teutonised any more than they were Romanised. The narrower belt of an alien, non-Aryan speech may have been another cause of the preference for the Roncevaux over the Betale route.

Even now the barrier is still very serious, especially economically. A good proportion of the total foreign trade does use the railway across the Bidassoa bridge *viâ* Irun and Hendaye, and quite a fair amount travels by various “roads” that wind through the chain from the north of Navarre and Aragon ; but the railway gauge changes at Hendaye, and the “roads” are not kept in good repair, and are often made impassable in winter by heavy snow, especially in Navarre.

SURFACE

About three-quarters of the area can be described as a typical Euro-Asiatic meseta, of old hard rock, largely granitic. It has a higher average altitude than any other inhabited area in Europe, being seldom below 2,000 feet ; but its critical line is the 3,000-foot contour, for it is really this that divides Old Castile from New Castile and both from Aragon, Leon from Galicia and Asturias, and New Castile from Andalusia and Murcia. It is so compact that a circle described from Talavera with a radius of 250 miles cuts ports on every coast—Cartagena, Cadiz,



THE RELIEF OF IBERIA.

The broken line shows the effective limits of the meseta. The line of dots is the waterparting between the long, gradual slope to the Atlantic Ocean and the short, sharp slope to the Mediterranean Sea.

The "Catalan" arrow suggests easy movements—for Carthaginians and Arabs, Rome and Aragon—between Tarraco or Barcino (Barcelona) and Palma or Mago (Mahon). Both Barca and Mago were famous Punic names.

Lisbon, Santander, a suggestive comment on the centrality of Toledo, and even of Aranjuez and Madrid.

Obviously, Toledo, with its immemorial story, had the most appropriate site for the political or ecclesiastical capital of the peninsula as a continental block. It was equally appropriate from its immediate setting. At Aranjuez (*Ara Jovis*, "Jupiter's Altar") the Tagus plunges down to the 1200-foot contour, and the twenty-five miles of fertile *vega* to Toledo, and as much again west of the city, were an unfailing source of food, while the Roman fortress (*loco munita*, "a natural fortress," according to Livy), like its Visigoth successor, crowned a river-girt horseshoe of granite hills cut clean out of the south wall of the valley. The river cut down into the granite below in meandering over soft Tertiary strata that have been swept away. Nothing could be more suggestive of the age of the meseta.

But shape and altitude are very far from being the only isolating factors. The block has so steep a face that even trunk railways to-day may have to climb 1,000 feet in a dozen miles, as between Linares and Manzanares. This makes them as costly to work as they were to build, even though twenty-five per cent. of the system is narrow gauge; and even where relief is favourable, as over the bare flats (*paramos*) of the meseta, population is so scanty that freightage is very high (*cf.* p. 77). In the meantime, therefore, the construction of an obvious short-cut, which would save a whole week on the journey to England from the Valencia fruit-markets (Castellon to Denia)—up the Levante scarp *viâ* the Teruel lignite, the Soria potash, and the great natural junction of Burgos, to Santander—is out of the question.

The block has, too, an upturned edge, which is highest relatively, *i.e.* above the level of the *paramos*, where the meseta itself is lowest, *i.e.* in the west, to windward and rainward—actually about 7° W.; and in the course of ages

the parapet even of this lower part of the meseta, like the parapet elsewhere, has weathered into most fantastic forms, which deserve more attention from historical geographers than they have had. It is a far cry from Al-Cantara, "The Bridge" (of Trajan), and Al-Mena, "The Minaret," to the Brigg of Turk and the Trossachs; but all the Moors had a wonderful eye—the observant eye of those who survive in the desert—for country, and a geographical sense which led them to teach geography in Spain from *globes* (to children of both sexes, in free schools), 500 years before Christian Europe had ceased to burn people alive for even asserting, as David had asserted, that the world was round. They named rivers from their colour, *e.g.* Guadalaviar ("White") and Guadalimar ("Red"), and from their character, *e.g.* Guadalaxara ("Stony") and Guadarrama ("Sandy"); so, Al-Meida is on a "Table," and Al-Manza on a "Plain."

It is always asserted that Castile took its name from the Castellos, or "Forts," which were built to defend it from the Moors; but the Moors over-ran the whole area within three years, and they named it Ardo-l-Kal'ah, "Castle Land." The land could not have been covered with Castellos in three short years, for the time was not enough; nor could there have been opportunity, with the victorious Moorish cavalry always advancing over the windless levels against knights *in heavy armour* under an Iberian sun. Were the Castellos already there? If so, who built them? ¹ And why were they needed in the most peaceful provinces of the later empire? The very success of the Vandal raids was due mainly to the fact that Spain had been denuded of Roman troops. Why do we talk of "Castles in Spain" only when they do *not* materialise? We have our own Castle Craggs, Combes, Heads, Rocks;

¹ The tiny political units (50 to 100 persons) amongst the Iberians did live in "peels," but these were definitely houses rather than forts.

so had the Dinosaurs in the Flaming Cliffs. What did the Moors really mean by Calahorra, "Castle of Stones"? Were not all the Castellos built of stone? Stone was the only material available, and was lying about everywhere. If Al-Mena is really a "Battlemented Fort" (though one would have thought that all forts were battlemented), why have we borrowed the word *minaret* from it? It is surely probable that—

"The rocky summits, split and rent,
Formed turret, dome, and battlement,
Or seemed fantastically set
With cupola or minaret."

Just think what a natural Al-Borge, "The Turret," or an Al-Mena, "The Parapet-spire," suggested to Moslems! Or—if you have visited them—how you were yourself mistaken, from a distance, about the "Serrania" of Cuenca or the Laurraun "parapet" of Pamplona!

The ocean rampart of the meseta, besides its adverse affect on rainfall to leeward, marks off Portugal as naturally separate from the Castiles and even from Spain as a whole; and, by depriving the Portuguese of a natural hinterland, it impelled them seaward. But there was no serious political separation till the eleventh century, and even then it was based partly on the bitter jealousy between the primates of Santiago and Braga, and was confirmed later by the artificial desert "burnt" by Alphonso I along the western strip¹ of the meseta in order to protect his landward flank from the Moors.

The young folded mountains that buttress the meseta on both the north and the south, do so closely and continuously on the north, but loosely and discontinuously on the south; and where the young folds were thrust up against the block, the surface of the latter was ribbed—

¹ It is most improbable that "he burnt the whole of Old Castile."

perhaps, along very old (Pre-Cambrian) lines—with a series of ridges of sierra type, lying roughly parallel with the southern folds, *i.e.* S.W.—N.E., and having maximum height in the central line—from the extreme western limit of Europe in Cape Roca, which the Romans thought worthy of the title *Magnum Promontorium*, to Moncayo (7,700 feet), where a *treeless* dome overhanging the Iberus (Ebro), seemed to deserve the nickname of *Mons Calvus*, “The Baldheaded Mountain.”

Wherever one found a lonely block of such a character outside very high or very low latitudes, even if it had never been trodden by the foot of man, one could forecast with some confidence certain peculiarities of its water régime. There must be a quick run-off, especially if and where the rocks are neither porous nor horizontal, and a quick run-through, especially if and where they are both porous and horizontal; there must be also quick evaporation by day and in summer, and quick radiation by night and in winter. But there will not be much water to run off or through or to evaporate, for any saturated indraught is likely to be robbed of its moisture in climbing the scarp of the block; and in the dry air of the interior, especially if and where there are horizontal strata, rivers will cut cañons, and so drain the surface even more exhaustingly.

Such conditions must involve normally aloofness and monotony and aridity in the environment of human life; and the human response to the semi-desert control is as often indifference as that to the stark desert is fatalism. The one trait is as typical of the Iberian particularist as the other is of the patriarchal Bedouin, and it is not surprising that the emotional qualities in Spanish art are subdued, though the artist himself has the passion of a fanatic.

But the conditions involve other results, which to some may seem less disputable. For, obviously, the depth of the cañons and the height of the pairs of ridges which

flank them (over 8,700 feet in the Gredos) make movement northward or southward across the meseta very difficult. Indeed, in time of war the difficulties are immense ; for the physical conditions are as favourable to guerilla warfare as to the subdivision of the area into small, isolated self-centred "pockets," which foster provincialism in the natives, and make co-operation in force almost impossible for intruders. When these conditions are related to the tilt of the block down towards the ocean, it is apparent that supreme importance must be attached to the direction of the ridges and river-valleys, the gaps joining one valley to another, and the Atlantic exit of the valleys. The names of towns marking such gaps are household words in Military History, especially that of England and France, and almost every important gap is associated with such names. The slow Roman conquest worked westward across the north ; the rapid Moorish conquest, greatly facilitated by the Via Augusta and other Roman roads that circuited the meseta, worked eastward across the south ; Wellesley kept on striking eastward across the centre. Even here, however, the great central cañon of the Tagus ("The Gash" ?), beneath the overhanging brows of the Gata and Guadalupe, the Gredos and Toledo sierras, was only a trap ; he tried it once, and was only saved by the heroism of his men at Talavera.

Of course, the isolating conditions referred to above are most unfavourable to real political unity, whether natural or artificial ; and the latter had no chance of success unless spread from a natural centre, such as Toledo or Madrid. Even so it was quite unable to affect seriously, still less to neutralise completely, either the regionalism or the externalism. From the Phœnician era down to our own, Spain has been exploited by foreigners and specially by foreigners bent on the exploitation of minerals ; Iberian trade under Rome was almost entirely in the hands of

Italian and Gallic traders, and it was exploitation of minerals that denuded so much of the area of its original cover of wood (for props and fuel).

At the same time all the adverse factors have actually proved less influential than the combined effects of the unifying factors—the compactness and the isolation of the whole peninsula, the dominating size and monotonous environment of the Castilian meseta, the total area—too large for premature development and too small for suicidal incoherence, the Roman base—very strong and widely spread, the struggle against the Moors—especially as a religious struggle, and in modern times the growing consciousness of the disintegrating influence of extreme regionalism and of the extravagance of leaving exploitation to foreigners. The one supreme influence was the five centuries of struggle against the Moors ; and in this, if the sword was that of Castile, the spirit was that of Galicia, where the environment is utterly *non-Mediterranean*, and where the only Roman influence that ever conquered was spiritual, not military.

The melancholy monotony of the meseta may be associated with the African character of the river-system. The great basins are up on the plateau ; their mutual relations, considering the smallness of the area, are difficult—just as difficult as those of the French basins are easy ; their descent to the flanking lowlands is broken by falls and rapids ; and their lower courses are ruined by swamps and sandbanks, such as that of Cabedello below Oporto.

The Douro and the Ebro basins are the largest, and are curiously alike in size, the two rivers being respectively rather more and rather less than 480 miles in length, and the two basins being respectively rather less and rather more than 38,000 square miles in area, *i.e.* larger than Portugal. Very little of the Ebro basin, except in the ex-centric Catalonia, and practically none of the Douro

basin in Spain, is below 1,000 feet ; most of the latter is above 2,000, and a fair fraction is above 3,000. Between them they completely dominate northern Spain, and the Douro drainage gives a fundamental unity to the northern half of the meseta (Leon and Old Castile), *i.e.* to the unifiers of Spain.

The Tagus and the Guadiana appear at first sight to do something similar for the southern half of the meseta (Estremadura and New Castile) ; but there is little real unity. The Tagus (570 miles in length), though nearly 100 miles longer than the Douro, rises nearly 2,000 feet lower (5,700 feet) ; it has a distinctly smaller basin (=Ireland) ; and it is deeply entrenched (? hence the name of Tagus,¹ "The Gash") in a narrow valley. Owing to the structure of the Sierra Morena and its Atlantic exposure, the Guadiana basin shows a much diversified southern edge ; it includes a good proportion of low land even east of the Portuguese frontier ; it has relatively easy access to the Jucar and to the Guadalquivir basins ; and in La Mancha it has the flattest expanse of the whole meseta.

Even if it cannot be proved, or seems actually to have been disproved, that the Douro basin once contained a vast Miocene lake, there is no question that here, as in the Guadiana basin, drainage was for ages very difficult. Over large areas, especially in the Campos and La Mancha, there is a cover of very recent alluvium—not very thick, but quite fertile and well-suited to wheat, especially in the higher latitudes of the "Lake Valladolid" floor ; and there is still a considerable aggregate of marsh, more or less saline, especially in the lower latitudes and on the dead levels of La Mancha.

So far as relief is concerned, movement eastward across the meseta is relatively easy in these two regions, but only

¹ The name might originally have been Dagus, "the Fish River." Cf. Dagon, "the Fish God."

here—over the Campos *viâ* Burgos to Logroño and over La Mancha *viâ* Manzanares to Albacete. As we have seen, the tilt of the block down to the west does not make movement easy between Portugal and the meseta—which throws some light on the political independence of Portugal, while the tilt up to the east does make movement very difficult between the Levante lowlands and the meseta, even by the Jalon and the Jucar gorges. But movement round the block has been relatively easy, even for cavalry, especially since Rome built 12,000 miles of roads round it, though there was always a serious hiatus in the north-west. It was this relative ease that helped the Moorish cavalry to over-run the mass of the peninsula so rapidly; it was the hiatus that—like the English hiatus in south-western France, though for different reasons—drew special importance to a native rallying-point, in Leon. The English menace, of course, faded from France; but the forested recesses and the perennial rains of “Atlantic” Spain, remained. And forested mountains, as the Turks found out in Austria, afford very difficult ground for cavalry, while perennial rain does not suit either horses or horsemen from the desert.

HISTORICAL “RESPONSE”



The fundamental importance of this horseshoe of easy circuit becomes very clear if one follows the series of later battlefields from the last foothold of the Christians in the northern mountains to that of the infidels in the southern. By the victories of Tudela (A.D. 1114), Saragossa (1118), Tortosa (1148), and Lerida (1149), Aragon and Catalonia were freed finally from the power of the Moors; by those of Leiria (1135), Lisbon (1147), and Evora (1166), Portugal was freed; Elvas (1225) and Badajoz (1228) freed the south-western gate of the meseta, as Valencia (1237) and Murcia (1243) freed the south-eastern, and thus

both ends of the Guadalquivir—Segura trough were secured. But, once the Moors had been driven down the Despeña-Perros ("Dogs' Gate") pass, which now carries the main line from Madrid to Seville, Cordova (A.D. 1236) was the right point from which to strike westward for Seville (1244) and eastward for Jaen (1246), the latter commanding the direct approach on Granada between the Parapanda and Lucena sierras.

Unfortunately, the very gradual and piecemeal reconquest only accentuated the regionalism and even the externalism from which Iberia had already suffered so much. Each natural region seemed to have its own complex of strategic and tactical problems, and passage to a new region involved a new complex. This was, no doubt, a good reason for a pause in which to organise the region just freed and to prepare a new plan of campaign before going forward to free the new region; but in practice it meant that the newly freed region, especially in the case of Portugal, was left to itself, whereupon it naturally began to think only of itself, and to be indifferent to the fate of other regions. This gave to the fanatical Castilian soldiers the opportunity of appearing almost everywhere as deliverers, and so greatly increased the influence of Castile (*cf.* p. 97); and it greatly strengthened, incidentally, the ties of friendship between Portugal¹ and the English.

The latter were directly concerned about the freedom—for trade—of the Portuguese coast; and, if they helped one Alphonso against the Moors, they helped another against Castile. Indeed, in some ways the interests of the two maritime peoples were almost identical. For when Islam blocked the Levant routes, Portugal had the best chance of all European countries of finding an alternative route to the east. Only a people living on the Atlantic coast in Portuguese latitudes could *know* at first hand the

¹ Tartessus certainly worked a tin-trade between Cornwall and the Tagus.



BATTLES OF RECONQUEST FROM THE MOORS.

The heavy black line marks the boundary of Moorish dominion at its greatest extent, but the Moors actually reached Covadonga and even Gihon.

unfailing alternation of N.E. winds "outward" in summer and S.W. winds "inward" in winter; and, once the Crusaders had freed Oporto and Lisbon from the Moors, Portugal should have been ready to make the great attempt. But from the Phœnician epoch onwards the country had been dependent on foreigners;¹ even the Azores were discovered, and linked with Iberia, by the Moors, not the Portuguese; and the busy medieval trade with England was English—Edward III was "the father of Portuguese trade." Indeed, Portugal did not become oceanic until his English mother, John of Gaunt's daughter, gave the instincts of an Island Race to Prince Henry the Navigator, along with his Nordic Christian name; and then one of his tenants in those Azores had a son-in-law called Columbus.

The ultimate sequel gives us a curious chapter in the Political Geography of a maritime empire. In Asia, round "Golden Goa," it was—most inappropriately for a seafaring people—aristocratic; and it failed mainly because it was at once parasitic and yet naturally not exclusive. In Africa to-day, it is a success as a bureaucracy, based on material resources, such as cacao. In South America it has been appropriately democratic, not fighting either the Amerinds or the Brazilians; and so Portuguese America refused to be sacrificed by Spain to Holland,—bore the cost of restoring the Braganza dynasty to Portugal after Waterloo,—and even interfered in Portugal to curb the tyranny of Miguel. In other ways, the children of Portugal in South America, in strong contrast with the experience of Spain, have remained in close cultural and political contact with their motherland.

The difference may, perhaps, be associated with the early history of Castile, as we have already suggested. While Portugal ultimately and naturally became maritime, the rest of Iberia became military, even on the northern

¹ Even the (unwarlike) Tartessians were probably foreigners—(?) Anatolians.

face of the Cantabrians and specially so on the southern face. For Old Castile (and Leon), became the dominating power; and behind Castile was Rome, as Republic, as Empire, as Church. When Rome first invaded Iberia, all Irreconcilables—Kelts, Iberians, etc.—took refuge in, or on the seaward face of, the Cantabrian system, where for centuries they had no opportunity seaward; and in self-defence Rome had to conquer the landward face thoroughly and to Romanise it effectively, settling ex-service men in it and garrisoning it with picked troops. Indeed, it was only the enormous preponderance of Iberian women that kept the human type practically unchanged, though entirely Roman in organisation; and, though the same retreats sheltered refugees from all subsequent invasions, *e.g.* of Vandals, Goths, and Alans, the Romanisation remained in all essentials, and was even carried across the mountain crest by the refugees to the coast people.

In the fateful crisis, amid the forested glens on the southern face of the range, but backed by the descendants of generations of such Irreconcilables, Romanised Leon survived, and revived. So did Navarre, with its cirque bastions, its Basque and Gascon people, its Atlantic and Mediterranean drainage, its Navas (hill-girt, flat-floored valleys), the forested hills as rich in game as the fertile flats were productive of bread and meat and apples—that typical piedmont fruit of the Old World, which has left its Slavonic name across the map from the Jablunka pass to the Yablonoi “Mountains.”

From this “Atlantic” base Leon and Navarre began the reconquest; but, in spite of the vigour of little Navarre—in the van and quite independent of Leon even in the eleventh century—it was very slow. It would have been still slower but for the fact that the two immediate flanks, Aragon and Portugal, were, though in different ways, precisely those parts of the Cordova Caliphate which were

geographically least favourable to the Moors and farthest from the Cordova base ; and it might have been much quicker if control had not passed into the hands of Castile, and if the Castilians had thought more of the old Roman route of victory—Zaragoza (Cæsar Augustus), Pamplona (Pompeiopolis), Leon (*the* Legion), Badajoz (Pax Augusta), and Merida (the colony of the ex-servicemen, Emeriti), and less of the Gothic pursuit of the Vandals. For the general position, the special base, the main lines of movement in the Moorish (advance and) retreat were precisely those of the Carthaginians against Rome.

Once Leon and Castile were united (by marriage), the meseta was cleared of the infidels up to the Guadarrama frontier of Old Castile, and then on to the Morena frontier of New Castile ; and then even Andalusia became, and its speech has remained, Castilian. This seems to have roused the jealousy of Aragon, and given her the first impulse to look seaward instead of landward—over the 50 odd miles of sea between her own coast (at Cape Nao) and the Balearic Islands and on to Italy, and so to what proved a fatal goal. Cf. p. 91.

We must again notice that the fundamental difficulty was that Rome had done too much for Iberia, especially in the way of urbanisation—with its herd instinct. Even by the time of Augustus no less than fifty urban centres had full Roman citizenship, and at least fifty more had full Latin status ; and it was the very large local demand that developed the olive-oil industry of Bætica—itsself, evidently, as old as the Phœnician settlement at Cordova (*Coteba*, “the Oil-Press”)—to such an extent that surplus supplies could be exported *viâ* Seville even to the Romano-Spanish troops in Eboracum¹ (York).

The previous development of the peninsula had been

¹ Bushe-Fox records Spanish oil-jars also at Richborough, Corbridge, and Silchester.

entirely the work of foreigners, and foreigners working only on the margin of the land ; and it must have meant some premature exhaustion of wealth, such as is apt to exhaust also the political outlook and aptitudes of the inhabitants. But the Phœnicians had done little more than exploit, and the Carthaginian influence had been more or less confined to the east and south coastlands ; and so Rome had a clear field, even though a whole century of hard fighting did not give her complete control of the " Atlantic " mountains. Her ultimate success, however, may be judged from the fact that she could leave Bætica entirely without a garrison (*cf.* p. 78) and Lusitania with a very small one, and that the whole country was so peaceful that it became immensely prosperous, and made wonderful contributions to Latin literature, *e.g.* Quintilian, Martial, and Lucan. Indeed, Imperial Rome owed to Spain both her silver plate and her Silver Age.

But Spain was denuded of Roman troops *c.* 400 A.D., and the story had an unhappy ending ; for the inroads of Vandals, Suevi, and Alans, destroyed the unity imposed by Rome and the prosperity made possible by the *Pax Romana*. The mountaineers of the Cantabrians and the Nevada (the Orosipedans) maintained a sturdy tribal liberty, but the rest of the country became a prey to the Teuton hordes, and had no bond of union except a heritage of Roman law and Roman Christianity. Unfortunately, the difficulty was again solved from outside.

The Goths, as " commissioned allies " of Rome, destroyed the alien (Turan) Alans, drove the Suevi and some Vandals into the Atlantic corner, and swept the rest of the Vandals down into the fertile Bætic valley, which thus became Vandalusia. But for a century the Visigoth capital remained north of the Pyrenees—at Bordeaux or Toulouse or Narbonne. Even when the Visigoth kingdom was really Spanish, and the kings had thrown off allegiance to the

Roman Empire, they adopted the Frank plan, which had worked well in France, of buttressing the Crown with the Church; and they became Orthodox (instead of Arians), and established Roman Christianity as the religion of the State (*cf.* p. 84). Consequently, when Goth and Moor met, they represented the rival bigotries of mature and rigid creeds; it was even persecution by bishops of Toledo that had made the Jews intrigue with the Moors after the latter had swept Christianity out of northern Africa.

When Castile took over command against the infidel, she intensified this pestilential *odium theologicum*, and claimed (*cf.* p. 94), that she earned alike her title and the device on her armorial bearings by advancing her capital step by step and building castles for every step—from Cangas to Oviedo, Oviedo to Leon, Leon to Burgos, where gradually the montaña of Burdulia was converted into Castilia. Then Castile was linked by marriage to Aragon, as it had been to Leon; tribal units of such different speech as Galicia and Catalonia were united by the common struggle with the infidel; common legacies from Rome, legal and religious, made for union; and the sparsity of population and the strength of the environmental control tended towards homogeneity.

But dominating everything in the long run was the influence of 500 years of ceaseless war, which left indelible marks on art and science, literature and politics, Church and State, especially by poisoning the temperament of Castile. Pedro the Cruel and Torquemada were both natives of Old Castile; the only values recognised were military values; obsession with them made Castile blind to maritime values, and so she “lost” Portugal, as Prussia—for similar folly—“lost” the Hansa; every art or science practised by the Moors was discredited and discarded; political influence was centred entirely on the meseta, where a government had least resources, least reserves of

men, least accessibility from Cadiz and Lisbon and Barcelona. Indeed, the barren meseta and its military people were not only naturally antagonistic to the fertile lowlands and their coastal people, but actually kept the various units apart from one another, rather as Bismarck's Germany kept the surrounding Powers apart,—intensifying in a hundred ways the fatal regionalism and externalism. Such was the price that Spain had to pay for ejecting the Infidel from Christendom ; and any criticism of Spain since then should be solidly based on full recognition of what the Banner of the Cross meant to her in blood, in burdens, and in brutalisation. At least it is true that the fanatic Spaniard was fighting for the Unity of Christendom, while the diplomatic Frenchman was engineering the nationality of France ; but genius is whole-hearted, while talent is very circum-spect.

So far as the issue was partly a natural reaction and partly an unnatural legacy, we may look for a single cause working out in a double way. For the *Pax Romana*, alike by its virtues and by its vices, did for ancient Iberia very much what the *Pax Britannica* has done for modern India. Whatever unity existed, was Roman unity, the result of a superior and external control ruling over and over-ruling a medley of inferior and internal centrifugal forces ; it was not the outward and visible sign of an internal coherence achieved by compromise and co-operation between uncongenial elements. And the control was removed too soon : Iberia was not ready for " Dominion Status " ; it had not even learnt to be orderly, still less to organise.

The moment that the Barbarians cut the Imperial roads, and the external control was broken, Iberia dissolved into a mere geographical expression, without real unity of race or speech, of environment or interest. The first raiders were neither numerous enough nor coherent enough to exercise wide or firm control, and their work and

influence were mainly or merely destructive. More might be expected of the Goths, and they did carry out some effective and constructive work, achieving "Dominion Status" and even establishing an independent kingdom; but from the first they seemed to degenerate. We shall find a similar phenomenon amongst Northern intruders in ancient Greece, and we should find it also in Italy if the climate of Lombardy were typically Mediterranean instead of being Central European. with *more* rain in the summer half of the year (April—September) than in the winter half. Cf. p. 11.

But the strain and the necessary changes of habit were more severe in Spain than in Greece; and more than the Gothic monarchy came to an end in A.D. 711. There was an end of a whole system of government and material development that had proved unequal to the task which confronted it—unequal, probably, because external and alien; and some part in the failure, as in Greece, was probably played by a geographical factor, the relation of the relief and the latitude of the meseta to the brightness and the colour of the light.

In the stark Trade-wind summers of the southern latitudes, the Gothic foresters of the European plain, even if they reached Iberia *viâ* the Danubian steppes, seem to have been over-stimulated by the bright light (cf. p. 17), and thus reduced to scattered coteries of quarrelsome neurotics; and the mixed host of Arabs, Syrians, and Berbers, that we call "the Moors," took advantage of the weakness and the quarrels to conquer the country. For them the movement northward was into a more and not a less favourable climate, and yet one that was sufficiently "familiar" to involve no serious changes of habit. On the contrary, the introduction of their terrace-culture, their better methods of irrigation, their astringent fruits, was quite easy and immensely profitable. They made the Valencia *huerta*, as it still is, the most densely peopled

“ market-garden ” in the world outside of Asia ; and they were able to hold some part of the peninsula for half a millennium. Indeed, it is possible to believe that they might have been there still and in possession of the whole peninsula, if they had not made the one immediate and irremediable mistake of thinking that “ Africa ” extended north of the Pyrenees, and if the Berber element had been given the arable *huertas* instead of the barren meseta.

CLIMATE

It is usual to divide Iberia into two major climatic regions, the one with and the other without sufficient rain to supply naturally the normal needs of Mediterranean man, especially his bread and “ meat.” This means, in the first instance, grain and pulse, for the orchards and vineyards which supply his “ butter ” and fruit and drink, are much less dependent on the actual rainfall ; and, of course, the goats and sheep, which supplement the “ meat ” and “ butter ” and drink, are still less dependent on it.

This rough division into what we may call the Pluvial and the Parched, is as old as the Roman differentiation between Cis-Cantabrian and Trans-Cantabrian spheres. But the moment that we try to give titles to the divisions, we find ourselves in difficulties. If we call the Trans-Cantabrian (*trans* from the Rome standpoint) area “ North-West European,” we ignore seasonal values and their reflection in, *e.g.* the presence of maize as the bread-stuff of Galicia ; if “ Atlantic,” we fail to distinguish between the north and the west coasts, and to understand the wide reputation of Cantabrian acorn-fed hams in the days of Pliny and Strabo—or the appreciation of them by Sir John Moore’s men centuries later. So, if we call the Cis-Cantabrian “ Mediterranean,” we ignore three-fourths of it—where a drift of winter air may “ kill a man without extinguishing his candle ” ; if “ Continental,” we ignore the other fourth.

We might call it "African"—in the same sense as we might say that any of the climates of Africa was literally African; but we cannot classify under any two heads which do not suggest a simplicity which does not exist, or comparisons which are false. There is clearly climatic control even behind the regionalism.

The one thing which seems to be reasonably certain, is that Mediterranean man has flourished best under conditions that are really typical of the greater part of the European coastlands of the Mediterranean Sea—with temperatures of *c.* 50° F. in winter and 75° F. in summer, mild and wet winters followed by a dry and bright summer, and the rainy season (as in monsoon lands) beginning and ending with relative violence in the Former and the Latter rains of the Autumn and the Spring equinoxes. These conditions imply certain relations of mountain and inland sea to intervening lowlands in definite latitudes ($\pm 40^\circ$ N.) and even then only when the sea is encircled by the land, not the land merely flanked by the sea. It may be convenient to call the climate, *e.g.* of Central Chile or Central California, "Mediterranean," but only in relation to the seasonal winds; the January temperature of Santiago is below 68° F., and that of San Francisco in July is below even 58° F., *i.e.* less than that of Nairn or Bergen, while its maximum comes in September.

If the above conditions may be accepted as typically Mediterranean, what are we to make of a unit which gives us a minimum rainfall in July on both its Atlantic and its Mediterranean coasts—at Santiago and Barcelona, and its next driest month at the Mediterranean station in January? Santiago, however, has only one maximum (7·8" in January) and one minimum (2" in July), while Barcelona has the normal two maxima (3·4" in September and 2" in April) and two minima (0·9" in July and 1·3" in January). Santiago, again, like other marginal towns, *e.g.*

Lisbon, Seville, Murcia—and like typical Italian towns—has its maximum temperature delayed till August, while Barcelona, like meseta towns, *e.g.* Burgos and Salamanca, Madrid and Ciudad Real—and like typical Balkan towns—has it in July. On the other hand, as in all other Mediterranean lands of Europe, practically no place has its minimum temperature in either December or February.

Some other curious little coincidences or discrepancies are worth noting. The maximum rainfall occurs in December at Seville, in November at Oporto, in October at San Sebastian—and in March at Oviedo, in April at Madrid, in May at Murcia. Autumn is the wettest season ($3\frac{2}{3}$ " out of $11\frac{1}{2}$ " at Salamanca, but May (nearly $1\frac{1}{2}$ " is the wettest month; and Estremadura is the only province that has a steady and uniform monthly rainfall from October to May. Climatically, then, Iberia is not a typical Mediterranean area, and regionalism is again rampant.

Comparison between Estremadura and Leon illustrates the difference between plateau and mountain controls. The Leon area is true, uniform plateau, directly (W.) open to the ocean, but the Estrella crest intercepts the prevailing wind (S.W.), and has the heaviest rainfall in Iberia. This explains the small rainfall and the low humidity of Salamanca; and then, in the dry air, the plateau heats up so rapidly (11 per cent. rise from March to April, and 14 per cent. from April to May), that it encourages the marked temporary indraught which makes May the wettest month. In Estremadura the range of relief between the Tagus and the Guadiana troughs and the Guadalupe crest is nearly 4,000 feet; and each trough acts as a funnel leading to a *cul de sac*. Landward of Leon altitude and latitude give Old Castile marked extremes of winter cold, while landward of Estremadura the extremes in New Castile tend to be rather of summer heat—the "Hell" of Sancho Panza and his mule; but the absence of cloud may actually give

as low a temperature to New Castile in winter as is felt under the clouded skies of Old Castile, and the December cold in both is typically continental. Frost may occur even in New Castile as late as May.¹

With such details to qualify any generalisations, we may return to the fundamental division of the whole area into Pluvial and Parched, and try to determine some relative values; and it is rather difficult to believe that the Pluvial (above 600 mm. annually) represents literally *c.* 45 per cent. of the whole peninsula, and even 35 per cent. of Spain alone. If the actual proportion is so large, why has its influence been so small? The answer is to be found in its character and its location.

In the first place, a very large proportion of the Pluvial area is represented by mountains. The Cantabrian system at the shortest (to the Minho) is 300 miles in length, and varies from 60 to twice 60 miles in breadth; it consists of a double series of rain-drenched, forest-veiled ranges, the inner being the higher, with intricate ramifications, including many parameras or lofty, flat-floored basins with precipitous sides often of great height (*cf.* Navas, p. 103). Many peaks are upwards of 6,000 feet, *i.e.* 1,000 feet above the probable level of maximum precipitation in those latitudes; a dozen exceed 7,000, and half a dozen vary from *c.* 8,000 to nearly 9,000. The main line from Gijon to Leon, which does not actually use the Pajares pass, goes through 59 tunnels. This natural fortress is further defended by a rugged and storm-beaten coast, where tides and currents are equally troublesome.

Besides being difficult in itself, the mass of this formidable and intricate highland is far withdrawn from any main axis of movement; for relief has forced all land movements into Iberia from Europe on to a couple of

¹ This occasionally happens on the Levante lowlands, but only inland, *e.g.* near Murcia.

definite lines. The natural approach to the mass and the middle of the area is by the line of least resistance which has come to be marked historically by Vitoria, Burgos, Palencia, Valladolid ; from there the natural route went on over the open plateau by Salamanca, Ciudad Rodrigo, Fuentes de Onoro, and then by the Mondego valley round the Estrella to Coimbra and the ocean. There was, however, a choice of less natural routes across the grain of the relief, *e.g.* by Segovia or Avila to Aranjuez, Toledo, Madrid. Access to the Vitoria-Valladolid trunk was marginal from the French point of view, but central from the Spanish ; and in any case the north-west corner was quite off the line.

The opposite was true at the east end of the Pyrenees, the route being marginal from the Spanish point of view, and so even farther removed from the north-west corner. There was a choice of natural routes again here—by Lerida, Zaragoza, and Guadalajara, *i.e.* a semi-central route, and by Gerona, Tarragona, and Castellon ; but this wholly marginal route was the more natural even for movement from the north, and much more for movement from the south, the climb up the Guadalquivir—Segura saddle being much easier than that up the Jalon defile. The tide of movement, then, in earlier days, when Roman roads on the meseta were few and short and far between, swept steadily up and over this eastern ¹ margin ; the old centres are typical hill-fortresses, such as Tarraco on its 550-foot hill (*cf.* Lerida) ; and it was during years of constant warfare between Vandal and Goth, Goth and Moor, Moor and Castilian, that the floods and silt of the Francoli were allowed unchecked to ruin the old port of Tarraco—in spite of its hill-fortress, its nearness to Italy, and its good access inland (*ctr.* *Emporiae* = Rosas).

¹ Scipio Africanus began his campaign against the Carthaginians, on principles laid down by his father and his uncle, by gaining possession of this coast road. *Cf.* p. 96.

Obviously, even the Burgos route left the forested Atlantic mountains so far out of sight and touch that they remained aloof from many historic¹ currents; and thus their immense importance to Iberia and to Europe has never been quite realised. The conditions of human life in them, were, of course, hard; but there were great, if unobtrusive, compensations. The highland bred fine types—mountaineer and miner, forester and fisherman; it fed them, especially from the fertile Minho valley, with an adequate and assured minimum, without any fear of drought and famine; and even to-day, apart from the oasis concentration on the Huerta de Valencia (where, *excluding* the city, an area of less than 150 square miles supports a—naturally most democratic—population of more than 175,000 agriculturists), the most densely peopled *provinces* in Spain, in spite of heavy and constant emigration, are those of Pontevedra and Coruña; and, if we ignore the cities of Madrid and Barcelona, Biscaya and Guipuzcoa come next. It is most unlikely that this density is a new phenomenon. On the contrary, there must for centuries have been a surplus of labour to have made “Gallego” the term for “odd-job man” in Castile; and it was almost certainly this unfailing reserve of man-power, with its typical fishermen’s preponderance of male births, *i.e.* potential soldiers, that made possible the repulse of the Moors from the Leon piedmont of the system.

Outside Pluvial Spain, the meseta is overwhelmingly dominant, as we have seen; and by structure, physical history, and relief, it has been doomed to be Parched from end to end, a barren and monotonous sequence of steppe and semi-desert except for the sierra crests. The steppes to the north-west are “Asiatic” grass-steppes, capable of

¹ The Portuguese were for centuries (and perhaps are still) more “Latin” than the Spaniards because more free from Gothic and Vandal elements and influences; but, of course, they have Negroid elements!

tillage for wheat and similar crops ; those to the south-east are " African " alfa-steppes, enclosing salt steppes, which amply merit the special title of La Mancha, " The Parched." The meseta must, therefore, have always produced a scanty sustenance, on which no foe could live in force for any time, and have had a scattered population, which no foe could find or effectively " round-up," even if he knew where and how best to cross cañon and crest or to climb up or down a scarp defile.

The moment that one describes any area as steppe or semi-desert, one implies that its occupations are likely to be seasonal,—that it does not supply continuous work throughout the year ; and, in so far as this has been true of the meseta, it could not be a very suitable home for Mediterranean man. Even if we insist that the climate may be called Mediterranean—and not, as it might be, Saharan!—for Madrid and Valladolid and Salamanca have scarcely $\frac{1}{2}$ " of rain in July, all three have distinct Former and Latter rains, and none of them has normally a mean temperature much above 75° F. in July ; still Valladolid and Salamanca have less than a dozen inches of rain in the whole year, and Madrid, though at the foot of the Guadarrama, has not much more, and the great extremes (even at Leon from 37° F. to 73° F.) and sudden changes are more Saharan than Mediterranean (*cf.* May frosts in Murcia, p. 112). The vegetation can be called Mediterranean, but is intensely specialised ; and the people, though predominantly Mediterranean in type and origin, are also much specialised.

In the first place, the vegas¹ are quite local and limited in area, and their fertility is wasted if not used for intensive tillage with irrigation ; and, unlike the huertas, they give

¹ The vegas are riverside strips of recent alluvium, humid and rich in humus, which *may* be irrigated ; the huertas (*hortus*, " garden ") are oases of naturally arid red soils in the Levante region, which *must* be irrigated.

normally only one main crop each year, and both the soil and the water are too precious for that crop to be grain—the tiller must be a gardener, not a grainger. Moreover, apart from the vegas and the red clay of the Pisuerga basin, the return on labour is very small. The region, as a whole, is naturally pastoral; and the pasture is very poor, even for sheep and mules. When very strong and rapid evaporation is associated with rainfall far too light to wash away resultant salts, the saline steppes are practically useless, and may be classified as semi-desert. Even on the best grass-steppes the normal return on pastoral labour is only one-twentieth of that from a grain crop, just one-thirtieth of that from an olive crop, and scarcely more than one-fiftieth of that from a wine crop. Even merinoes cannot pass the summer on the Estremadura meseta, much less on La Mancha, but must be moved up to the sierras and by preference right up to the Cantabrian brañas, with their real alp—at least 250 miles away. For, as the “heavy” rains are equinoctial, the temperature is too high for the snowfall to be heavy, and the nearest alp is on the Picos de Europa. The mesetan, therefore, must be normally a herdsman, a mobile horseman, a seasonal nomad, *i.e.* scarcely a European; and in the course of ages he has approximated in type and in temperament to the Bedouin, as the Moors in Valencia approximated to the Provençal.

Even a wide application of irrigation, so far as that is physically possible, would not seriously alter the problem, as it would have to be more or less limited to land suitable for raising bread; and already Spain “wastes” on cereals land (one-third of the total) and labour which might be used more profitably for other purposes. At present, though since the War she has usually managed to supply herself with cereals, three-sevenths (15,000,000 acres out of 35,000,000) of the cereal land has to be left fallow every year; half of the total area which seems capable of irrigation, is already

irrigated; but only two-thirds, of the area which is irrigated, is irrigated adequately.

The path of progress lies first in improving the natural pasture over wide spaces, and then in limiting the radius of transhumance; for, with proper organisation, *e.g.* the use of fertilisers and provision of transport, each province could maintain all its own stock at all seasons. The saving of cost on the long journeys and their harmful effect on the stock would more than make good the cost of the improvements. And modesty might take a moral from the Moor. He believed, *i.e. acted* on the conviction, that well-bred beasts did not eat or drink more than badly bred ones, and that, if food and water were precious, they should not be wasted on worthless beasts or beasts valuable only for spectacular purposes.

Of course, the problem is not simple, especially because of the intense regionalism and the consequent jealousies. Unfortunately, there is almost everywhere real antagonism between the core and the circumference; and, so far as this was more or less natural, it always seemed to involve the strongest development of central government. Even to-day a language map of the peninsula suggests trouble, with the Castilian tongue from the northern piedmont to the southern strait bounded east and west by continuous belts of "Provençal" and "Portuguese." If such differences of dialect may represent differences of doctrine, the dilemma between the ideals of liberty and efficiency must still make it difficult for "Roman" Castile to rule the Catalan Levante. To be ideally efficient, efficiency must be absolute, while liberty, to be ideal, must include liberty to rule oneself; and the only way to deal effectively with idealistic individualism, especially when the individual is badly educated, is to provide the wisest forms of education and the widest facilities for communication. There is vast room for improvement in both respects.

Fortunately, so far as the circumferal provinces are concerned, the geographical opportunities seem to be most promising just where the regional interests seem to be, both literally and metaphorically, farthest apart, *i.e.* in Catalonia and Andalusia ; for the mechanical problems of the two are almost identical, though the economic and linguistic differences are considerable.

In Catalonia there is no great mineral wealth, though the Cardona salt has been worked since Roman times, and coal has had to be imported ; nor have relief and soil been naturally favourable to large-scale agriculture, and raw materials for textiles have also had to be imported. Dry crops flourish, especially olive and vine (with the cork-oak,¹ so useful for providing stoppers for bottles and dust for packing fresh grapes) ; but no one except the Romans ever thought that the wine of Tarragona (*Tarraco vitifera*) was the best of Spanish wines, and they probably drank the strong Rioja² of the upper Ebro basin, not the baked *priorato* which we know—by hearsay—as Tarragona “port.” Moreover, commerce has been naturally as little favoured as agriculture, for the Ebro is only nominally navigable from the head of the Imperial Canal at Tudela, and the coast has no natural harbours. But there was one great asset in the vigorous human type, Provençal in base and in speech, but blended with Phœnician and Greek, Roman and Gothic (whence the fifth century name of Gothalandia and then Catalaunia) ; and there is easy access now to the water-power of the Pyrenees. To-day Barcelona claims to have a population of 1,000,000, and so to be the largest centre on the Mediterranean coast ; and the

¹ The climate produces the thickest and most compact bark in the world, and Spain produces c. 42 per cent. and Portugal c. 33 per cent. of the total output. France is far the most important buyer of bottling cork, the United States of other cork.

² Used to “blend” Oporto and Bordeaux wines.

interests of rural agriculture and urban industry—for once—meet, in the development of hydro-electric power. Nearly half (3,000,000 h.p.) of the estimated available power of Spain is in the Ebro basin, and the Segre and the Cinca are already being used effectively.

Of course, to some extent even the Ebro, like the Jucar and the Tagus, is rather of the Wadi type in régime, if not in relief,¹ with a large maximum flow and a correspondingly small minimum, which occurs just when plants want water most. Even the maximum is wasted—for navigation, irrigation and power alike—without storage; but one advantage of the cañons worn by the floods, at least along the Mediterranean scarp of the meseta, is the relative ease with which the rivers can be dammed at the exits. Incidentally, too, this means a relatively small surface exposed to evaporation, and that too for most of the day often completely sheltered from direct sunlight by the depth and the twists of the gorge. Even where there is an open valley, as most of the way below the so-called head of navigation (!) on the Ebro at Logroño, reservoirs could be dug out and roofed over. Cf. p. 79.

Andalusia has been much more favoured. It has better boundaries and better access to the sea, much more variety of relief and yet much more lowland, with much better river transport. As we have seen, the melting of snow and ice on the Nevada fills the rivers in summer, especially the southern tributaries of the Great River, while westward from La Sagra heavy rains fill them in winter, especially the northern tributaries.

The volcanic "black earth" of the southern watershed is very fertile, and even the salt patches of the northern are useful, the damper providing stimulating herbage for cattle (bulls for the arena) and the drier being very suitable

¹ The Wadi was really the "Ravine," and then the "Intermittent Torrent" that cut the ravine.

for sugar-beet. Indeed, the cheapness of the poor land and the high content of sugar in the beet make the crop exceedingly profitable, even if that has encouraged its growth so much here as to have definitely discouraged it elsewhere, *e.g.* in Old Castile. At the same time, good land in the Guadalquivir basin is very dear, and population is dense; and neither the climate nor the cost of irrigation is quite favourable to the growth, *e.g.* of cotton, not even between Cordova and Seville, where the Moors grew it on a considerable scale. But, thanks to the Nevada, "The Snowy," the variety of crop is as striking as the variety of scenery. From a saddle across the range you can look "straight down" on fields of sugar-beet at the northern foot and on plantations of sugar-cane at the southern foot, and "straight up" to the most southerly glacier in Europe (9,000 feet, 37° N.) and the snowy peaks of Mulahacen and Veleta, 2,000 feet higher still.

Both the great sierras are rich in metals, copper and lead in the Morena (*cf.* the mercury), and iron and lead in the Nevada; their sunny terraces are covered with olives landward—where they gave its name to the Morena ("The Sombre"), and account for two-thirds of the 3,000,000 quintals which make Spain the largest producer of olive-oil in the world—and with vines, of old Falerian stock, seaward; and the climate is as favourable for maturing the grapes for wine as for drying them for raisins.

The wine deserves rather more attention, because Andalusia produces on the Jerez lowland one of the most useful wines in the world. To windward of the Ronda crest (5,000–5,600 feet) and of the piedmont terrace on which Medina Sidonia—taking his title from "The City of the Sidonians"—grew his oranges near enough to the sea for the Castilians to count him as a seaman, there is a low stretch of rolling hummocky "hills" with a soil white

enough to be called albariza, composed of (80 per cent. pure) chalk underlaid by an impervious subsoil. A light rainfall (c. 20") is associated with such a high humidity that the range of temperature is only c. 20° F., and the annual mean is only that of London in July. The result is that Palomino cuttings, grafted on to sturdy stock, flourish exceedingly; and the sunlight is so well filtered by the high humidity that, though the grapes ripen perfectly, the carbides of hydrogen are *not* oxidised. Sherry is, therefore, the richest of all wines in organic ethers, and at its best has almost the medicinal value of cognac.

A somewhat similar control is seen on the Alto Douro; and the proof that soil and climate alone are responsible is afforded by the fact that any and all varieties of vine yield practically the same result. In this case the vineyards are cut off from the sea by relief and by distance (60 miles), and the grapes are simply "roasted" in summer; but in August N.W. winds from the Azores high-pressure bring rains which are just sufficient and just in time to save the Douro wine from the worst results of "roasting"—as seen in the so-called Tarragona "port." Here, too, the impervious layer is on the top; and so the wine has body and strength without being resinous and sticky, but it lacks the organic ethers of sherry.

The import of the latter into England seems to have begun in the fifteenth century, but it was not consumed on a large scale till Tudor times, when it was called Sherris (a very close approximation to "Jerez") or simply Sack or Sec, "Dry (wine)." The suggestion that this name was not derived from the Latin *siccus*, "dry," but from the Japanese *saké*, *i.e.* the rice-beer brewed at Osaka (!), is surely one of peculiar fatuity. It practically assumes that, *e.g.* Edward IV did not know the difference between beer and wine, that his vintner had heard of Osaka, and that the Spaniards, who had been brewing beer of barley and

growing rice of their own for 1,000 years, were really interested in Japan.¹ The assumptions are colossal.

The fact that this import from Cadiz had begun before the Moors were finally expelled from Granada, shows how entirely their survival there depended on the Nevada system, not only as a magnificent refuge, but also in relation to food supply and communications. The character of the relief made a frontal attack on the city intolerably costly and a flank attack almost impossible ; the climate is superb, the height (2,500 feet) keeping the July mean below 80° F., while the latitude keeps it above 40° F. in January. Directly behind the city the beautiful basin of Las Alpujarras, "The Mountain Pastures," gives easy access to the sea at Motril, with supporting routes—westward *viâ* the Guadalhorce valley to Malaga and eastward *viâ* the Almeria valley to the Almerian roadstead. Thus the Moors could keep in easy touch with Africa, and so draw constant reserves and resources from there ; but the Granada vega, *la Vega*, is profoundly fertile, and so are the other vegas, *e.g.* in Las Alpujarras. Consequently, the kingdom of Granada was able to feed itself, and even for some time to grow its own cotton ; and it survived for two centuries after the Moors had been expelled from the rest of the peninsula. Indeed, it was in no serious danger till Ceuta (*Sebta*, "The Seven Hills") was taken—by the Portuguese, not the Castilians—in 1415 A.D. This was a great loss, for the Moors had always realised the military value of the peninsula, rating it far above that of Jebel-al-Tarik (*cf.* p. 81).

The focus of the Levante coastlands between Andalusia and Catalonia is Valencia, which is clearly differentiated from both by its essentially oasis character. Of course, its

¹ It is interesting that the 250,000 tons of rice raised annually in Spain is all of the (short, fat-grained) "Japanese" type, both being derived originally from "East Indian" seed.

mesetan scarp is used for sheep, as its piedmont is for dry crops, especially olive and vine ; but the dense population is on the irrigated huertas and vegas (*cf.* p. 115), where the naturally rich alluvium would not need to be " repaired " by fertilisers if only the rivers were properly dammed at their exits from the limestone gorges, so that the heavy floods of the Former (September) rains could not work havoc with soil reduced to dust by the drought and heat of July and August.

The soil, the water-supply, and the sea-exposure here recall the conditions of Jaffa, and make this essentially the Orange Coast ; but the orange, like the mulberry and unlike the date, was a late arrival, brought by the Moors. We are apt to associate this orange crop with the name of the great *raisin*-market of Denia, but Valencia is " the city of orange groves." The winter-ripening crop is well suited to the agricultural calendar of Mediterranean man, as a free tiller of a small plot.¹ On such a plot for such a plant close personal attention is needed, and the tiller shares with all other tillers all water free of charge. Possibly the absence of any charge encourages some over-watering—to hasten the swelling of the fruit, and so we find it sour ; but at least it is juicy, and the picture shows individualism at its very best. At least quite another picture is presented at Elche, where the 80,000 date palms represent a crop more suited to the Semite than to the Mediterranean, and there water has to be bought—from a company.

Of course, the climate of this coast makes the sun-drying of fruit cheap and perfect, and it might well be called also the Raisin Coast (or quite truly the Raisins and Almonds Coast). But, though Valencia does export large quantities of raisins, and we associate its name with the best quality, Alicante exports four times and Malaga more than six

¹ The small irrigation holdings seem to incline the people to small holdings in other spheres, *e.g.* in mining.

times as much. The trade is, of course, shared by other towns, *e.g.* Almeria and Murcia, Castellon and now Barcelona ; and the abundant supplies of cork-dust are encouraging a large export of fresh grapes, especially from Almeria.

It was the same climatic control that made Malaca, "Salt" (Town) and Carthago Nova famous in Roman times for salt fish. The trade was shared by Valencia, where the deltaic coast was too unhealthy to be of much use for settlement or tillage or anything else except salt-making, fishing and trading ; and Albufera, "The Lagoon," was apparently used—from Carthaginian, if not from Phœnician, days—for the storage of live tunny and mackerel in cages until they were needed for the table.

SUMMARY

If we may summarise these scattered suggestions, and even emphasise some of them, we may be able to make some definite inferences ; and it will help us if we keep at the back of our minds a picture of the real Semitic lands of the world, with their peninsular flanks in Anatolia and Arabia.

Obviously, Iberia, like Anatolia, is a land link between two continents, and commands a water link between the Atlantic and the Mediterranean comparable with that between the latter and the Pontus—if we may use the old name to suggest the great change in relative values between the two straits in the past 2,000 years. But its history has been very dissimilar to that of the Balkan peninsula. Iberia had no "Corinthian" waterway, through it east-and-west ; it was never a natural land thoroughfare north-and-south ; it has no Occident Express through it to-day ; it did not become a thoroughfare at all until it became a battlefield—in the struggle between Rome as the representative of the northern Mediterranean and Carthage as that of the southern Mediterranean.

From the first, and until the ocean ceased to be estranging, the south-westward descent of the meseta laid the land open only to Africa and *viâ* Africa to Asia. Republican Rome went there against Semitic Carthage, and Ecclesiastical Rome fought in it against Semitic Islam; and the Saracens never held it until they held every desert and semi-desert between the Indus and the Tagus.

This throws some light also on the completeness of the Roman conquest. No doubt, the remarkable strength of the "Keltic" resistance forced Rome either to conquer thoroughly, or have to do it again; but she held North Africa, and had made the Mediterranean a Roman lake. Even after the Barbarian raids began, she still held half of the North African coast; and, as long as she did that, Europe ended at the Sahara. The Saracens made Africa end at the Pyrenees, and geographical conditions made that the easier task, for the Saracens were as "familiar" with the conditions in Spain as the Spaniards were later with the "mesetas" of the Andes.

The character of the Spanish meseta is the vital factor in the whole story. Its lofty and abrupt Mediterranean scarp, by isolating the Levante lowlands, doubly isolated the rest of the peninsula from Europe; and its climate and scanty population, though they allowed the Moors to conquer rapidly, kept the two flanks so far apart literally and metaphorically that even unity of speech became difficult. It was almost inevitable that, *e.g.* in the War of the *Spanish* Succession, Externals should interfere, and that the meseta should support France while the Levante supported Austria, even though the Franks had held the Spanish Marches under a Count of Barcelona, whose people spoke Provençal.

Then, again, we have the meseta deciding the destiny of the Moors. One of their two fatal mistakes (*cf.* p. 109), was the result of racial jealousies between Semite and

Hamite. The Arab autocrat was essentially pastoral and nomad, and so he was well suited to the natural mesetan environment; but that was allotted, most inappropriately, to the Berber democrat, who was agricultural and sedentary. The meseta was an easy area for Arab cavalry to overrun, but an impossible one for Berber tillers to hold.

And so Castile became the victorious Champion of the Church against the infidel, and was thus encouraged to be aggressive against the heretic; and conditions of relief were favourable to penetration over the Burgos saddle into Aragon and over the Murcian saddle into Andalusia, and Castilian domination became inevitable. At the same time, though Catalonia was ex-centric and alien in "race" and speech and development, she had been made by the Romans (*cf.* p. 84) so essential to the external relations of the whole peninsula, that—however much anti-Castilian in sentiment and however successful in steadily resisting assimilation by Castile—she has never been able to bring political separatism within practical politics.

But the year that saw the Moors at last expelled from Granada, saw Columbus set sail from Palos; and, though the seamen of the north-west were too few to give sea-power to the soldiers of the meseta once other seamen were adventuring over the ocean, they could give it so long as there was no one else there to object or hinder, and so long as they landed the soldiers on coasts where the native people were too weak or too peaceful to resist trained armies. Of course, the actual journey was relatively easy—except to "superstitious" nerves: for Columbus went out on the Trades, and came home on the Anti-Trades—quite normally. But the new empire was too large and too far away (at the time), and drained Spain of her most vigorous citizens; it brought, also, sudden and excessive wealth *without* adequate effort—a very dangerous gift to an individual or to a nation.

The effect on the nation was almost wholly bad, and it was reflected—in a much less noxious form—in the individual. The country had always been too sensitive to External influences and too much obsessed by Regional influences, and now an excessive particularism was bolstered up by an “accidental” prosperity. The typical individual began to have, and then to demand from others, too much respect for himself; and presently he suffered from his egotism, for it affected all his relationships: as a soldier, he could lead a guerilla troop but not an army,—as a politician, he could lead a faction, but not a party. The final result was seen in Spain during the War.

For centuries she had been shedding her blood on behalf of the Roman Church; and the best unity which she had achieved, had been religious unity. But she had neglected education—largely under the guidance of her Churchmen, and her administration had been correspondingly inefficient. Consequently, the Church had retained little religious influence; but it had great political influence, and all this was used against the Allies—for Italy had “diminished the Pope,” France was frankly anti-clerical, and England had always been the one great heretic.

The army was officered by Castilians, of families trained for centuries to military standards and in military traditions. They were obsessed by the prestige of Prussia and the apparent perfection of the German military machine; they had been trying for generations to forget that Peninsular War which had brought so much more credit to Externals than to Spaniards, and they honestly despised our 120,000 “Contemptibles”; and they were very jealous of French success, military and administrative, under their very eyes in North Africa.

But the Great War between Externals did, in some ways, more for Spain than any of her own wars had done. Suddenly she had to become independent of Externals, and had

to do and to provide everything for herself, or go without it. At the same time wealth and refugees poured in, and the recent loss of her colonies had left her with a reserve of surplus vigour. Difficulties were analysed, and responsibility for them was recognised and duly distributed; and the result was a real, if bloodless, revolution. This has undermined Externalism economically and Regionalism politically, for all regions have shared, *e.g.* in the sudden replacing of tallow candles by electric light, mere bridle paths by good motor highways, and hoes by mechanical tractors.

Spain has had good reason to dread sudden and excessive change, but this time it has not been without adequate effort; and it has been brought about neither by the Church nor by the army, but by work-a-day men. They were almost wholly *non-mesetan*, if not actually anti-Castilian, and certainly anti-military, if not positively pro-naval. They were, like the great mineral wealth of such a complex geographical unit, essentially marginal; and that did mean that they were more awake to such influences as oceanic commerce and mineral exploitation. They realised, *e.g.* that they have been extracting their ores too rapidly, shipping them abroad too much, neglecting to use them at home in the manufacture of fertilisers for pasture and tillage alike. Their normal speech was *not* Spanish, but the *Langue d'Oc*; they were quite accustomed to singing the "*Marseillaise*"; and they preferred our tolerant—if you like, casual—British ways of doing things. They were, therefore, pro-Ally.

But this affected Spain herself in the first instance, especially in equalising regional advantages and opportunities; it was Internalism. And it makes one inclined to ask whether now Spain will not have something to offer to Externals, to the common good of Europe: Can she offer one thing which western Europe, peninsular Europe,

greatly needs? If it is true that "the Spaniard lives against a back ground of eternity," can he give us a glimpse of his distances?

Quite literally, these distances are largely a climatic response, and they are not found in Pluvial Spain. There the unique effects are associated with rain-washed and forest-fringed mountains, especially the historic rallying-ground of the Picos de Europa—with Pelayo's cave, his little capital of Cangas, and the magnificent seaward gorges of Cares and Deva. But, once the line is crossed from the Pluvial to the Parched,—and even Santiago is approached over a "Judæan steppe"—the monotonous relief, the absence of such landmarks as villages, and the extraordinary purity of the air, combine to produce the illusion of endless space. This is, geographically, that "background of eternity."

It would be in accord with the historic rôle of the peninsula, as the Court of Military Christianity, if it became again a land of pilgrimage, but with a new sense of values—based on warfare of the spirit, not the sword. The shrine of Santiago de Compostela, St. James of the Plain of the Star, has been for centuries a Land's End sanctuary. It is not actually within sight or sound of the billows that break on Cape Finisterre or the typical Biscayan storms, but lies anchored in a very Vale of Tears, with an annual rainfall that can be measured in yards— $2\frac{1}{8}$ yards. Even on the driest day the humidity is very high—a suggestive sign to this "Son of *Thunder*,"—the encircling mountains are filmed with haze, outlines are always soft. In all ages such conditions must have brought comfort to pilgrims, even if they did not realise that part of their burden came from tired nerves.

But muscles and morals may be slack, as nerves and consciences may be overstrained; and then low humidity and bright light, not high humidity and soft light, should

be the object of pilgrimages. These can be found, along with silence and solitude, on that meseta ; and the silence is not the friendly silence of St. James's dripping forest, but the searching silence of treeless spaces around and above you, especially at night. This is what our street-bred people need, but they are afraid of it, for the narrow city streets are always lit, and their ceaseless noise is company.

Here, on the magical meseta is the nearest sanatorium or sanctuary where west Europe can snatch 40 days of at least semi-desert environment. St. James in the mist can only see his single star lost or half lost in a Milky Way ; but the frosty starlight of the meseta is as clear as crystal, the dry air is infinitely bracing, and there is nothing to disturb your self-examination. Is it the height that makes the silence and the solitude so "uplifting" ? Day brings the stimulus of bright light ; and, if your Theology demands that Hell should be a hot place, the Solano will guarantee you at least 110° F. in the shade—if you can find any.

CHAPTER IV

SCANDINAVIA

FIORD AND FOREST

IF peninsularity meant almost nothing internally to Iberia, especially to Spain, it meant almost everything to Scandinavia, especially to Norway, both internally and externally ; it is explicitly behind the whole story of the ocean face, and implicitly behind at least the great failures of the continental face. For this reason it is helpful to study Iberia and Scandinavia in sequence, for there is enough similarity between them in the wide generalities of physique, the distribution of encircled land and encircling water, and the relations of margin to core, to suggest that the marked differences in the human note must be largely associated with climate and international relations, the latter being themselves closely dependent on the articulation of the coast.

Further, without having any detailed knowledge of the climate, we may infer—even from a political map of Europe—that latitude alone will involve two great changes from Iberian conditions ; one will be the absence of seasonal change in the direction of the regular winds, and the other will be the association of the continental influence with winter cold, not with summer drought. The former meant that seamen must learn to work “out,” not on steady N.E. Trades, but against unsteady S.W. Anti-Trades ; the latter meant the certainty of the Baltic coast waters being frozen up every normal winter, and the

possibility of the whole sea being frozen over occasionally, and so a water-surface being converted into what is climatically land. Obviously, this might tempt landsmen—from Sweden—to adventure across the narrow belt of sea ; and the Norsemen must have been better seamen than even the Gallegos. Charles X did actually march his army across the ice in 1658, and the sea was even more firmly frozen in 1709, as it had been in 1323 and 1459 ; and the opportunity for, and the winning of, their vast experience and immortal reputation came to the Norsemen in the two “ Saga ” centuries of stormless weather, during which they discovered America and dominated Europe. Cf. p. 126.

NORWAY

Of course, though Eric the Red sailed the seas five centuries before Columbus, and though the actual distance from Norway to “ Vinland ” was not less than that from Spain to San Salvador, the Northmen had an almost continuous chain of islands to guide them, while the Azores and the Canaries were from *c.* 2,000 to *c.* 2,500 miles even from the Bermudas, and more from the West Indies. But the Northmen were sailing *direct* to and from (a Christian) Greenland at the time of the Norman Conquest of England ; and the virility of the type must have been unique to leave its mark so widely—in the capture of Athens, in the Varangian Guard at Byzantium, in a Russian dynasty, and in the founding of half a dozen kingdoms, great and small, from Sicily and Naples to Scotland and Ireland.

No doubt, the type exhausted itself very rapidly ; by 1319 not an heir was left to the famous Royal House of Harold the Fairhaired, whose knörr, “ King’s Ships,” had kept up the regular service between Bergen and Heijolsnes (near Frederiksdal, *i.e.* the extreme southern point of

Greenland). But they were probably (? certainly) familiar with a Vinland ¹ that did grow vines, a Greenland that was fairly green, an Iceland (or rather Snowland) covered with forest, not ice, and growing corn. The twelfth century broke the sequence of warm and dry centuries, and returned to the normal (?) wind and storm ; Snowland became Iceland, and mountains that had been called Black (Blasert) came to be called White (Hvitseck). Presently the traffic stopped (certainly by 1410), and all links with the Far West were broken ; even its existence was forgotten, and the ravages of the Black Death (1349) had left the population of Scandinavia too scanty and too much enfeebled even to resist the Hansa merchants.

If we may go back, not a few hundred years, but several hundred thousand, and indulge in some sheer suppositions, we may picture a very old block of the earth's surface, too old to have coal in it, left as a lonely meseta, or "table," by the foundering of the floor round it ; and in the catastrophe it was tilted down towards the east and up to the west, and so left poised between plain and ocean. It was in latitudes where the crust of the cooling and contracting earth was most rigid, and it was covered with cracks in the process. The uplifted western edge was exposed to the storms and waves of an ocean off which saturated S.W. winds blew—to colder latitudes and colder altitudes ; and the heavy precipitation found its way back to the ocean down the web of cracks, deepening them into V-shaped valleys.

In the Great Ice Age the same causes, high latitude and heavy precipitation, covered this block with ice, which worked down the river cracks, deepening them still more,

¹ One does not press these details ; the "grapes" may have been "wine-berries," i.e. cranberries (which could have been picked "in spring"—as the Flatey Book says). But it is important and indubitable that the Norsemen did visit the North American mainland c. A.D. 1000.

(the Sogne to 4,000 feet), widening them, flattening their floors, and carrying the débris down to form a sill at the mouth of what were now fiords. And when the ice at last retreated, it left the old shield swept bare of soil—in latitudes where a new cover of soil is the work of centuries, and on a crystalline base which can never yield a very fertile soil.

To make the picture complete we must glance again at the lowlands. Except at the ends of the great central valley of Norway, *i.e.* behind Trondhjem and round Oslo, the mass of the lowland is on islands. There is constantly at the foot of the scarps both along the fiords and along the open coast a narrow bench with a fair cover of fertile soil, and this is very important locally; but it is very narrow and discontinuous, and the total population on it is not great, because the gaards, or peasant estates, are deliberately isolated, each house cut off from its “neighbours” by small fields of grain (and in recent centuries potatoes), etc. Apart from the towns, the mass of the population is now, and must always have been, on the 150,000 islands which fringe the coast. The real Skerries are the very small ones, “sheared” or “scarred” off the scarp of the block; but irregularities in the relief of the original lowland account for a great number of larger ones, and north of Trondhjem Alpine folds were pushed up against the base of the block, *e.g.* to over 4,000 feet in the Lofotens.

Thus each fiord is protected by a sill, which would in any case exclude storms and cold Arctic water (below 200 feet), but this Skerry-guard, or Fence of Islands, provides an outer barrier, inside which the water is calm and safe at all seasons. It is, too, never frozen along any part of the coast, not even inside the Arctic Circle; the rivers bring down immense quantities of mineral “food” for the algæ, which swarm where warm and cold currents

meet ; and this rich vegetation provides unfailing food for fish. Then the heavy precipitation, the great accumulation of snow on the plateau during the long winter season, and the very rapid melting of the snow and ice during the long summer day (nine *weeks* long at Tromsö), combine to flood the fiords with immense volumes of fresh water. Even along the coast there are no high tides (five feet at Bergen), none is felt at all at the head of the fiords, and the tidal wave at the mouth is some yards below the surface of the (fresh) water.

With the land swept bare of soil, with the fiords thus *poor* in fish, with a coast that, straightened out, would go half way round the world, and actually gives ten miles of water front to every one square mile of inhabited land, and with a teeming fishing ground between the skerries and the coast, the main source of food and the main lines of movement were bound to be this belt of "roads," which to-day gives the Norwegians the largest mercantile marine *per caput* in the world. At the last census the population was 2,600,000, and they owned 2,600,000 tons of shipping; to-day (1930) they own over 3,660,000 tons without counting sailing ships, over 30 per cent. is less than five years old, and over 35 per cent. is motor tonnage. Even for steam and motor tonnage alone Norway stands fifth in the world. Here, then, is the geographical background of all that the Northerners were, and achieved. Is it peninsular, or insular ?

If we ask what exactly were the vital controls here, a rough answer may be—the mildest climate in the world for its latitudes (58°–71° N.), the poverty and inaccessibility of the land, the wealth and accessibility of the water, and the movements of the fish ; and it may be useful to consider the last first, for we start with the normal customs of to-day except that steam or oil has displaced sails,¹

¹ In all Teutonic languages the word is the same, and is said to be borrowed from the *Latin* *sagulum*, but the root is far older than Latin !

as sails displaced oars. There must always have been the daily fishing "on the spot" for necessary and immediate food, as there must always have been subsistence farming (still the most important occupation in Norway); and this explains the absence of any real distinction between farmer and fisherman, and possibly the absence of loquacity in the farmers. But the daily catch is small, and in winter more or less limited to sprats, (which give much more nourishment per cubic inch than most fish). For big catches depend on abundance of fish food, and this is seasonal—in a double sense. Any great increase in the supply is associated with the Spring (thaw)-flood and the Autumn (rain)-flood, while in winter the watershed is frozen up. But Norway stretches through 900 miles of latitude, and the seasons are differently timed from latitude to latitude. The fish follow the food, and the fishermen (some 30,000 to 40,000, with 7,000 to 8,000 boats) follow the fish; and so it must always have been.

No doubt, the North Sea banks must have once supplied the Norwegian home waters with far more fish than they do now; but always, *e.g.* the cod would swarm in the Vest-fiord in March, and then move north to the Tromsö and then to the Hammerfest waters. Always, too, the catch had to be dried or salted for winter and for provisioning the (Pirate) boats; and so the women, if not also the children, must have moved with the men, except in the very earliest days. The overwhelming strength of the family unit in Norway makes it exceedingly probable that the children did move, naturally, with their parents.

If Norwegian ships, to-day, go whaling off equatorial Africa and in the Antarctic, and sealing off Iceland and Spitzbergen, and if the largest catches of cod and herring are still landed at Svolveaer and Bergen, the "foreign" markets, with their great curing and tinning industries, are at Aalesund and Stavanger (*i.e.* at the two ends of what

was the Viking¹ coast *par excellence*), for the same reason as made it the Viking coast, *i.e.* ease of access to foreign "neighbours." But such access over miles of open sea could have been "easy" only because the normal conditions of their daily life had given the Vikings a magnificent preparation for the type of overseas adventure that they developed. For they were so much accustomed to moving great distances in their shallow, narrow-beamed, twenty-oared (ten each side) boats that distance *per se* was a matter of supreme indifference; though the water was smooth, the currents through the channels and straits must have been, even in the calmest weather, as rapid as they are now, and the fish, especially the herring, must have been equally fond of the water off these "races"; and in the miraculous weather of the Saga Age—or, perhaps we should say Viking and Saga Ages—rowing in the open sea was as safe and almost as easy as in the home waters.

But the home itself was a tiny island, which could not usually supply the smallest "village" with bread, and from which all movement must be by water. Life was, therefore, purely maritime; the little (rather *unseaworthy*) boats, with prows at both ends and manœuvred by oars, were really admirably suited to their work; and men, women, and children must have been most adept boatmen. Even their "long ships," though eventually they had one large square sail, were really rowing boats, the crew of forty fighting and rowing by shifts; and it was their extraordinary mobility, especially in narrow waters such as creeks and rivers, that made them so formidable and so very difficult to "round up." Perhaps their greatest asset was that complete familiarity with troubled waters²

¹ The word "Viking" almost certainly means "Son of the Calm Water"; the Irish called them "Lochlannoch."

² It is no accident that we have borrowed the word "maelstrom" from Norway, and rather significant that it means any "mill-stream," though

had freed them from the superstitious terrors with which the Mediterranean peoples regarded the sea ; and, as the berserk's song of complete confidence in his own power to fight swordsman and axeman or swirling water was the true prelude to the Saga, it seems unnecessary to divide the Viking Age from the Saga Age.

But the island home needs more attention—from two points of view, the multiplicity of units and the uniformity of life. The immense number of islands meant a parallel development of independence, initiative, willingness to take responsibility. From the earliest years, every boy and girl learnt automatically to “paddle their own canoe,” and every island learnt to manage its own affairs, its families combining, *e.g.* to own one “long ship”, and choosing an *ad hoc*¹ skipper for each raid. But all the islands along hundreds of miles of coast had exactly the same problems to be solved in the same way ; and so there was a remarkable unity of interest to strengthen the ethnic and linguistic unity. We see here, then, in the free and friendly particularism of the democratic seaman on the ocean fringe, a strong contrast with the formal and aloof particularism of the aristocratic landsman on the continental meseta ; to the one the weak, just because they are weak, seem to need *more* help, while the other says the weak must go to the wall.

Behind this fundamental difference is really the true equality of sex. Women certainly did not take part in the earlier Viking raids, and they seem to have taken no more part in the actual fishing, the work *on* the water, than the wives of fishermen elsewhere have taken and do take. From the first, then, an island or a group of islands was

the actual Maelstrom—off the Lofotens—is very dangerous when (at the end of a cyclonic storm) a N.W. wind blows against the tide.

¹ For very large “national” raids they seem even to have chosen an *ad hoc* king, which shows how far they were from being merely pirates.

temporarily denuded of its men ; and in their absence the women were entirely responsible for everything on shore. Even when the men came back, they were tired-out—with fighting, long night watching, and constant rowing (for these men were free men, not slaves) ; and, even if not tired, they were ignorant of what had been happening on shore, and were not competent at once to take up the reins of government. Perhaps, too, the women were not quite prepared to lay them down at once. In any case, there was found to be a spell of overlapping, of co-operating, of sharing the work and the responsibility. · A Salic law here would have been an impossible stupidity. Sea-fishing people all over the world in the same ages agreed with them ; witness the fame of the Empress Jingo of Japan, of Queen Teuta in the Adriatic, of our own Boadicea !

As we have seen, too, the boats were constantly owned by a group of families, each family providing—in turn or by lot—the skipper (the original Norse word). All the rest, whether older or younger, more famous or less famous, obeyed him instantly and without question *at sea*, whatever their relative rank on land ; no one was so stupid as to think obedience, for a reasoned purpose and in matters of life and death, was beneath his dignity, or made him a slave, or suggested any kind of inferiority. Out of this disciplined equality between man and man, as between man and woman, with its self-respect, its tolerance, its common sense, emerged the Viking people and their real democracy.

This Viking setting is purely oceanic, and has produced the finest sailors and the truest democracy that the world has ever seen ; but it now threatens all that has been most typical in the historic development of Norway, and the new departure is inevitable, however regrettable. For Norway cannot expand territorially, and her natural resources are small ; but the base of her population is of

the fishing type, marrying early and being very prolific (with a typical surplus of male births). Indeed, the great increase during the past century, from less than 1,000,000 to more than 2,500,000, was one main reason for the demand for independence a generation ago.

Although the Germans sank *c.* 1,000,000 tons of her shipping during the War, much of it in her *home* waters, her mercantile marine still ranks third in Europe (10 per cent. still under *sail*) ; and the percentage of her people engaged in trade and commerce has increased enormously (*c.* 450 per cent. in half a century). This implies a marked growth of towns—absence of which before the eighteenth century was very adverse to the development of a mercantile marine,—and some further advance on commercial lines may still be expected. As a maritime people, too, they have no fear of emigration. *Cf.* p. 81.

But emigration and diversion to commerce are not enough to meet the increase of population in a country 75 per cent. of which is uninhabitable waste, while 21 per cent. is still under forest. The forest is already being developed to the utmost—for timber, wood, pulp and paper industries ; indeed, the spruce is probably being cut far too much, for it is so free from resin that it is in great demand in the paper works. As a matter of fact, too, the Norwegians are not partial to forest work, leaving it often to the Finn element in the population. In any case, timber industries are too scattered for much concentration in single centres ; the timber trade began in the sixteenth century, with the introduction of the water-mills, but it gave rise to no urbanisation.

As for the subsistence farming, it is being carried on under as favourable, or as unfavourable, conditions as before ; but little expansion can be expected here. There are large farms behind Trondhjem and round Oslo, where *c.* 15 per cent. of the total area is under crops ; and in this

south-eastern area the acreage under wheat is actually increasing (and that under rye decreasing), a significant comment on the higher standard of living due to industrialisation. But only $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. of the total area is under tillage, and the mass of this is in the hands of peasant proprietors. They grow barley, oats, and potatoes, with such grasses as timothy and clover wherever the climate is very cool and moist; but they work tiny strips of land, where machinery is impossible or would be useless, and where intensive tillage under hand labour leaves little room for expansion. Further, wherever there is any question of high latitude or high altitude (up to 2,500 feet), barley is the only cereal of importance, and it is more valuable for pigs and other stock than for human food.

The result is that beasts are far more important than crops, the industrialisation again encouraging dairy development (including poultry and pork). The little farm, the in-mark, is still the base and the home; but it is associated with out-mark rights on the fjeld, with its expanse of communal alp—wherever the ice has left sheets of fine morainic gravel—which is even manured. Here, round the saeter hut—placed just above the tree-line in Norway, but inside the forest in Sweden,—there are two to three months of summer pasture, which is invaluable; but the long winters make the provision of winter fodder exceedingly important. This accounts for the spread of root crops, and for the very scientific treatment of "hay," including the constant mowing (which improves so greatly the quality of the grass¹), the aerial transport, rack-drying, etc. And the cattle, like their owners, can, and do, eat quantities of fish in winter.

Even so, real success is more or less limited to the central valley, where perhaps 3 per cent. of the total area

¹ Cutting increases the percentage of protein so much that pulped grass from lawn cuttings is almost as good as meal for pigs.

is under crops, and where the climate is favourable; for the centre of the west coast here is concave, the valley lies north-east of the great convex bulge which bears the Jotunfjeld dome to a height of 8,500 feet within 100 miles of the ocean directly to windward (S.W.), and a measured ¹ rainfall of 60" to 120" drops to one of 30" to 40". Indeed this was the home of the Bønder peasant aristocracy.

Industrialisation, therefore, was inevitable, and the lines of progress were unmistakable. The same causes that flood the fiords with water which masks the tide, guarantee—in the mild oceanic climate—unfailing supplies of water-power (up to fully 12,000,000 horse-power). Lakes and forests are natural storage reservoirs; and the narrow gorges and the hard rock greatly facilitate the building of dams and artificial reservoirs. At Notodden, Rjukan, Odde, and a dozen other centres, industrial nitrogen, calcium carbide, etc., are being produced in electro-chemical works, which use *c.* 50 per cent. of all the power already available (*c.* 2,000,000 horse-power); and there scarcely seems a limit at present to the possible development. But it is simply industrialisation. The numbers employed in farming, forestry, and fishing are only 50 per cent. of what they were a century ago, with a 50 per cent. smaller total population; and the numbers in industry have increased 500 per cent., and those in commerce 600 per cent. The number of "seamen" has dropped 35 per cent. in the past thirty years.

Norway, then, is and must always have been naturally poor, struggling and incoherent. It might be roughly divided into three regions—the great drenched dome in the south-west, the dry valley of the centre, and the cold plateau of the north; but the unit was the fiord, damp and dark, with its associated coastal islands. Ease of move-

¹ To windward of Guldhøpig the Jostedalstraæ conceals, in two dozen large glaciers, an unmeasured precipitation estimated at fully 240'.

ment by water and the continuity of the island fringe favoured the growth of personal ties with neighbouring fiords and islands; and this was also encouraged by the small size of the individual "farm," which was too small to be divided, and so was left entire to one child, the other children moving off to find food and farms elsewhere. Except in the central valley, however, the fertile land was so limited that population was nowhere great, even if there was eventually some concentration at a few particular foci.

This meant that there could be little or no public life, ties being personal rather than political; but, as these personal ties were linked with a "neighbourhood," a small well-defined region, a habit sprang up of all inside a given region, or Fylke (folk-land), meeting at a fixed time and place to discuss all common interests. This custom proved so satisfactory that it spread, "neighbouring" Fylkir combining in a Thing; and geographical conditions seem to have decided that there should be three¹ Things—Gula in the south-west, Frosta in the north, and Eidsfjella in the great valley. The dominating centre in the south-west was between the two great fiords, Sogne and Hardanger, at Bergen; in the north it was where a large fiord had the best access to and from the great valley, at Trondhjem; in the great valley the natural centre was Lake Mjøsen, at the foot of which Eidsvold still stands. This safe and fertile lake basin was the Cradle of the Nordics, and here inbreeding—in the high latitude and high humidity, with the dim light of fiord and forest—produced the pure blonde type. But conditions of soil and climate, of intercourse and trade, led to such increase in population and in importance that presently the south-eastern lowland was made into a separate Thing, Borgar, with its centre at Sarpsborg, *i.e.* practically Fredrikstad.

¹ Eventually there were even three "kingdoms."


The balance of power between these two favoured southern foci was bound to be held by Oslo.

The Age of Piracy gave place to the Age of Trade (c. 850), when Harold the Fairhaired—evidently a typical blonde—realised that these regional ties, under which even kings had no official and dynastic authority (*cf.* p. 143), might be unified. He pressed up the Glommen valley to Trondhjem, and worked his way back to The Vik *viâ* Bergen, conquering all the “kings”; and, as he had no brothers, he thus became the sole king of Norway.

The various chiefs defeated by Harold represented regions that were not prepared to accept his dominance, and they emigrated with all their personal followers. Thus the Shetlands, Orkneys, Hebrides, Ireland, the Isle of Man, the Faroe Islands, Iceland, etc., were colonised; but Norway never really recovered from the exodus. Of course, there was an end of the petty, local struggles, and there was a beginning of political unity and coherence. But the union of western Vikings and central Bønders in St. Olaf's Norway meant a steady and increasing preponderance of the “inland” type; and the country perpetuated her population from parents who were willing to be “subjects,” or were scarcely suitable to be “leaders.” Eventually Harold's House died out, colonies became independent, trade was lost to the Hansa, Norway herself was absorbed in Denmark and began to speak Danish. No one was left to indite or to inspire a Saga.

THE BALTIC

This ocean face of the peninsula is separated from the continental face by nearly 1,200 miles of plateau covered with ice and snow, a broad belt of desolation which made such a natural boundary between Norway and Sweden that no effort to draw any formal frontier was made till



SCANDINAVIAN RELIEF AND RAINFALL.

The 3000-foot contour is important here to mark the crest of the plateau, but eastward from the scarp of the Jostedalabrae (*cf.* p. 142) there is an area of about 3000 square miles which is above the 6000-foot contour

1751 ; and it required three-quarters of a century to finish the delimitation. Even where the plateau is relatively narrow and low, and where the high latitude is adverse to any heavy precipitation, the glimpse of human life that exists is neither Norwegian nor Swedish, but Finn and nomad Lapp (with reindeer) ; and these alien elements further separate rather than link Norway and Sweden.

This great physical obstacle differentiates the two countries in such a way that they have had almost nothing essential in common from the Lacustrine Age down to the Great War. The Baltic, as an inland sea and specially as the terminus of the later Amber Routes,¹ gave Sweden the advantage over Norway except in the earliest days, just as the Mediterranean gave it to Spain over Portugal ; and Sweden had eventually (*cf.* p. 154) some access to the North Sea, as Spain had to the Atlantic. Both peninsulas were originally peopled from the south ; but the line of ingress *viâ* the Danish islands favoured Sweden, as the Guadalquivir valley favoured Spain. And, though in such a peninsula, as in Iberia, topography is of more importance than soil, the cretaceous formation of Denmark is continued into Scania, which, too, is the most favoured climatic region of Sweden. Indeed, this, no doubt, explains the great success with which the "Danish" system of dairy-farming has been introduced into Scania ; and the invention of dairy utensils, *e.g.* the cream-separator, is an appropriate development for a people associated for centuries with (mining and) metal-working.

Southern Sweden, then, was bound to have great advantages over Norway, even over the Oslo lowlands, so long as the ocean was a *mare ignotum*, and the Baltic

¹ Obviously, Sweden reaped more advantage than Norway from trade on the Oder and the Vistula, *i.e.* the *later* Amber Routes ; but the mouth of the Elbe, the older route, is very easily reached—behind the North Friesland Islands—from Ribe.

was a great centre of civilisation and commerce. But the North-East Passage led to no dense populations or big markets, and leads to none now, even if a ship-canal from Viborg to Lake Onega could be kept open ; and the Baltic could never allow Sweden to do for Europe a tithe of what the Atlantic has allowed Norway to do. Indeed, the mere fact that Sweden is specifically a Baltic unit, means that it scarcely belongs, climatically or otherwise, to Peninsular Europe.

The two vital factors in this dependence of Swedish destiny on the Baltic have been the configuration of the sea and the character of its basin. For its size, the sea is the shallowest and the freshest in the world ; and, of course, both conditions have made it freeze quickly, as both were adverse to our submarines in the War. They went to the Baltic to try to stop the transport of iron ore (200,000 tons a month, in 1915, from Luleå alone) to Germany ; but—unlike the German underwater craft in the sea—they had not been designed for the special service, and had to be lightened (by 30 tons for every 1000 tons of displacement) in passing into the fresh water from the North Sea. As the ore boats kept in Swedish waters—where we did not trespass—till they reached the nearest point to the German coast, and as German cruisers frequented the Swedish waters behind Öland, our task was very difficult ; and the salvation of our boats, apart from the clever handling, was due to the shallow waters being so opaque from mud.

The shallowness is not of serious economic importance, and ice-breakers can keep open most of the ports on the Baltic proper ; but the configuration retains its political importance. Whether viewed as a single unit or as a group of three units, the sea is very long (800 miles north-and-south) for its width (not one-quarter of the length, excluding the Finland Gulf) ; and the entrance to each

"link" is very narrow, even ignoring islands. Coastwise traffic, therefore, very early gave way to crosswise; and the latter was greatly helped by the number, the size, and the distribution of the islands, especially Sealand,¹ Gotland, and Ösel. But this configuration made it very hard to control the whole sea from any one point. If we regard it as a lake, the best centre is Stockholm, *i.e.* "The stockaded *island-in-a-lake*," (not founded till 1157, after the burning of Sigtuna by the Baltic pirates); if as a sea, it is Visby, "the Sacred Abode"; if as a pocket of the ocean, Copenhagen, "the Merchants' Haven," which displaced Roskilde as the Danish capital.

Strategically, of course, Visby and Copenhagen have been far more, and even Arensburg (Ösel) has been rather more, important than Stockholm. Every Power that has controlled the sea, has actually held both Gotland and Ösel, and one of the first German moves in the War was to seize Ösel. Even the relative importance of Visby and Copenhagen from the purely strategical standpoint may be considered disputable—possibly since Denmark lost the north shore of the Sound to Sweden in 1658, certainly since she lost the west shore of the Little Belt to Prussia in 1864.

As a result of this configuration, the coast came in modern times to be shared by four States—two old ones, which had sunk to minor rank, Sweden and Denmark, and two new ones, which had been too incoherent internally and too much exposed externally to have been of importance in early days, Prussia and Russia; but the relations of the two latter to the sea were dissimilar.

Russia had a natural relation to the central waters, where the three limbs converge, where the vital island foci are distributed, and where only the few miles of the Schleswig "neck" interrupt the direct passage—*over water*—of the normal S.W. winds and their attendant

¹ *Zeeland* is a purely English (Dutch-inspired) mistake.

cyclones until they strike the " Russian " coast at Windau. Not only is the southern limb of the sea seldom frozen over, however bad the drift-ice may be, but off the low east coast the sea is also relatively deep; and, as the coast itself south of Windau has a distinct eastward trend, the regular S.W. winds do not drive broken ice back into the harbour (as *e.g.* at Hangö), even if they do not naturally carry it out of the harbour (as *e.g.* at Danzig). So the exposure, the deep water, and the trend of the coast combine to keep the Windau harbour usually open the whole winter through.


The Baltic Basin is in a lonely corner of the European plain, and so the sea is shallow and full of islands (much more fertile than the Skerries); and there is a remarkable uniformity, not only of relief, but also of climate and of vegetation. This uniformity was favourable to uniformity of human type—Nordics practically surrounding the sea by 3000 B.C.—with similar occupations based on similar products (forest products, hardy fibres, hardy grains, etc.). That is to say, the basin was bound to make a Natural Trade Area, where similarity of supplies involved rivalry, if not antagonism, of economic interests as national problems. But at first, from the general European standpoint, the basin was in a lonely corner of the continent, shut in and shut off by ocean and ice, mountains and marsh, and with the entrance of its *mare clausum* easily blocked; and this seclusion, though favourable in some respects to early development in and round the sea itself, favoured also—and has favoured up to our own time—the domination of the sea, if not the basin, by a single Power, Prussia or Russia, Sweden or Denmark, Varangian Vikings or Hansa Traders. And, of them all, only Russia had no natural relation to the North Sea.

That this was the vital thing is strongly suggested by the Hansa tolls—levied nominally to suppress piracy in the

Baltic, but really to spy out what goods were passing between the two seas, whence and whither. Only on the west, the north, and the east, does the whole of the apparent hinterland drain to the Baltic. On the south morainic hills, river-bends, and old channels converted into canals—supplemented later by railways—led Prussia both naturally and artificially to the ice-free North Sea, though her real coast was on the Baltic. This diversion of the natural drainage favoured the ultimate domination of the sea by some southern “Power,” whether the Hansa or Denmark or Prussia, that held the link between the two seas. So long as Prussia was incoherent, she was out of the picture; and Denmark had more promise of permanent control than the Hansa had, for an alliance between Lübeck and Hamburg was no equivalent for the Danish possession of a private waterway in the Liim fiord—in the days before the existence of a Kiel Canal.

But the essential defect in the Hansa position was that the over-long stretch of its units, at least from Bruges to Novgorod, almost forced it to place its headquarters in the natural centre of the line at Visby. The fine harbour is on the “Atlantic” coast of Gotland, but its natural relation is with Sweden rather than with Denmark; and power was steadily moving to the North Sea, especially after the herrings deserted the Baltic (c. 1425). In the meantime and purely from the internal point of view, domination was bound to lie on the east or the west of the long Baltic-Bothnian waterway.

The west coast of the waterway is a continuous line, with easy access—largely by water—from its central peninsula to the mouth of the Göta, and Sweden was an old Power; and for centuries she controlled both the east and the west, and for a considerable time even the south. The east coast is a broken line, along which there was not a unity of racial type; it had no natural access to



THE MEDIEVAL BALTIC TRADE AREA.

No historian seems to have related the medieval trade of the Baltic to the pre-historic, or to have established a precise date, or an adequate cause for the rise of typical so-called *Hansa* activities; and thus much undeserved credit has been given to the Hansa. The decline of the Imperial power and the bid-keeping between the territorial princes and the towns are not obviously problems of sea and river transport, and, though much of the Hansa trade, especially in the earlier times, was done by porter and pack horse, the water trade became the essential feature. It was certainly the water competition that affected towns along the western, Rhone-Rhine, Amber Route (largely the work of Greek colonists—Macedonians), and their northern neighbours below the Rhine gorge, e.g. Dortmund and Cologne and even Soest and Münster.

The date was certainly *after* the German expansion over the three great Slav rivers—Elbe, Oder, and Vistula; the first known meeting of the "League" (A.D. 1256) was largely a meeting of Slav centres, including Rostock and Stralsund; and the group came actually to be known as the Wendish!

Why had the Germans not started similar activities on their German rivers? Why could not the League, even at the height of its power, stop the piracy? And why was it definitely political, especially in real German lands, and definitely economic only on the plains of these Slav rivers? Surely, in each case the answer may be that the fundamental agency was not German.

With the Slav rivers the Hansa inherited a legacy of aptitudes from the 3000 odd years of the Amber Trade—first (c. 1800 B.C.) on the Elbe-Moldau and then (? c. 800 B.C.) on the Vistula-Dniester, both supplemented by the Oder-March, the former concerned specially with the "glacial" amber or "Angeln" (with the heavier exchange product, Bohemian bronze, as the down-stream freight), and the latter with the "drift" amber of Sarnland.

The vital agents in the later trade were again Greek colonists—on the Pontus, and in the older trade the people or "Angeln". As there had been a sea-trade, reaching even the Mediterranean (and Cornwall) as early as 3000 B.C., the Anglo invaders of Britain (cf. p. 179) had some 3300 years of sea and river experience behind them!

the North Sea ; and Russia was quite a late arrival on the coast.

It is obvious, then, that Sweden is specifically a Baltic unit, and we cannot ignore the Historical Geography of the lacustrine Baltic as the scene of very early movements and as having kept Sweden wholly European. Norway is purely oceanic, the word including the Atlantic and the Norwegian Sea as well as the North Sea ; and we must stress the Economic Geography of the latter. Denmark is the link land, and here probably the Political Geography requires special attention. For the natural water link has been supplemented economically and neutralised strategically by the Kiel Canal, as the sequel to the theft of Schleswig and the prelude to war. War seems to have been declared about one month after the completion of the alterations needed to allow Dreadnoughts to pass through the canal.

DENMARK

From quite early days even the convergence of the three limbs was less important than the exit of the *cul de sac* ; and here climate and soil, the configuration and the distribution of the straits, and its relations to Jutland, Scania, and Germany, gave exceptional importance to Sealand. This importance, too, was independent of the herrings, though it increased—so far as Copenhagen was concerned—with the stormy weather of the twelfth century, which seems to have driven the fish into the Baltic, and was probably associated with the causes which seem to have made them desert it, *i.e.* the killing off of the whales in the North Sea and the greatly increased traffic in the shallow Sound. From the time, then, when the North Sea began to be more important, till the Baltic began to become unimportant, Denmark was of supreme im-

portance ; she held the three small straits and dominated the two large ones, and so the approaches to the cores of both Norway and Sweden ; for the Kattegat is the continuation of the Norwegian valley, as the Skager Rak is that of the Swedish lakeland. Even now, though the kingdom is only the core of what it once held, the Danes have never lost that core or suffered foreign dominion over it. In 1864, Prussia, by force and by fraud, obtained a lever against her, and eventually built the Kiel Canal on land¹ filched from her ; but Copenhagen is still the economic metropolis of the Baltic.

Denmark had always been politically the vital part of Scandinavia so far as location was concerned ; for the southern frontier of the pure Nordics here was in the line of forested swamp along the northern waterparting of the Lower Elbe basin, backed (*c. A.D. 900*) by the Danavirki rampart from Tönning to Schleswig.² This location made Denmark a pivot for Nordic North, Slav East, and Teutonic South ; and as structure, relief, and climate were all very favourable to the production of food crops, population was always relatively dense ; and virile and adventurous citizens were not lost by emigration. Normal movement, too, as in Norway, was by water, so that concentration for attack or defence was easy and rapid ; and defence was even easier than one might have expected. For early Denmark consisted of the peninsulas, Jutland and Skani, with the intervening straits and islands ; and the peninsular population in each case was “ thrown ” inwards (*cf. p. 33*), *i.e.* towards the fertile islands, by a belt of forested marsh. Indeed, on the north, the bare rock and bogland of Småland made a second natural rampart, as the Danavirki made a

¹ The peoples of both England and Russia were greatly roused over this, and were anxious to restore the territory to Denmark by force of arms ; but we had a Germanised court, a great foe of Russia in Palmerston, and a great friend of peace in Bright.

² The recent settlement did not give even Flensburg to Denmark.

second, though artificial one, in the south. Each unit had its own customs and customary law and its own centres, political, religious, and economic—Ribe and Randers, west and east of Jutland, Odense and Roskilde, west and east of the islands, and Lund and Malmhanger in Skani; but the whole was a strong, coherent, compact kingdom.

Of course, Denmark had a great start as the gate of Christian civilisation into Scandinavia, and its island stepping-stones led to Sweden rather than Norway; but, as an ocean gate, Denmark was more in sympathy with Norway as an ocean margin than with Sweden as a continental plain, and the separation of Denmark from Norway after Waterloo was as unnatural as was the linking of Norway with Sweden. But nothing could have been more significant or more “natural” geographically than that a great Sea Queen, Margaret of Denmark, should unite the three countries in the Treaty of Kalmar (1397), and that the necessary preliminary should have been to sweep the Germans out of the Stockholm pivot of the Baltic. And the choice of Kalmar as her temporary capital guaranteed that no German ships should haunt the Scanian waters behind Öland (*cf.* p. 147). If the subsequent progress of Denmark was somewhat meagre, we must remember that she could not flourish, as England did, until the Hansa was crippled by the migration of the herrings, and Holland was crippled by her struggle with Spain.

SWEDEN

Sweden has as much fertile land as Denmark, and her lakeland is much larger, lower, and more level than the Norwegian valley; but in the early days Scania was Danish, and the coastlands north of the Göta were Norwegian; Sweden did not reach the Kjölen frontier or the Sound till the middle of the seventeenth century, and—

apart from Ural-Altaic primitives—her population of Goths and Swedes was quite localised, the Swedes round Lake Mälär and the Goths round Lake Vetter.¹ Moreover, the two peoples were so closely akin, as well as such near neighbours, that both were under the Priest of Sigtuna, who was chosen by each in turn. Of course, as the Goths came under the Christian influence of their Danish neighbours, this caused religious trouble, and there were ages of civil war, in which population was decimated, and resources were exhausted. But, again, the disturbed area was local.

As a whole, Sweden, like Central Canada, is a land of wide and gently rolling terraces, dropping from a western water-parting by definite scarps (at *c.* 1500- and 600-foot contours), associated with lakes and rapids. It has a definitely continental climate, but with some modifications. Except directly to leeward of the Jötunheim-Dovre-fjeld dome, very little of the area has less than 20 inches of rain a year, and the influence of the Baltic in summer and of the strong *southern* component (due to the high latitude) in the winds is suggested by the fact that the frontier of normal agriculture runs through the country north-and-south parallel with the Baltic and with the 600-foot contour. Where the precipitation is lightest, too, it is mainly in the form of snow. Structure, relief, and climate are all, therefore, very favourable to the growth of coniferous forest (mixed with that “Lady of the Forest,” the birch), and fully sixty large rivers flow across all these terraces, with their “power” rapids and their lake “reservoirs,” to separate mouths in the Baltic. Lumbering is thus greatly facilitated, though there is no concentration on a single port. *Cf.* p. 140.

But the forest stretched, and still stretches, far south of the southern limit of heavy snow (and of fruit trees) :

¹ Which divided them into Eastern and Western tribes.

and the Swede is naturally a forester (*cf.* p. 140). This meant that, though relief was very favourable to transport (and the Swedes have to-day more rail *per caput* than any other European country, Denmark coming second), the forest cover made union slow and late, especially as Svealand remained pagan till *c.* 1150, *i.e.* for 200 years longer than Gothland. But conditions were also far more favourable to agriculture than in Norway; the food supply was much larger, and there was plenty of room and material (timber) for building houses; and so emigration was as much less needed, as it was much less easy, than in Norway.

But population never became dense. Even now, though ten times the size of Denmark, Sweden has not twice as many people; and the most virile people, the miners of the Dalarne highlands, served Gustavus Vasa so well that they left none to carry on the type. It was absurd, therefore, for her ever to extend her frontier to the shores of Lakes Peipus and Ladoga; the Swedes were even too poor and too few ever to dominate the much nearer Prussian coastlands, though this was almost an accident. The policy of Margaret's triple kingdom was to hold the hegemony of the Baltic, and this involved the occupation of the southern shore. Unfortunately, after the dissolution of the Union (of Kalmar) in 1523, *i.e.* without the help of Denmark, Sweden tried to retain the Prussian coast; but her constant warfare with Norway-Denmark prevented her from making regular and vigorous resistance to Slav encroachments. And, when the Westphalian settlement gave to Sweden, as a Protestant Power, western Pomerania, Bremen, etc., she was brought into fatal hostility with the rival Protestant Power of Prussia.

While Sweden has done little for Europe historically, she is at present, and will continue to be for years, of great economic importance as the best source of conifer products.

About 57 per cent. of the whole area is under forest, and this 57 per cent. is about 57,000,000 acres, *i.e.* nearly 10 acres *per caput*. The existence of it is largely a matter of soil, for the vast expanse of stony moraine can scarcely be used with profit—if at all—for any other purpose; but both the distribution and the character of the forest are largely climatic.

The north is naturally colder than the south, conifers there requiring 160 years for perfect rotation compared with only 80 in the south; but the south bore the brunt of the earlier exploitation, and is in the deciduous belt. The dividing line is roughly in the latitude of the Dal Elf—*e.g.* Malung, Falun, Gefle (the historic timber port)—which is roughly the southern limit of the 1,500-foot contour, of heavy snow, of long winter (150–200 days). It is also the northern limit of oak-flora; but the oak itself, like the beech in the far south, is of no importance except as suggesting soil and climate which encourage clearing for cultivation.

The great source of forest exports is the 40,000 square miles of northern Sweden between the 600- and the 1,500-foot contours (*cf.* p. 155), where Scots fir and Norway spruce dominate a belt 600 miles long and 100–150 miles wide. The fir, which predominates to the north, is a lover of light, and flourishes on the drier convex sections of the plateau, while the spruce is a lover of shade, and flourishes on the wetter concave sections; and forest fires at once keep the spruce sufficiently in check, without doing much harm to the fir, and leave both an open space and a top-dressing of ash, where the light-lover can find a home for its seeds.

In this connection, too, the birch is of great importance. The upper limit of the conifers varies from rather over 2,500 feet in the south to rather under 1,500 feet in the north; but throughout there is a fringe of birch above

(usually 200-600 feet above) the conifers, and birch is scattered widely through the conifer stands. The high belt has great protective value to the conifers below it, and everywhere the leaf-fall of the birch greatly improves the humus layer, which remains naturally "raw" in such a bleak climate. Indeed, in some parts the reproduction of the fir depends absolutely on the presence of this top-dressing of leaf-mould.

This is an area, too, where earth-movements and glacial moraines have left a large number of highland lakes, especially between the 900- and the 1,400-foot contours, some of them quite a considerable size (200 square miles), with a background of fully 200 glaciers; and though cultivation is scarcely possible, the great mineral wealth, *e.g.* in "the Lapland iron-ore mountains" round Gellivara, has drawn attention to the area.

While the winter temperature here is naturally very low, especially on the upper terrace and to the north, the summer temperature—under the clear (usually 50 p.c. cloudless) sky—is abnormally high for the latitudes; and the one is as great an advantage to the lumbering as the other is to the growth of saplings, so long as there is sufficient rain or subsoil moisture. In this respect, as we have seen, the forest is greatly favoured by its nearness to the Atlantic and its high latitude. This involves so much southerly component in the regular winds that their natural course takes them directly over most of the country; for it stretches over 13 degrees of longitude between the south-east corner of the Kattegat and the north-east corner of the Bothnian Gulf, as well as over 13 degrees of latitude between the Sound and the Finn frontier. This causes a large amount (*c.* 75 per cent.) of cloud in the otherwise continental winter, and so a relatively slight loss of heat by radiation is accompanied by an actually heavy fall of snow. The existence of the

forest is mainly due to this heavy snowfall, while its quality is mainly due to the relatively considerable proportion of "mild and moist" winds in winter, minimising the harm done by transpiration at a season when the trees cannot replace the lost moisture from the frozen soil.

The hard snow is, of course, as useful as in Canada for lumbering operations, especially transport of logs, and the facilities for this otherwise are wonderfully good. There is little or no trouble about labour. As in Norway the farmer is the fisherman, so here he is the forester. The labour comes from the farms, where it would otherwise be idle; so do the horses, and the hauls are very short. Almost everywhere there is water frontage at from one mile to four miles; it aggregates *c.* 19,000 miles, and delivered at sixty different ports in the Baltic in 1927 some 450,000,000 cubic feet at a cost of under £100¹ per 30,000 cubic feet.

The excellence of this water transport is partly natural and partly artificial. The river gradients are naturally gentle (*cf.* p. 155), but irregularities of bed and bank in important reaches have been removed or reduced; and the current is now normally just sufficient for easy work—on a 5 to 10-foot a mile gradient at a speed of *c.* two miles an hour at the best. Of course, some of the logs come immense distances; but three factors minimise even this difficulty. All the great rivers flow *south*-eastward, some almost due south, *e.g.* the Angerman; and so their mouths are in lower latitudes as well as in lower altitudes than their upper courses, and they thaw steadily up-stream from the Baltic. Then there are two floods, the Spring (April) flood, which clears the lower half of the river, and the Mountain (June) flood, which clears the upper half. The only danger is when a very warm Spring starts the "Mountain" flood before the "Spring" flood has cleared the lower river.

¹ Where rail has to be used, it is *seven* times as costly as the water.

Then storage and power are abundant and cheap. Fully 6 per cent. of the whole Norrland consists of lakes (*cf.* p. 142), and the potential power¹ is very great, *e.g.* 60,000 horse-power on one fall (the Krangede) on the Indals and over 45,000 on one (the Harsprång) on the Luleå. Under these circumstances, a great deal of "conversion" work has been developed, not only in various wood industries (*e.g.* window-frames), but also in pulp, paper, and similar industries. Mills stand at the mouth of almost every Norrland river, and they are run now by electricity, for the old "sawmill-waste" fuel is used by the pulp mills.

Sweden is now the premier producer in Europe of both sulphite and wood pulp, as well as of soft woods; and the pulp and paper exports, already 50 per cent. higher than the wood exports, are steadily rising, while the latter are steadily falling—actually as well as relatively. At the same time, though pulp is displacing wood, and the source of the largest supplies varies from year to year, over the whole area the increment equals the cut.

The result of this development is, obviously, an industrialisation of Sweden somewhat similar to that of Norway, but much less—if at all—harmful to the continuity of the best human type. Statistically, since 1900 the percentage of persons in agriculture and forestry has fallen from fully 54 to under 44, while that in industries and commerce has risen from under 40 to over 50; but these industrialists are "farmer-foresters" under another name, and draw their raw materials from the forests.

For the natural plant-formation of Sweden is forest; the Swedes are naturally foresters, with typical forest laws, *e.g.* the Udal; and their forests are the best managed in the world. Here the pure Nordic lives in a climate in

¹ The Swedish total is c. 6,000,000 horse-power, *i.e.* 1 horse-power *per caput* (Norway is 3 horse-power to 1), for an average of nine months in the year.

which the short dark days of a long hard winter enforce on him as much leisure as the Mediterranean enjoys in his rainless heat, while the long days of a short summer involve him in a rush of work unknown to the Mediterranean. In his typically "Alpine" environment of poor plateau, he shows as much industry as an Alpine, coupled with the driving power of his own race; and he devotes his long dark winter to education. In Sweden illiteracy is a crime.

In 1914 the Treaty of Malmö, with its suggestions of the old Treaty of Kalmar, brought into the horrid jargon of our daily Press the word Scandinavianism; and again we find a parallel to the reactions to the War in Iberia, though here there are three separate countries as well as separate classes of people. The fundamental decisions were really based more on the economic than on the political geography; and that, perhaps, is why our Ministry of Blockade was guilty of such astounding folly, doing things that could be done by no one except a certain type of politician.

Denmark was anti-German—on political as well as economic grounds. With her Schleswig dynasty, she had not had time to forget 1864 and the plea that "a people who could be so easily deceived once, deserved to be deceived again." But for Bismarck's falsehood, which made Denmark hold out in the war, a European Congress would have given Schleswig to Denmark, while the Holstein fief of the old Empire would have remained Prussian; for the Holstein (Oldenburgh) dynasty of Denmark had died out, and Prussia had a real claim to the northern watershed of the Lower Elbe. So Denmark lost her North Sea coast south of Ribe (*cf.* p. 183), the work of which has now passed to Esbjerg, with a trade that is almost wholly British. For fully 63 per cent. of the total Danish trade is with us, mainly in butter and bacon;

indeed, in 1914 we paid Denmark £9,000,000 for bacon. That was why it seemed so strange—to ordinary people—that in 1915 our Minister of Blockade sent 100,000,000 lb. of bacon to Denmark! As she was now *importing* bacon, one might have thought that she would need fewer jute bags for packing it. Not at all! We sent her some *millions* of square yards of jute sacking more than she had ever before purchased in any year; and they found an immediate and most profitable market—as sandbags for the German trenches. Of course, Denmark (Greenland) was our sole source of cryolite for the electric smelting of aluminium; but our need for that was not great enough to affect our political action.

But at least Denmark was definitely pro-Ally, and so it is interesting to ask, “What was Sweden?” and “What did we send her?” She was naturally anti-Russian; she was ruled as an autocracy during the War, and her people were voiceless; her army, like the Spanish, greatly admired the Prussian model and machine; and the whole nation, being landsmen and not seamen, were not shocked, as, *e.g.* the Malays were, by the sinking of the “*Lusitania*.” But we had always been on friendly terms with the Swedes, and were large purchasers of their forest products, *e.g.* resin, though they were not large buyers of the things of which we have a sort of monopoly. These certainly include cacao, tea, jute, and pepper, all of them immensely important in the War for rations, for bags, or—like resin—for shells. Now, before the War, Sweden never purchased from us even 150,000 lb. of cacao¹ in any one year; but in 1915 we sent them 13,767,000 lb.—13,757,000, apparently, to the single port of Malmö, *i.e.* to the terminus of the train-ferry to Germany! The story of the tea and the pepper is somewhat similar, and we even sent her immense quantities of *resin*, which one would have said that

¹ See U.K. Trade Returns, 1916, p. 161, etc.

she did not need any more than Denmark needed bacon. *Cf.* p. 164.

We were less generous to Norway. We threatened to stop her supplies of jute (for nets) unless she agreed to send no fish to Germany. She agreed at once, but that only gave Germany an excuse for completing in war her old peace campaign¹ against the Norwegian mercantile marine; and Norway lost 2,000 men and *c.* 1,000,000 tons of shipping, for she could not keep her long, intricate, secluded coast free from German submarines (*cf.* p. 140). But Norway was naturally pro-Ally. She had no Schleswig problem, and was relatively remote from Central Europe; but her democracy was roused by the invasion of Belgium, and her sailors were shocked by the "Lusitania" outrage. Even her economic ties with us could not be wholly ignored, for we were taking nearly one-third of her total exports.

Between these three States, then, so much akin in race, speech, and culture, all relatively small and all politically weak, the War encouraged closer relations. It was understood that Sweden was anxious for a more or less political union, in which her superior size and population would have given her a certain hegemony very comforting to the pride of a once Great Power. Denmark was indifferent, because she was too sure of her own economic hegemony to fear Sweden's possible political hegemony; but Norway had been free scarcely ten years, and feared that this "national insurance" might become national subjection. But there was no kind of objection to an economic understanding, Denmark guaranteeing the dairy and meat products, Norway the fish and fats (oil), and Sweden the sugar, wood, and iron. The natural pivot was Copenhagen, and Denmark was playing again the part that she had been playing off and on for centuries—since she became the

¹ See Report of Royal Commission, 1902.

pivot and the channel of Christianity travelling northwards. But Sweden had learnt her lesson, and to-day she has three free ports in Göteborg, Malmö, and Stockholm, even the last kept open by ice-breakers the whole winter through.

NOTE

The following figures (in *lb*) of our exports to Sweden in five significant years are from the U.K. Trade Returns. By 1917 the scandal behind them was stopped, partly owing to the pointed attention drawn to them by some geographers; but they throw a curious light on the mentality and the ignorance of officialdom.

	CACAO.	TEA	PEPPER	RESIN
1912 ..	145,393	251,087	17,289	3000
1913 .	149,737	245,660	46,999	43,231
1914 ..	2,403,733	377,533	541,844	1,489,264
1915 .	13,767,234	1,049,960	2,612,739	3,208,800
1920 .	9317	360,272	112,000	330,400

CHAPTER V

ANGLES AND SAXONS

FISHERMEN AND FARMERS

SINCE the publication of Professor Chadwick's *Origin of the English Nation* (1906), there seems to have been a tendency amongst History students to overwork the term "Anglo-Saxon," and to condemn the use of any words which imply disagreement with his opinion. "The use of the words 'Angles and Saxons,'" wrote one of them, "suggests an apparent ignorance of the substantial identity of all the people called indifferently by either name or by both names." He made no reference to Schütte's emphatic statement¹ that the term Anglo-Saxon originally "merely served to distinguish the Saxons in England from the Germano-Saxons in Germany"; but he gave three quotations² from Professor Chadwick. They were all concerned with the unity of type in the Anglo-Saxon settlement of England: "The invaders belonged not to three, but two, distinct nationalities (*sic*), Jutish and Anglo-Saxon"; "The people of the Saxon kingdoms as a whole were not of a distinct nationality from those of the Anglian kingdoms"; "But for Bede we should hardly hesitate to say that Angle was their own name for themselves, and Saxon the name given by foreigners."

Professor Chadwick gives a map to illustrate his contention that the original home of his Anglo-Saxon

¹ Schütte, *Our Forefathers* (p. 51), 1929.

² Chadwick, pp. 84, 83, 55, and (map) 193.

people was in Schleswig. He plots them on it as separate units with distinct homelands (!), the Saxons in the western and the Angles in the eastern half of the area. It is true that there is a belt of thin barren sands (from the Lüneburg Heath) running up the centre of the isthmus, and this must always have made a rough natural break between the two flanks. Further, the eastern flank, with its wooded hills, its diluvial drift or boulder clay, its indented coast and fine harbours facing the lake-like Baltic, must certainly have offered a good homeland for such a people as the Angles. But the "Marshlands" of the western flank, with their mud-flats and shoals, were always liable to periodic and even to tidal flooding, and could not have supported more than a few scattered hamlets; and the whole area—never more than about fifty miles wide and sometimes less than twenty-five—is not much larger than Lincolnshire. That it should have been the homeland of two distinct tribes is incredible.

The map does give lines of latitude and longitude, and shows the whole land area with both its sea fronts easily within the limits of longitude 8° and 10° E.—in latitude 55° N.; that is to say, it should convey the impression that the whole area (land and sea) cannot be more than eighty miles from east to west. But no scale is given on the map, and Professor Chadwick seems scarcely to have realised either the tiny total area or the character of the "Saxon" half.

But our immediate concern is not with any theory, possibly right or obviously wrong, of the original homelands of these peoples, but with the obsession that there was no real distinction between them in England; and on this point the decision must lie with archæology. Fortunately, that science speaks with no uncertain voice. Indeed, it seems fatal to Professor Chadwick's theory even if by "national" he means "tribal," cf. p. 64.

Professor Baldwin Brown,¹ after a scholarly study of the archæological evidences concerned with the early Anglo-Saxon distributions on both sides of the North Sea, concludes quite definitely that "the word 'Saxon' does possess its own meaning apart from the word 'Angle,'" and that the evidence of the cemeteries seems to show an essential unity of racial type, but an equally essential diversity of tribal type.

He divides the pertinent part of England into three main areas—The Thames basin and the land to the south of it, the Trent basin and the land to the east of it, and the basin of the Yorkshire Ouse and the land to the east of that. The first of these is specifically Saxon, the two others are specifically Angle. In the various subdivisions of the former, *e.g.* cremation was entirely absent or very rare, while in those of the latter it was normal. At the same time cremation cemeteries have been found in a few places in the Saxon area, and inhumation cemeteries in some parts of the Angle area. Professor Chadwick says (p. 67): "The question at issue is whether the Saxons did, or did not, practise cremation"; and we may agree *if* the word "practise" is used in its proper sense of "doing habitually and normally." But he uses it of what was exceptional and abnormal. Reworded, then, the question is whether cremation was the normal mode of burial with the Saxons, as it was definitely with the Angles; and the only answer which corresponds with the evidence, is that it was not normal. Even about the few cases of cremation outside the Angle territory in England, Mr. Thurlow Leeds² says that "Professor Chadwick is unfortunately under a misconception about the meaning of these."

Special attention is called by Professor Baldwin Brown to marked contrasts on opposite sides of natural features


¹ Baldwin Brown, *The Arts of Early England* (p. 599), 1915.

² Thurlow Leeds, *Archæology of the Anglo-Saxon Settlements* (p. 26), 1913.

along which tribal frontiers ran. Of course, no exact line can be traced; indeed, we may assume that there never was a precisely delimited line, though in some places a river may have made an unmistakable boundary. Probably the best course is to adopt a narrow "neutral" belt along such features, and not to press the importance of any relics—if there are any—from this neutral belt. On the contrary, marked contrasts on opposite sides of a conspicuous natural feature, *e.g.* a water-parting, may surely be pressed to the utmost, and Professor Baldwin Brown selects in eastern England the general water-parting between the Thames and the Great Ouse as a marked Angle-Saxon frontier. Along the southern edge of this waterparting (and its neutral belt) westward from Ipswich—really outside both basins—not a single cremation cemetery has been found; along its northern edge, from Snape to Cambridge, there is an unbroken series of them. A trifle farther west, at Barrington, an intrusion of inhumation occurs—at the one place along the watershed where, in the valley of the Granta, the frontier suddenly sent a narrow tongue southward into Essex (*East Saxony*).

This Granta valley seems of more importance than any other geographical feature that breaks across the natural line of the Chalk downs and their artificial parallel in the Icknield Way (or Ways). Mr. Thurlow Leeds has formulated (*History*, July, 1925) an interesting theory of the West Saxon invasion working *south-westward from the Wash*, and thus given a convincing explanation of the Wansdyke facing northwards; but he is less interested in the difference of type and tradition between Angle and Saxon, he assumes that the Saxons came up the Great Ouse (they could not have crossed the Lower Fens in any other way), and he does not attempt to explain why they left a very good waterway for a very bad one.

But, if they worked up the Blackwater basin, where



DISTRIBUTION AND MOVEMENTS OF ANGLES AND SAXONS.

they have left us abundant relics, into the Granta¹ basin, then at once we understand the concentration of Saxon cemeteries "between" Chesterford and Girton, especially round Barrington; and the mixed Saxon and Angle culture in Cambridge suggests *why* the Saxons did not progress farther down the Cam. Unable to push the Angles back down the Cam, they themselves worked up the river—to Ashwell and Astwick. They seem to have worked up the Lea in the same way—to Leagrave and Chalton, again crossing Icknield Way; and so to have made a link for—possibly, a junction with—the line of Saxon cemeteries between the Upper Cam and the Upper Thame *viâ* Toddington and Leighton Buzzard; and there is a concentration between the Way and the Thame—*i.e.* between Bletchley and Oxford—exactly parallel with that between the Way and the Cam—*i.e.* between Bletchley and Cambridge.

Even if we agree that the mode of burial in itself does not make a real *discrimen* so long as any cases of cremation are found outside Angle districts, the case is not materially altered, for this is provided by the accompaniments of the burials, the tomb furnishings, specially the cruciform brooches, the wristclasps, the girdle-hangers, and—to some extent—by the equal-armed fibula, the spout-handled urn, the use of runes. The first three of these are found widely in, but are practically restricted to, Angle areas, not only in England, but on the continent, where Professor Chadwick maps the "nations" as separate and distinct; and Professor Baldwin Brown says quite definitely that "the cruciform brooch does constitute a real *discrimen* between Angle and Saxon regions."

Mr. Thurlow Leeds is equally clear and convincing. He asserts that "the keynote of Anglo-Saxon settlements

¹ The scale of the Granta on the map is exaggerated fourfold. The route marked "Jutes" was probably the earliest and the most frequented of all the routes; but it was definitely Frisian, and the mass of the Jutes went on to the Isle of Wight, *cf.* pp. 182, 193.

is heterogeneity," not uniformity; he explains the importance of the women's tombs, with their wealth of ornament; and he concludes that "the evidence from these proves the tribal instinct to have been at first immensely strong" (p. 27). He adds a map based on data from all the districts surveyed, and this shows, for c. A.D. 550, the division of the pertinent country into clear cultural regions. The date is important, as Professor Schetelig has proved that the "West Baltic" cruciform brooches—only four of which have been found in England outside the *Angle* territory—had "reached their *final* stage of development in the first half of the sixth century or, if anything, still earlier" (p. 76). Mr. Leeds agrees with Professor Baldwin Brown;—"the resemblances suggest races of the same general stock, the differences suggest tribal variation within the limits occupied by that stock" (p. 63); and, like Professor Baldwin Brown, he emphasises the significance of the abrupt contrasts on opposite sides of the same frontier waterparting, *e.g.* in Northamptonshire, where he says that "a sharp line has to be drawn between the cultures."

In each case the Saxons seem to have been farther from the primitive "Northern" rites and designs—(that cremation was the primitive rite here deserves more attention than it has received)—and we know that they had been in close touch with the less primitive "Southern" peoples. Inhumation is, therefore, as typical of, and as natural and appropriate in, the Saxon regions, as are the "Roman" bronze objects (which are found along the northern border of the Empire). These are found in almost all parts of the Saxon region in England, but are practically restricted to that region.

These clear cultural distinctions between the two types of people in their post-migration distributions suggest long differences of environment in their pre-migration

distributions ; and the question at once arises as to the validity of such a suggestion, and the extent to which, and the directions in which, it may be pressed. To a geographer the validity is obvious, for he cannot think of a clearly defined *locus* without thinking also of a pervading *genius loci* ; but interpretations of the phenomena must be reasonable and natural. For instance, it is both reasonable and natural to expect that a human group will flourish best where, if, and while, it corresponds most closely with its environment, *i.e.* when the environment offers, and the group takes advantage of, the best opportunities for using its “ spiritual ” gifts, hereditary and otherwise.

Every geographical environment, like every racial inheritance, contains both good and bad elements ; no environment can be called favourable which does not make possible, if not easy, the perpetuation of the race ; and no inheritance can be called favourable which does not enable the race to make fairly full use of its natural environment.

To take a pertinent instance, it is reasonable and natural to associate bear-worship with the cool-temperate belt (50° – 60° N.) of the Northern Hemisphere ; only there do we find a vast belt of temperate forest, and bears are not likely to be of much significance outside the limits of such forest. So, too, people living in such forests, especially in the rainier seaward parts of it, are likely to be of a blonde type ; the presence of the forest implies a high humidity and a canopy of shade, and in the high latitude the angle of incidence makes the sunlight relatively weak even during the long summer days. The same conditions are very favourable to the growth of lush meadow in any clearing, while the long winters ensure a demand for artificial warmth ; and, as the forests are cleared for fuel, the foresters are very likely to become farmers. Further, it is reasonable to expect the farmer to behave naturally—like a farmer, not like a fisherman.

SAXONY

Now, from Cæsar and Tacitus, Pliny and Ptolemy, we know that in their times the land "beyond," *i.e.* north-east of, the Lower Rhine was occupied by numerous tribes of tall, fair people, speaking kindred languages and with much similarity of customs. We are in no way bound to accept unreasonable and unnatural details from any one of the authors; for instance, Ptolemy is obviously wrong about the actual distribution of the Angles¹ on the continent. For it is certain, from Tacitus, etc., that the Angles—and their allies the Varines or Schwerins—did not live on the Rhine delta in the first or the second century A.D.; and Cæsar had no doubt about the tribes generally being included in a formal Confederacy, led by a Cheruscan (or Chattan) tribe—in virtue of its military prowess.

Like the *Nomen Latinum*, this *Nomen Cheruscum* was not confined to a single race (it certainly included, *e.g.* some Wends), still less a single tribe; and probably its strongest internal bond was a certain unity of speech, while there was a certain unity of external danger.

No doubt there was always a natural tendency for the inland or "Saxon" tribes to drift southward into the belt of deciduous forest, where acorns and beech-nuts fed their pigs, and where the leaf-mould gave a soil rich in humus, and so favourable alike to meadow, to artificial crops, and to the wild flowers that guaranteed the invaluable supply of honey—for sugar and mead. But presently, in addition to this natural drift, there came heavy pressure of Slavs from the east, which provoked more artificial movements among the inland tribes, movements towards the west and south-west. These movements, of course, reacted on the coastal tribes, *e.g.* the Frisians, and brought the "Saxons" directly up against the Roman frontier.² This firm

¹ Chadwick, pp. 101, 186.

² Chadwick, p. 166.

obstacle to expansion south-westward at a time when Slav pressure from the east was increasing, and when tribal population was probably growing too rapidly, was very serious ; and the hordes of Slavs were apparently more formidable than the organised Romans. Of course, the Slavs had to be met in frontal attack, but the Roman frontier was along a flank of the Empire.

In the consequent struggle Rome was at first victorious, and the tribe or tribes that bore the brunt of it must have been decimated. At all events the Cherusicans and the Chattans disappear altogether from the story. Their place as leaders was taken after a while by a Chaucan tribe from the " Hanover " fenlands, who were probably fowlers rather than fishermen—Spartianus says that they lived *beside* the Elbe, soldiers rather than sailors—Tacitus reports their being recruited for the Roman army ; and, when they too disappeared, their place seems to have been taken by a tribe of " Saxons " (*Saex*, " a sword "). Under these Saxon " Swordsmen " success was more frequent and more permanent ; the whole group seems to have expanded in various directions, *e.g.* even south-eastward into the " Province of Saxony " and then " The Kingdom of Saxony," possibly southward into Swabia (where the Romans knew them as Suevi), and *en masse* south-westward towards " Flanders " and " Normandy." The only direction in which there was no movement was northward. It is practically certain that none of the " Saxon " group lived north of the " Baltic Heights " ; otherwise their speech and their arts would reasonably and naturally have been tinged, if not strongly coloured, by what we may call West Baltic elements. The Sagas know nothing of any Saxons ; and *e.g.* the Saxon speech was definitely German, not—like the Angle—perceptibly Scandian.

In any case, up to the beginning of the migrations the Chauci (and the Frisians) lay, as Pliny described them after

serving in their country, between the Saxons and "Saxon" England, while only open sea lay between the Angles and "Angle" England. A map of Professor Ramsay Muir's (c. A.D. 395) gives the whole Friesland coastland to the Frisians, and makes the Saxons an inland people—except, apparently, for some coast on the Zuider Zee, if that really existed before the thirteenth century.

No doubt, as usual in the case of generic names, e.g. Welsh and Cornish, the name by which these tribes came to be known "abroad," was given to them by foreigners—from the particular part of the outside world with which they came most significantly into contact; and in this case the generic name of Saxons was given to the Confederates by their enemies to the south-west, whatever any particular tribe called itself. The latter is of little importance, but it is interesting that the earliest invaders of Wessex called themselves simply Gewisse, "Confederates." Cf. p. 173.

Long before the collapse of the Roman Empire there were settlements of these tribes, all called Saxons by the peoples into whose territory they intruded, along the meadow lands of "Flanders" and "Normandy." They seem to have had some kind of focus at or near Bononia (Boulogne), where the oldest place-names suggest their presence in large numbers; and long before that coastland was called the Saxon Shore officially and politically, it *may* have been called so unofficially and economically. The settlers were numerous enough to form a definite proportion of the Roman forces in "France," and the *Notitia Dignitatum* speaks of an "*ala Saxonum*." That is to say, they were cavalry, which scarcely suggests anything *maritime* in their recent distribution or their training.

In any case the important thing is that this great south-westward movement was a land movement, conducted as landmen naturally move; and, when the Saxons crossed

the Channel, it was by the short and relatively sheltered "Folkestone-Boulogne" route—from the mouths of the Cauche and the Somme to that of the Rother, the most easterly river in England west of the choppy Dover Strait. So Sussex became naturally—as the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle says—the scene of the first Saxon settlement; and the Saxons seem to have settled down at once there, and quietly resumed their old occupation of farming in forest clearings—hoeing their cornpatches and feeding their pigs in the valley "dens," letting their cattle lie in the open "leys," and getting protection and fuel from the enclosing "hursts." The essential conditions have survived almost till to-day in any typical *pays de bocage* in France, e.g. in Bas-Maine, with its wide "timbered" hedges (still providing acorns for the pigs), its unfenced pasture, its best land under cultivation.

If we were compelled to associate these people with just one geographical feature, we would select the forest clearing. No doubt, in England their wise and pertinacious search for a dry subsoil on which to build their habitations, took them up the slopes of the downs, and these were certainly not thickly forested then; but any one who believes that the downs in those days were as treeless as they are to-day, must first account for the high percentage of humus in their thin dark soils and for the wide survival even on their crests of such forest flora as, e.g. *wood sage* or *wood germander*. *Wold* and *weald* are only different forms of the same word.

Wherever their race-home was, it had an environment of temperate forest. Such an environment may keep its inhabitants somewhat backward, but it greatly favours hardiness and independence. Moreover, the climate and the consequent conditions of life in the particular forest were equally favourable, the abundance of milk and the absence of luscious fruit being specially favourable to the

survival of children ; and the adult population must have increased at a rate incredible to, *e.g.* Mediterranean people, with their lack of milk and their superabundance of luscious fruit. What struck Tacitus most, however, was their love of forest and fountain—neither of them a normal feature of *coastlands*. A very old German proverb also suggests that the Saxons were certainly foresters ; and they were always and everywhere as clever in woodwork as they were clumsy in stone-work. But temperate forest itself does not support human needs as tropical forest can ; clearings must be cultivated, and the conditions favour pasture and hardy grains.

The economic basis of life, therefore, was agriculture—in the broad sense. Both cattle and pigs are forest fauna ; it was natural that the people should come to speak of their girl children as daughters, “ milkmaids,” and should follow the cult of a cow goddess, Nerthus, who dwelt in the forest. The combined cult of water-giving stream and milk-giving cow (illustrated to-day at its best, or its worst, in India) is profoundly typical of a continental control—though these Saxons were far too backward and barbarous to have evolved any *Āranyakas*. Obviously, these people were landsmen, living on the land, expanding by land, making admirable land troops, as they proved in the Roman army. One would expect them to behave as landsmen, as foresters, as farmers. Professor Chadwick says (p. 86)—“ It is a very remarkable fact that in Bede’s time and indeed for more than two centuries previously, we never hear of the Saxons as a sea-faring people.” But the really remarkable thing would be if we did hear of them as such !

ANGLELAND

WHAT were the Angles ? Not farmers !

Bede, a most conscientious and sensible compiler, (but not quite a critical historian in our modern sense), says

that the three tribes came from in, or about, the Cimbric Peninsula, *i.e.* an area which unquestionably included all or part of Schleswig and probably Holstein; the Angles were "in the centre" where Angeln (*Norwegian* Qngull) still stands between Schlei and Flensburg. From King Alfred, a surer guide than Bede, we learn that the Angle territory stretched eastward—possibly a good deal eastward—of the Jutland peninsula, and included many islands, though his Gotland is probably Jutland, not the island of that name.¹ *Beowulf* places them "between the seas"; *Widsith* makes Offa, the Angle, defend his frontier on the tidal Eider.

In other words, these people are unquestionably not farmers and foresters, but fishermen and seamen; and they would behave as such. They would naturally move by sea, and their natural objectives in England would be the Wash and the Humber. This does not imply that they did not raid southward also. As early as A.D. 300 there were fair-haired pirates raiding along the French coast, to the mouths of the Seine and the Orne, possibly round the Cotentin Peninsula to the mouth of the Trieux. There is no *proof* that the Saxon Shore (*cf.* p. 175) received its official and military name from settlements of Saxons on it or behind it; the Count of the Saxon Shore was more than a military officer, and the actual shoreline was fortified. But it is unnatural and unreasonable to think of the pirates as Saxons. They were very similar to the Saxons in physical traits and in speech, and came from the same general north-eastward direction; and so they, too, were dubbed Saxons. Indeed, from the time of Constantine the Great the word "Saxon" became a synonym—even amongst the Irish—for "pirate" generally. But the pirates were mariners, not merely marines—seamen, not landmen—sailors, not soldiers; and one would expect such men

¹ Chambers, *Widsith* (p. 255), 1912.

to behave as sailors, as seamen, as fishermen. Indeed, they had an *epitheton constans* for practically every aspect of the sea except one; and the exception did truly prove the rule, for the missing epithet was one for a "serene and summery" sea. They were seamen with *thirty-five centuries* of sea experience behind them. Cf. p. 151.

Here are some sentences abstracted from a letter written (c. 450 A.D.) by Sidonius Apollinaris to a friend who had just been appointed to command a Saxon Shore fleet, warning him about these fiends of "the curved pinnaces"—
 "The dangers of the deep are to them intimate friends; they hail with joy the crash of waves on the rocks; a shipwreck to them is not a scene of panic, but a source of practice in seamanship!"

Does any one really believe that this was written about Farmers?

Surely these raiders were the Angles! They were the worshippers of the *male* Nerthus, who dwelt on an island far out in the ocean, the god of sailors and fishermen; they claimed descent from the same ancestors as the Danes; after the *en masse* migration of the Angles the type began to be called Dane; and the "Saxons" instituted a Dane-mark as a protection across the old traditional frontier, Agyr Dör, significantly "*Neptune's Gate*"—so known down to the time of Charlemagne, and then for 1,000 years as Romani Terminus Imperii.

Only from the time when it ceased to be a northern terminus did it become a gateway—the gateway of international thought into the literature of Norway and Sweden. Of course, it has been for centuries a gateway of international trade, only flowing east and west, not north and south; but, from Professor Chadwick's standpoint, the Saxon need for this "protection" is not obvious.

Professor Chambers' analysis and interpretation of the *Widsith* evidence give a solution of some difficulties.

The internal evidence suggests that "the Ytes (Eutiz, Jutes) were almost certainly a continental people" (p. 238), and that "the difference between the so-called Anglo-Frisian stock of the North Sea coast and the inland tribes (Deutsch) is ancient and deep-lying" (p. 154); and he shows how much more easily a uniform speech can spread along a continuous sea-coast than across a continuous forest belt. In any case, sea-farers of Satanic ubiquity—Greeks, Angles, Malays—have been constantly the source of a *lingua franca*, and in this instance the speech was bound to be "English"; every one who spoke it might be called "English," as *âliens* who speak the particular tongues are called Hausas or Swahilis; and, in the same way, all fair-haired people from the north-west corner of Central Europe might be called Saxons.¹

On the contrary, no people that lived in Jutland could have been continental—any more than they could have been neighbours of the Warni; and the Jutes of Kent (?) and the Isle of Wight, therefore, probably came from a Yte-land in Holland. That is to say, they lived—like the Warni—to landward of the Frisian islanders and coastmen; and this would account for the affinities between Frisian and Yte speech, systems of land-tenure, tribal leaders, etc. The Frisians were the first of the West Gothic peoples to establish their individuality—under monarchy, on a North Gothic model, and unlike all their West Gothic neighbours; and they were too strong and too firmly established for any "republican" tribe to be able to dislodge them.

If there was such a Yte pocket near the head of the Rhine delta, dating from *c.* 350 A.D., Bede and others confound the Yte-land, where the Ytes lived "behind" the Frisians, with the peninsula which King Alfred called

¹ Haddon begins his account of the Angles (*Races of Man*, p. 81) with the words—"The Angles, whom strangers called Saxons . . ."

Gotland (Geotland), inhabited by Scandian Iðtar or Gioti. Similar confusion seems to have been caused (*cf.* Chambers, p. 245, and Chadwick, ch. 5) by the existence of two Thuringias—the large area in Germany and the small one in the Low Countries; and there were also, of course, two “Zealands,” the Danish Zealand¹ and the Dutch Zeeland.

From this point of view, Bede’s statement about the relative positions of the three tribes might still hold more or less good—concealing a longitudinal verity behind its latitudinal version; the Jutes were to the west, the Saxons to the east, and the Angles, roughly between them—“*inter provincias Jutorum et Saxonum.*” But the Angles were seamen, pure and simple; the Saxons were strictly landsmen; and the Jutes were more landsmen than seamen, less familiar with the sea than the Angles, but much more so than the Saxons. The fundamental distinction, then, is not, as Professor Chadwick says, between the Anglo-Saxon and the Jute, but between the Angle and the Saxon, with the Jute or Frisio-Jute as a link.

There is no need, however, to accept Bede as infallible or even as specially accurate on such a point. The entire absence—as far as any evidence goes—of communication between England and Denmark in the seventh and eighth centuries does not encourage us to accept his statements even about contemporary conditions in Denmark; he borrows phrases from Gildas, *e.g.* about “Saxons,” and adds the words “or Angles”; and he stands alone and wholly unsupported in his assertion that the Kentish invaders were “Jutes.” Two centuries before Bede, Procopius, a critical historian and a competent geographer, said that the invaders of Britain were Angles and Frisians; he does not mention either Saxons or Jutes.

Mr. Thurlow Leeds adds some valuable details (pp. 95 and 96) which go far to confirm our definite suggestion.

¹ For the spelling of *Sealand*, see note on p. 148.

He finds that "material from the German cemeteries breaks off almost exactly at the very earliest point at which anything comparable appears in England." He thinks, with special reference to the Saxons, that "it is scarcely conceivable that so little overlap should be observable had the invaders emigrated direct . . . there seems to be lacking an interval . . . during which the culture of the invaders reached the stage of development which characterises its first appearance in England . . . this interval may have been passed in the north of France (though the archæological evidence is very slight)." He adds, with special reference to the Angles, that "if any special cemeteries are to be assigned to their ancestors, that at Borgstedt must certainly be one . . . the difference of time between the latest relics from this district and those (Angle) in England, are not so great . . . and the (Angle) relics speak, moreover, for connexion with districts farther north," *i.e.* farther north than Germany.

In other words, the evidence suggests strongly that the Angles came directly to England, the Saxons by a round-about route; a direct route could only be by the sea, and any indirect route must have brought the migrators into touch with the "higher" Southern influences. The Angle relics, therefore, are closer to type, and suggestive of Scandian influence, while the Saxon relics show modifications of German originals by Roman influence. That is to say, the two peoples were clearly distinct both before and after the migration; and the Ytes were probably more Angle than Saxon. Indeed, if Angle raiders or refugees from the Sealand gave its name to Zeeland, as Angle raiders or refugees gave names to places up the Elbe-Saale, the Ytes may originally have been Angles from Jutland, and then have developed as a semi-continental people behind the coast-land held by the Frisians.

In that case, they may even have reached England in

Frisian vessels, especially if they went there by invitation, led possibly by a Frisian volunteer, Hengist, and travelling by the Frisian vessels which plied regularly between the Rhine and the Thames. Obviously, traders or pirates going as far afield as Bordeaux and Cadiz, as North Gothonic seamen did, must have needed provisioning bases on the route ; and, unless they were unlike all other pirates of whom we know in other parts of the world, they must have preferred to seize and use islands for this purpose—such islands as, Thanet and Wight, Alderney and Ushant. Probably, too, the same crews were traders or pirates as occasion offered ; Schütte says (p. 98) that “ the Jutland port of Ribe was originally the *Ripa* from which Roman trade was done.” In any case, to Procopius, whether the Ytes were linked to the Angles historically or to the Frisians geographically, they needed no separate mention.

Further, Saxon Britain was conquered from Sussex, not from the continent ; and, as Mr. R. G. Collingwood has shown, the Saxons wanted only the *betuwe*. “ the good soil,” while the Britons seem to have been always a “ poor soil ” people. There was, therefore, little or no need for the Saxons to expel or extirpate them, as they were not really rivals ; and so the mixed population may have come to be regarded as the “ natives,” the natural inhabitants of Britain, while the Angles were obviously aliens. When Procopius names the nations of Brittia as “ Angiloi, Phrissones, and Brittones,” he almost seems to include the Saxons under the name of Brittones ; certainly, to a man of his critical sense and power of visualisation it would seem natural and reasonable to assume that the invasion of Britain had been the exploit of the only real seamen amongst those tribes, the Angles and the Frisians.

CHAPTER VI

THE BALKAN PENINSULA

CRESCENT AND CROSS

THE parallel belts of the Sahara and the Great Sea in the south and of the Tundra and the Arctic Ocean in the north, with the wide Atlantic in the west, left Europe vulnerable only in the east ; but there it was vulnerable both north and south of the Caspian.

In both cases Europe is approached over steppe, which gave raiders certain obvious advantages (*cf.* pp. 15-17) ; but the northern route differs greatly from the southern. For it is a single vast natural region—narrow leagues of lonely steppe—from the heart of Asia to the heart of Europe (*cf.* p. 3) ; and this directed raiders on a single objective—*e.g.* Huns and Avars, Mongols and Tatars. Along its poleward flank runs a vast belt of forest, and the extreme contrast between the stable, long-lived forest-tree and the ephemeral, short-lived steppe-grass was repeated in Europe in an extreme contrast between the stable, patient, tenacious Slav of the forest and the fleeting procession of ephemeral nomads on the steppe.

In the south a fan of more or less contemporary raiders—*e.g.* Amorites, Canaanites and Jebusites, Hivites, Midianites and Perizzites—was radiated northward and eastward as well as westward, instead of being concentrated on one objective ; and those who survived westward found the steppe cut abruptly on the frontier of Europe.

Quite roughly, this means that the northern route,

followed by the horsemen of the plain, was in latitudes of hard winters and thin population, with no clearly defined natural regions, no natural focus, no nursery of empire. The southern route, followed by the camelmen of the plateau, had all these characteristics along with more genial climate ; and it was, therefore, the more important in early days, and that in a double way. It passed on to Europe, primarily to south-eastern Europe, the legacy of the dense populations of great empires administered



ASIATIC APPROACHES TO THE BALKAN AREA.

from culture centres "half as old as Time" ; and it had, for this work, two local agents in the Jew and the Greek.

Both deserve a passing notice, though we are not further concerned with one of them. The Jew was an Eastern, a landsman, deeply religious, while the Greek was a Western, a seaman, and never religious ; but both represented, truly or nominally, very ancient peoples, of almost unique value and interest historically, and yet dead or scattered to-day. Behind the Jew was an old

hard land, from which there came a constant ooze and periodic floods of virile man-power, and in which Hellenism and Iranianism were destined to fight out their differences, with Rome as the heir of Alexander. But Rome never tried to Latinise as the Greeks had tried to Hellenise; and peoples far from Byzantium could ignore Byzantine innovations, and retain old rites and doctrines and speech.

Before either East or West could definitely triumph, Islam interposed, the Arab cutting Europe from Africa, and then the Turk cutting it from Asia. But there was much in common racially and otherwise between the Jew and the Arab, and much in common intellectually and otherwise between the Arab and the Greek, for Greek science was warmly welcomed, *e.g.* in the Baghdad of Harun-al-Raschid; and there was also much in common practically between the Jew and the Greek as the agents between East and West.

The occupational control, the type of problem, the political and economic environment, were in many ways identical. But behind the Greek was a young world, into which ooze and flood were pressing, and in which the problems demanded gifts somewhat different from those of the Hebrews. And it is most important to distinguish the Greek, in his versatility and alertness, with his sanguine and rather unstable temperament, from the mongrel Levantine, who tried to be both Greek and Jew, and only succeeded in being a vicious sham from both points of view. The typical Byzantine was almost a Levantine, but the typical Greek was a European.

And he is the only inhabitant of the Balkan peninsula to-day who is truly European, or who is in any real sense peninsular. The Bulgars,¹ for all their merits, are merely Slavonised Tatars; and the Yugo-Slavs, in spite of

¹ Originally, they were the survivors of Attila's Huns, but were reinforced by Ugrian or Ungrian Bulgars centuries later.

Pan-German efforts, have remained only Tatarised Slavs. The Turk taught nothing to either people—not even cruelty. No Sultan in Turkey was known as “The Strangler,” or “The Impaler,” though most Sultans were probably responsible for much strangling and impaling. Indeed, Byzantium was oriental long before the Turk arrived ; and his worst mistake was that he accepted a debased Byzantine civilization, and spread it so successfully that the typical Balkan attitude in recent years has been debased Byzantine.

Of course, the personal influence of the Turk was Turanian, even though most Turkish rulers had European blood in their veins ; but no Turkish armies in recent years have behaved in Europe as the Tatarised “Dacians” of Rumania behaved yesterday in Hungary, nor have the Turks been in the habit of erecting public tablets to the memory of common assassins.

But, however badly one thinks of the Turk, one must admit that his formal imposition of Asiatic methods of government in this region was supplemented and complicated by all that was implied in Pan-Slavism. Of course, the Post-War Settlement has made the Balkan Slavs independent without any further aid from Russia, and has even left them antagonistic to her ; but the old influences still remain effective in an attitude of mind which is not oriental as the Jew was oriental, but is Asiatic as the Mongol was Asiatic.

In the days when a Russian Empire spanned the whole of northern Asia from the Baltic to the Sea of Okhotsk, it was inevitable that it should have friction with the Chinese Empire on the Pacific margin, *e.g.* in the Korean peninsula, and with the Turkish Empire on the Atlantic margin, *e.g.* in the Balkan peninsula ; but there was friction also at the Armenian pivot, where Russia met Turkey and Persia, and at the Pamir pivot, where she met China and

India, and in neither of these cases was there any plausible excuse of "a desire to reach open water."

But the intrusion of both Turkey and Russia into the Balkan area was as natural as it was inevitable, for they were the media of movement into Europe from Asia. The natural objective of movement across the Anatolian plateau for literally some thousands of years had been the Marmara isthmus, where the great Angora-Belgrade bridge between what is really Europe and what is really Asia, though fractured, shows a crack of only 800 yards¹ at its narrowest; and the Turkish camelmen were only following one of the oldest "roads" in the world, though it is still not threaded by rail from end to end. The Russians, again, were only projecting a sphere of influence along the other route, which—though the younger—they have already threaded with rail to the Pacific coast, and by which the Ugrian Bulgars had reached the Balkan steppes 1,300 years ago.

The word "steppes" is significant. Although the porous limestone of northern Bulgaria is largely covered with loess—a suggestion of prehistoric cold desert, and has sufficient early-summer rain (Sofia's maximum, $3\frac{1}{2}$ ", is in May) to be a rich wheat-growing area in spite of its porosity, it is entirely within the 32° F. isotherm for January, and the temperature range is well over 40° F.; that is to say, the climate is purely continental. Even Constantinople and Salonika are colder at midwinter than such places as Exeter and Dublin; and the nearest parallel to Edinburgh during a "haar" off the North Sea is probably Varna under a N.E. wind off the Black Sea—which looks black enough then. It is equally suggestive of the north and the continental that thunderstorms come in summer instead of autumn, as in Mediterranean lands,

¹ But it was too wide to please the Turks! They made Brusa their first capital, and Adrianople their second.

and that forests even on the Macedonian coast are mainly deciduous; and it is almost normal that the absolute range on the Thracian steppe behind Constantinople should have exceeded 90° F.—from under 13° F. to over 103° F. It was, no doubt, this familiar winter cold that was so favourable to the “Achæan” Northerners who bequeathed Classical Greece to Europe and the world, and who planted so many colonies to face the icy winters round the Pontus and so few round the frostless Levant.

The clash of the two great continental empires in the Balkan peninsula was not the original or only cause of its notoriety as the Storm-Centre of Europe; but it left an extra legacy of steppe poison in politics and in warfare. There is no object in a hunger-bitten group of steppe nomads conquering a neighbouring group for the sake of their pasture and other sources of food if the same number of mouths has still to be fed; the conquered must be slaughtered wholesale—or “bled white,” and then the victorious survivors will have more to divide. Even the Greek city-states had imbibed this poison from their northern leaders, and tried to annihilate their enemies.

The lands round the two ends of the Angora-Belgrade bridge, the sea-flanked land-link between Asia and Europe, with the land route lying N.W.—S.E. and the sea route lying N.E.—S.W., were in turn the van or the rearguard of each continent according as movement was inward or outward. In the early days, except for minor movements, *e.g.* of Phrygians and “Galatians,” movement was predominantly into Europe; in modern times it has been into Asia—along the route now followed by the Trans-Siberian railway, and along that projected for the Berlin-Baghdad line. The N.W.—S.E. land-route here was always interesting to a Land Power, *e.g.* Alexander or Constantine, Germany or Turkey; the N.E.—S.W. sea-route was always interesting to a Sea Power, *e.g.* Athens and England,

Genoa and Venice. The great Land Power of Russia was in a special position, because that northern steppe route across her Black Earth has natural access to cheap ocean transport only by the pivot of the southern plateau route—at the Bosphorus, and because Russia has been the true heiress of the Byzantine Empire, even taking her Imperial crest from a Byzantine princess (“Anna, the Roman,” A.D. 988).

The rulers of Kief in the tenth and eleventh centuries intermarried with those of Sweden and Norway, Poland and Hungary, and even France, and remained truly European; but Tatar-dominion cut Russia from western Europe, and she had to become either Asiatic or Byzantine or something of both. In any case her Byzantine Christianity isolated her from the Poles and the Czechs, though the Greek Church became really Slav (96 per cent. !) rather than Greek, and though the ruler of Russia was at once the patron—never the Head, for “God is the Head”—of the Greek Church and the protector of all Slavs. This meant that all Slav states would tend to become theocratic, *i.e.* really believers in political Christianity—and the Greek Church never could convert without Hellenising—and that Asiatic influence in the Balkans would be working through the deeply Tatarised Russian as well as through the truly Asiatic Turk.

From several standpoints, then, the region was intermediate, transitional, a debatable land, a buffer between East and West; and in such areas we always expect to find a great mixture of race and speech, frequent clash of political and other interests, a veritable storm-centre. In this particular case, too, both Serbs and Bulgars had held empire over the region; and when the Turk pushed them into pockets and corners, the little groups adhered tenaciously to all that reminded them of the past—customs and costumes, claims and creeds. So the area became a

paradise for plotters and intriguers, especially from landward, where Slav and Teuton were at feud in a double struggle; for the Slav had, and the Teuton lusted after, empire in Asia, a Holy Eastern-Roman Empire, while the Teuton had, and the Slav badly lacked, access to the ocean. The objective of both was in the hands of an Anti-Christian Power, which had both the empire and the access to the ocean, but which seemed to be incapable of developing its own empire, and was very jealous of Russia's success in developing hers.

There was, therefore, a superfluity of overlapping, of cross currents, of fermentation, embittered by a deadly *odium theologicum*, partly between the Crescent¹ and the Cross, still more between the Roman and the Greek Churches. Indeed, the Turk was wonderfully tolerant and ingeniously passive, though he did interfere to forbid any Christian school having upon its walls the text "Love One Another"; but the interference was quite unnecessary, for the behaviour of the so-called Christians to one another beggars description.

Nothing could be more significant, or more satisfying to the malicious, than the attitude of the Greek emperors to Latin Crusaders and its sequel. The first two Crusades were sent by land, *i.e. viâ Byzantium*; and to stop this the Greek emperors conspired with the Moslems—rather as Sparta had with the Persians, and as Prussia has recently with the Turks—and were so successful that the third Crusade was sent partly, and the fourth wholly, by sea. But the latter suddenly appeared in the Golden Horn, and established a temporary *Latin* empire there (1204–1261). Nor was this the end. For the Greek emperors, when restored, were so discredited by their treachery and by their temporary loss of Byzantium, that they never re-

¹ The Crescent was really the crest of the city of Constantinople, *not* of the Turk.

covered ; and so Constantinople came under the Moslems as soon as local dissensions gave the Turks a lever against the Eastern Empire, as local dissensions at Rome had given the Huns a lever against the Western Empire.

The influence of all this is still active. It was very significant that, in the recent exchange of alien populations between Greece and Turkey, the Turk made religion the main test. No doubt, both nominal descent and the speech of the moment were quite worthless as tests, for these trilingual middlemen change their "race" with their speech, and *vice versâ*, to suit their business at the time ; but the Greek Church has been able to Hellenise even when it has failed to Christianise. The old Russian capital was removed from Kief, on the open steppe, to Moscow, in the dark forest, mainly to remove it farther from Hellenising propaganda.

No doubt, Trajan's offensive against the Barbarians and the formation of the Dacian province inside the Carpathian rampart forced them to find their way towards Rome westward round the north, or southward round the east, of the range ; and in the latter direction there was the double danger—from the north-eastward plain and from the south-eastward plateau. So, even if Rome was not too far from her frontiers, too republican, too pagan, this double danger justified Diocletian¹ in making his capital at Nicomedia (Ismid), and having a colleague at Milan. But a century earlier Severus had actually dismantled Byzantium, and the Byzantines never forgot it, and never forgave it.

Even if the geographical conditions had favoured the rise of a single strong Power in the peninsula, what could have been expected from such a historic background except a permanent Storm-Centre ? And so we have a reflection of the Iberian Externalism, only vastly intensified

¹ Diocletian, like Constantine, was born in Illyria.

because of the closer connexion with Europe, because of the number of alien groups and interests, and because the European hinterland was occupied by aggressive and intriguing forces. Internals were always either leaning on, or intriguing with, Externals; and these, if honest, were justified in interfering to get justice or to press legitimate aims, while the dishonest were in paradise.

For instance, in 1914, the Black Sea, with the increasing export of raw materials, had a legitimate interest for all the industrialists of north-west Europe; our own mercantile marine was doing 41 per cent. of all the trade, and the French and the Greeks were doing rather more and rather less than 16 per cent., while Germany was doing 6 per cent. at most. The Russians and ourselves, therefore, were far more interested in the sea and in the land-and-sea junction of Constantinople than any other people; but Germany and Turkey were more interested in the land¹ trade, and there was constant obstruction of the sea trade. Three times during the ten years before the War the waterway was entirely closed on various pleas, though 12,000 vessels a year were plying to and from the Black Sea.

What part has geography played in the scars and the scares of this Storm-Centre? An active and an evil one, as a survey of the area will suggest. For, as in Iberia and Scandinavia, the core is an old block of very hard rock, not square—like the Iberian, nor elongated—like the Scandian, but triangular; and, as in Iberia, but not in Scandinavia, young folds have been pushed up against the old block on two sides, not north and south, as in Spain, but north and west.

The physical history has added a differentiating feature, to which the buffer location has given a sinister

¹ To tap the grain, cotton, minerals, tobacco, etc., of Anatolia, which would have made Germany immune from blockade.

value. When the young folds were pushed up against the block, it was fractured on both a large and a small scale. Its southern "half," or extension, south of a rough line from the Gulf of Volo to the Sea of Marmara, foundered, and made the Ægean Sea, leaving only its summits above water; the northern "half," the present triangular remnant, was broken by main fractures, which distorted the river system, and so left a legacy of trouble, *e.g.* to the present Bulgaria. There was also, of course, the normal differential erosion where the old and the young rocks met; and this line of contact is marked not only by the most fertile lowlands, but also—along the north-east of the block—by the primeval thoroughfare between Asia and Europe *viâ* the Maritsa and Nishava valleys. There is a similar line along the western face of the block *viâ* the Vardar and Morava valleys, which is joined by the other at the mouth of the Nishava.

The boundaries of the great Maritsa-Morava trough both to south and to north are water-lines, the Bosphorus-Marmara-Dardanelles straits and the Kulpa-Save-Danube, with the accompanying marshes which defend Belgrade to the west, the north, and the east; and the city itself stands just above the (400-foot) scarp of the northern apex of the block, completely exposed to attack—except for the marshes—from central and eastern Europe, and controlling all natural land movements, northward from Anatolia and the Ægean and southward to Anatolia and Baghdad. The importance of this to Europe does not become clear until we have glanced at the character of the coastlands of the peninsula, especially in the west.

In the meantime it is obvious that the great mass of the area is infertile and inaccessible. The old block itself is a barren, crystalline pyramid of relatively great height; no side of it measures as much as 400 miles, and yet the Rila Dagħ rises to over 9,500 feet. The karst limestone

in the west is almost uninhabitable except in the sinks (polyen) ; and the people had to choose between risking starvation in the mountains or slavery in the valleys.

As the conditions were adverse to the development of a single strong Power from a natural nodal centre, isolated small States were grouped round the old core ; and any unity between them had to face the mutually antagonistic interests—religious, political, and economic—based on the particular relationships of each. Religious unity was out of the question ; political unity against the Turk was achieved only once—for six months !—in 1912 ; economic unity was very difficult when all the “ summer-rain ” States had practically the same products to sell, and Greece, with its summer drought, was the only complementary market on the spot. Consequently, all “ agreed ” on just one point—their own need of access to outside markets and the outside world generally ; and it was this legitimate desire that was used so dishonourably by some interested Externals.

Much has been written, often with truth and wisdom—especially by Miss Newbiggin and Dr. Vaughan Cornish—about the importance of the three obvious foci of Belgrade, Salonika, and Constantinople ; but, if we think only of the political geography of the area in this twentieth century, it seems almost certain that the really critical focus was the Albanian Gate. For Europe needed a strong Serbia on the Moravan trunk, and so the Serbs should have been given direct access to the sea. The obvious sea was the *Ægean*, but both the Greeks and the Bulgars had equal or prior claims there ; and there was an alternative possible in the Adriatic, where neither Greece nor Bulgaria had any claim or special interest. No doubt, Italy had some special interest in the Albanians, as old Latinised Illyrians, and even in the Vlakh groups, as old Latinised “ Balkan ” people ; but Serbia could never have been the least danger

to Italy on the Adriatic, for the Dalmatian gulfs have very difficult access inland, and the Albanian flats can scarcely be approached from the sea, apart from being too unhealthy to attract the landward population. Indeed, their original inhabitants were driven inland by malaria, and the flats are used now only for winter pasture.

The great loop of (Dinaric, Albanian, and Greek) folds is of limestone, very pure in the western folds, but much less so in the eastern; and so the west has become a belt of Karst desolation, dissected by torrent-torn gorges, pitted with hidden sinks, tunnelled by underground rivers, waterless and treeless. It does not average much over 3,000 feet in height, though peaks do exceed 8,400; but its character makes it very difficult to cross, and it is even a formidable climatic divide. To the east the climate is wholly Central or Eastern European, with its favourable seasons in summer and autumn, not in winter and spring, as in typically Mediterranean areas. Cf. p. 298.

This great Alpine loop and its coast may be divided into three sections, which remind one of the western coast of North America; for the northern and the southern, which have been recently submerged, lie N.W.-S.E., while the central, which has recently emerged, lies N.-S. The joints are naturally points of weakness, and at the northern one the Drin has worked its way out between the great portals of Prokletia and Shar Dagh, both of them above 8,000 feet in height. This was, and is, the natural line of access for "Serbia" to the sea, as the Struma valley is for Bulgaria; and Venice even invited the Serbs to move down the gap in order to help in defending the Dalmatian coast against the Moslems.

But such access would have freed Serbia from the chance of friction with Greece and Bulgaria on the Ægean and from economic slavery to Austria on the Adriatic, as the Struma valley would have freed Bulgaria from similar

slavery to Turkey on the Bosphorus ; and, at all costs, Serbia was to be kept weak in the supposed interests of Central Europe—as opposed to those of Europe as a whole (*cf.* p. 195). And so, as Bosnia had been declared necessary to Austria for the defence of Dalmatia—to which she was “linked” by a *rack-and-pinion* railway!—now Dalmatia must be wholly Austrian to defend Trieste! And, with a Teutonic princeling in Albania, a Teutonic queen in Greece, a Teutonic king in Bulgaria, and a Turko-Teutonic alliance, it was easy to bring pressure to bear on Serbia to make her properly submissive.

But this meant that the Powers of Europe must be persuaded, by a diplomatic survey of the route, that it would be sheer cruelty to give Serbia what was only a sham, because it was impossible for her to build a railway through the gap or in any other way get effective access to the Adriatic. Any one with a modicum of historical knowledge, *e.g.* of the Romans and specially of that early soldier-politician Pompey the Great, or of the Crusaders and specially Richard the Lion-Hearted, would have asked for proof of such an assertion ; and any one with enough knowledge of geography to be *fit* for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in any European country would have known, without asking, that it was untrue.

The Romans built a military road up the gap from Lissus (Alessio) to the connexion with the Ibar valley, which Pompey thought the strategic centre of the whole peninsula ; and, as the Ibar runs down the natural line of the “Vardar” depression, he was probably right, certainly so from the old Roman—? and modern Italian—point of view. Along this road the Romans exported hides and ore in ox-wagons, till the Barbarians stopped the traffic (*c.* A.D. 400), and swamped the Romanised Illyrians ; but the road survived, *more Romano*, in good enough order to carry the Kopaonik ore-wagons in the

Middle Ages, and the Crusaders used it regularly. Now, modern engineers "could not build a railway along this route"! *And the nonsense was believed!*

The Romans had built another road here—up the Narenta valley to Serajevo, but at much greater cost, and had continued it—with perfect ease and little cost—to Nish; but the Austrians, after building their rack-and-pinion "strategic" line up the Narenta gorge, did not carry an ordinary commercial line on along the Roman road to Nish. This was very significant of the Teutonic attitude to railways here; they were to be purely strategic or to go *through* the region—to Baghdad, but were not to serve and develop it. Even the Romans had erred in this way; the Via Egnatia went to Thessalonica and Philippi only on the way to Byzantium and Armenia, as the gap road went through Nish only on the way to the Danube.

But why not build railways along *all* the Roman roads, even the easiest, where they do not need rack-and-pinion? It was not a sufficient answer that the Romans called their roads "streets"; but the politicians were bamboozled or bemused by the word, and blocked the Serbian safety-valve. It was the sort of trickery and treachery with which Balkan peoples have been familiar for centuries, and was accepted with dour passivity by the Serbs; but the perpetrators forgot that the "encircling" of Serbia was an attempt to thwart the irresistible modern tendency for States to get access to open water. They also forgot that the Serbs had held empire in this region for 200 years, and had proud memories of their empire, and that they were at heart both Tatarised and Turanised. If you combine Byzantine formalism with Slav hysteria, and then try to break tradition to pieces, the result will be outrage; for, if tradition goes, traditional religion goes, and all religion goes. When this happens in the very core of a great natural Storm-Centre, the resultant storm must

involve all who blocked the safety-valve, and may dissolve some of them.

If we draw a line across the peninsula, roughly parallel with the Via Egnatia, from the Otranto Strait to the Dardanelles, leaving Pindus and Olympus (and Troy) to the south of it,—if we limit the title of Balkan or Illyrian to the quadrilateral to the north of it,—and if we then ask what this Balkan, or Byzantine, area has contributed to the common good of Europe, what can we say?

During the fourth century the Roman Empire included every coast and pocket of the Mediterranean and its neighbouring seas, even the Caspian, the Persian Gulf, and the Red Sea, and the whole of the continent from the Black Sea to the Irish Sea south of the Danube and west of the Rhine: and yet the drawing of a divide along meridian 19° E. from the Save to the Sidra Gulf, and the moving of the capital from the seven hills beside the Tiber to the seven hills beside the Golden Horn, split that empire for ever into two (A.D. 395). It was an omen of what might be expected from the City of the Crescent Moon, and of what this northern part of the Balkan “peninsula” was likely to contribute to Europe.

CHAPTER VII

THE RISE AND FALL OF HELLAS

MARINER AND MOUNTAINEER

To the land south of our rough line from the Gulf of Volo to the Sea of Marmara, Europe, and the world through Europe, owe more than they realise or seem able to understand, especially in these days when one hears so much of "the folly of pressing boys and girls to waste their time and energy in learning Greek instead of Science." Even if Old Greece lingers on only in some Ægean islands, as Old Rome does only in corners of Illyria and Albania, every science in the world still borrows its terminology from Greek; and even these magnates who advise us so sapiently on education, might know that science is a method, not a subject. Perhaps, the unforgivable crime of Hellas, and especially of Athens, the City of the Violet Crown, was that they broke the spell of State tyranny, as matured in Egypt and the Orient.

The Greeks, *more suo*, had no name for the whole area which the Romans (? after 500 B.C.) named "Greece"; the nearest approach to one was Hellas, but that is a racial and not a regional label—simply, the land where Hellenes lived. For these Old Greeks were not prepared to perpetuate or even to tolerate the uniformity and the tyranny of any Imperial or State system flung indiscriminately across their whole land, tiny as it was. They gave Europe the idea of personal liberty, and showed her how to be civilised without coercion and to live in groups without

being herded. It is, therefore, surely worth while trying to analyse the geographical conditions behind the Rise and the Fall of this Classical Greece.

What, then, was that Classical Greece to which the world owes so much in Art and Science, Literature and Philosophy? Where was that Hellas in which the Hellenes specialised in that most aristocratic of all Arts, the Art of Poetry? And precisely what was its geographical setting?

It was the *Ægean* Sea—with so much of the natural hinterland as needs neither plough nor spade for its full and appropriate development. Even the Greek to-day, however little akin racially to Pericles and Plato, should not own any great plains, *e.g.* in Thrace or Macedonia, where the natural occupation is agriculture; for he cannot develop such land properly. The scanty population on the plain of Thessaly and the Greek failure in dealing with the problems there seem conclusive. The Greek is not—and never has been—a farmer¹ or a gardener, not even a market-gardener, unless you emphasise the “market.” He is a mountaineer or a mariner, or both—a trader who conducts his business by sea, and is therefore pledged to freedom; and he was a seaman before he was a trader. The sea is his natural element and his natural medium.

“The mountains look on Marathon, and Marathon looks on the sea.”

This throws immediate light on his apparent ubiquity (and therefore much exaggerated numbers) and his ubiquitous unpopularity; and it adds to the clash of creeds and dynasties as causes of turmoil in this peninsula the clash of coast and core. For seamen such as the Greeks and the old Venetians distribute themselves, their agents, and their influence, round seas rather than over lands; they cut off the landmen from access to the sea, and put forward some claim to the hinterland of every coast.

¹ The Anatolian “exchanges” (p. 192) may be an asset here.

All round the Ægean, then, and all over it—where the island people in type and speech and “Mediterranean” life are more purely Greek—and along all the coasts of the Balkan peninsula that have a Mediterranean climate, Greeks have been present and dominant for 3,000 years. They have been dominant, not from numbers, but from their mentality, especially in relation to their environment and their medium; and perhaps their most subtle gift has been that (misused) power of Hellenising which is such a sign of virility. Even Slavs and Albanians on “Greek” coasts become semi-Greek and semi-maritime.

This remarkable power of political and ecclesiastical Hellenising, then, and the distribution of Hellenes on all parts of the coast were the two factors which produced a much exaggerated opinion of their numbers and their importance. Their post-war claims north of our line should have been instantly dismissed in favour of the hinterland peoples, who could develop the hinterland, and who had urgent need of free access to its coast; and the entire failure of the Greeks—owing, no doubt, to virile love of liberty—to extend empire over the lands, as the Serbs and the Bulgars and the Turks extended it, should have disqualified them for possession of even coast-lands north of our line except on the one ground that they would probably make a better use of a coast or a harbour than their rivals could. To talk of Alexander imposed on no one except the politicians, who perhaps did not know that he was a Macedonian, or exactly where Macedonia was.

At the same time it is not only fair, but very important, to remember that the Roman Empire, so far as it was developed out of a collection of City-States, was only the application, on a large scale and over land, of the principle behind the Athenian Empire of the Sea. Even under the Republic Romans looked to Greece as their intellectual home; and the Empire itself began in the application, by

a bourgeois ¹ Italian, of Roman administrative genius to realising, under the *Pax Romana* and by the Roman roads, the civilised and civilising ideas of Greece. Indeed, the eventual failure of the empire was partly due to the folly of trying to maintain the Greek relations of the individual to the State—normal only in a tiny City-State—in the vast Roman State.

The Roman, however, quite understood what the Greek was too conceited to realise, though it applied equally to both, that on his Orient flank he had been near an older and higher civilisation than his own was to start with, and that therefore Romanising as the passing on of that westward must mean raising the standard. And Augustus followed, in his different attitude to the East and the West, Aristotle's advice to Alexander to treat them differently.

But to the typical Greek all non-Greeks were Barbarians, "Babblers," whose languages he never condescended to learn, and whose qualities were to him vague and negative. Even Aristotle thought that the normal Greek was a free man with brains, and the best Barbarian was a free man without brains; and his actual advice to Alexander, though probably "right" because appropriate to Oriental ideas and their environments, was to be a leader to his own western people, but a despot in the east, from which so much light had come to Greece. It was this cultural conceit of race that made the Greeks refuse to learn foreign tongues, and led them to over-rate the moral differences between themselves and the Barbarians, and to under-rate the æsthetic differences.

Their whole environment and manner of life, no doubt, made it difficult for them to realise that the fundamental difference was æsthetic; and yet it was their æsthetic application of *standards* of taste and judgment that led

¹ Augustus, though rich and respectable, was only a municipal.

them to test everything by reference to rational and appropriate standards. We may notice presently how a certain climatic control lay behind this rationalism ; but for the moment we may merely contrast the intellectual basis of the Greek classification into Greek and Barbarian with the religious basis of the Jewish classification into Jews and Gentiles. Homer was " the Bible of the Greeks," and his language was the first and the greatest bond of union amongst the Hellenes.

Under what geographical conditions did these Classical Greeks develop ? What control, if any, did those conditions exercise ? If what we may provisionally call the human response was both remarkable and yet territorially restricted, what were the differentiating features or factors in this restricted territory ? Why was the Fall as phenomenal as the Rise ? These are the problems of major interest, and any geographical solution of them must be based on some analysis of features which might be found in any part of the world, but of phenomena which are to be found only in certain " Mediterranean " latitudes. For these latitudes imposed on Man conditions which he must conquer, or to which he must conform ; and in them Classical Greece made a unique experiment in adaptation to a well-marked region, transforming a general *Ægean* culture—which, even as Greek, began on the *eastern* shores of the sea—into its special gift to Europe and the world at large. In this process Athens and her immediate hinterland, like the similarly tiny area occupied by Jerusalem and her hinterland under similar Mediterranean limitations, played an absolutely unique part.

The physical basis must have our first attention ; but, however much we press the directly geographical, we cannot afford to forget or ignore the historical, even if it is indirectly geographical. The Homeric " atmosphere," like the Homeric speech, came from the Orient coast of

the Ægean. The first place where the Anatolo-Mesopotamian caravans could meet the Egypto-Levantine fleets, was Miletus, with its four harbours and its easy access inland by the Meander valley; and Miletus gave the Greek world its first two historians, Cadmus and Hecataeus, and its first two philosophers, Thales and Anaximander, both of whom were sufficiently philosophic to be great geographers.

STRUCTURE AND RELIEF

The fundamental characteristic of Greece as a whole is variety—of structure and relief. The west is composed entirely of young folds; in the east a tongue of the old block runs at least as far south as the Gulf of Volo. In the west these folds run almost due north and south; but the Cambunian folds run eastward from Cape Glossa, intersecting the Pindus range, to Mt. Olympus, and the strike of all the beds to the south is parallel with the Cambunian. This arrangement at once suggests a number of basins between the two longitudinal highlands and between the parallel latitudinal ridges; and the freedom and independence of each tiny *area* spurred individual initiative, and increased personal responsibility, while concentration in one *spot*, the city, made that a “university” of intellectual and social opportunities.

The whole idea of the City-State was of one centre, on a river-girt rock, with arable land along the river and round the hill, and a circuit of barren mountains; and the mountain circuit seems to have been vital. No Greek wanted a “road” over it; no doubt, he was thankful that so many rivers plunged underground instead of carving a valley, and that so many lakes also were drained underground. The horizon was too mountainous ~~to be~~ monotonous, but it was very near and very definite; the little unit was narrowly circumscribed, and had little or

no sense of the lure and the enlargement of a wide horizon. Even from the crest of the barriers there was rather a peep at vistas than a broad landscape, and the Greeks do not seem to have climbed the crests. At Thermopylæ they were actually surprised by the Persians attacking "by a mountain¹ path."

The tiny area was equally vital, and it does not matter whether this sprang out of the natural subdivisions of the country or out of the human determination to be free and independent. Not one of the seventeen States was larger than a medium-sized English county, while—except for its north-western finger (a curious parallel to the "Caprivi finger" in South Africa)—Megaris measured only about a dozen miles from north to south and the same from east to west.

On to this fundamental net the relief adds an immense variety and even complexity; for almost every kind of land form is present—Alpine fold, rift valley, coastal plain, interior upland, alluvial basin—with unparalleled range of altitude for the size of the area. Thus, north of the Lepanto (Naupactus) gulf, the Pindus folds run through the country from end to end—some sixty miles; in the Morea, "Mulberry Leaf," the centre of the leaf is a mountain core which radiates rivers and ridges as veins and ribs in almost every direction, *e.g.* the spurs which run to Cape Malia and Cape Matapan (Tænarum), and enclose such bays as those of Nauplia and Navarino. At the core Arcadia (about the size of Cumberland) was the only Greek State with no sea coast.

In all parts of the area, too, the range of relief is phenomenal and spectacular. Pindus begins on the Lepanto

¹ The troops were Spartan, and may not have been familiar with the land, or they may have been playing their usual game—waiting for the light-armed to come raiding down the hill (*cf.* p. 225); but at least they might have sent scouts up the path.

shore in the 8,200 feet of Kiona, and ends on the northern frontier in the 8,400 feet of Smolika ; and parallel with Pindus some 50 miles eastward Pelion (5,300) and Ossa (6,400) are steps up to Olympus (9,750), " the snowy-clouded " Heaven of the Gods, standing on the farthest margin of Greece, but dominating the Greek horizon. The cross folds reach 8,000 feet in the twin-peaked Parnassus (Liakura), and nearly 7,850 in Tymphrestus (Velukhi) ; in the north-east of the Morea the crest of Cyllenè (Ziria) falls just below 7,800, and in the south-west that of Táygetus (St. Elias) reaches 7,900. And all this is in a tiny land no larger than Ceylon, where one Adam's Peak (7,350) is thought marvellous, or five-sixths the size of Scotland, where Ben Nevis (4,400) is certainly counted as a veritable mountain—too high for us to be able to afford the cost of keeping up the old observatory on it !

It is obvious that in such a land we need not expect to find any navigable rivers, any great plains, many natural outlets for lakes, much hospitable coast ; but we should expect to find torrential floods, over-loaded with débris, crater lakes, and a susceptibility to earthquakes, especially along such an obvious line of weakness as the Patras-Ægina gulf, where the Isthmus of Corinth ¹ is only three and a half miles wide.

The Greek (or Pelasgic) idea of a plain may be gathered from the name given to the strip of low and flat land, rather over ten miles long and under five miles wide, at the head of the Nauplia Gulf, for Argos means " The Plain " ! There are now, of course, larger plains than this in Greece ; but they are all deltaic or lacustrine. For instance, Thessaly was shut in by Pindus, the Cambunian folds, the Olympus-Ossa-Pelion wall, and the Othrys range ; and the basin filled up with water, the surplus of which seems to have escaped underground, as so many

¹ Even as lately as 1858 Corinth was again destroyed by an earthquake.

basins are still drained in Greece, *e.g.* the Arcadian core of the Morea. Then a convulsion (? earthquake) opened a crack in the archaic finger, and the Penēos (Salambría) escaped to the sea by what is miscalled the “Vale” of Tempe—really a gorge 8,000 yards long and 100 yards wide at the narrowest, and a dreadful obstacle on the climb to the Olympian Heaven.

In the same way Bœotia, shut in between Cithæron (4,600) and Helicon (5,700), was drained underground—partly into the dead crater of Hylica—until the natural drains became choked, when artificial ones were excavated, which restricted the water to what was called Lake Copais, itself now drained. It was the large amount of standing water in Bœotia—with its eastern and western frontiers also on two bodies of water, the Eubœan Sea and the Corinthian Gulf—that made the air so heavy that strangers to it felt sleepy and stupid; and so they thought that the Bœotians must also be, permanently, sleepy and stupid. But Hesiod, Pindar and Plutarch were scarcely stupid; nor could stupid people have held the whole approach on the Morea from the north as cleverly as the Bœotians held it from sea to sea. The approach on Bœotia itself from the north lay between the Copais Lake and Parnassus, where Chæroneia, on its granite knob, more than earned both the monument to its centuries of hard fighting and the legend on its base:—

“A Lion—where a Lion-hearted People Lie.”

In spite of the great length of coast—longer than the whole circuit of Iberia, and so much articulated that very few areas are 50 miles from the sea, while most are not 25—the proportion which is of real use commercially is exceedingly small. The scarred flank of the Olympus-Pelion highland makes the Thessaly coast almost as inhospitable as the Akrokeraunian flank (6,000–7,000 feet) of Pindus makes that of Epirus, “The Mainland”; and the

whole Morean coast from the Nauplia Gulf to the Patras is harbourless and repellant.¹ The coast just north of the Patras Gulf is again high and rocky except for the Gulf of Arta (Ambracia), with its Actium promontory and its swampy and malarial shores. The corresponding gulf in the east, that of Volo, does give reasonably good access to Thessaly; but the only stretch of the whole Greek coast—Strabo's "sea with a thousand arms"—which was really a natural nursery of seamen, was the Ægina (Saronic) Gulf.

Even here the best position in the earlier days was that of the island city of Ægina, with its twin ports, which shared with Crete and Chalcis (Eubœa) and, possibly, Corinth, the beginnings of West Ægean Trade; but Athens, also with two ports (Phaleron and Piræus), "bled white" the island at the end of the fifth century. In any case an island port here was bound to give place to one on the mainland, *e.g.* Corinth or Athens; and Athens had some advantage over Corinth.

For "Phœnician" Corinth, though she was the first "Greek" city to build a navy, really commanded land trade rather than sea trade except *westward* to her own colonies, *e.g.* Corcyra; Xenophon calls her "the Gate of the Peloponnese" (Morea). She also had two ports, Cenchreæ and Lechœum, the latter with "long walls" like those from Athens to the Piræus, though only one-third ($1\frac{1}{2}$ miles) of the length; but her eastward trade, and therefore her through trade, were at the mercy of Athens. In fact, even for sea trade before the rise of Athens she would not have been very important except for one *military* advantage, which gave her command of the land trade. This was her impregnable acropolis, 1,885 feet high and broad enough on the summit to encamp an army, and yet with a perennial spring, Peirēnē, of beautiful water.

So far from this being a unique or even an abnormal

¹ The island of Splagna (Splacteria) makes Navarino Bay a fine refuge.

combination, however, it is almost true to say that it was perfectly normal. In the Greece of our Legacies almost every famous city had a somewhat similar acropolis, varying in height from 500 feet at Athens to 700 feet at Nauplia and at Thebes, 900 at Mycenæ, and 950 at Argos. This "Legacy" land, with its very light and purely seasonal rainfall, is rich in these knobs; and, for protection from foes and floods, the cities were systematically built on them—near, but not on, the sea-coast, and near, but not on, a little plain. Then the limestone is full of natural subterranean ducts, down some of which basins are drained of surplus water, while up others surplus water is pressed, to appear as a perennial spring, such as this Peirēnē at Corinth, or as a seasonal spring—after the autumn floods—such as the Aganippē on Helicon.

Except, however, for the relative lowness of her acropolis, Athens had a better position than Corinth on land, for she was guarded by the ring of Hymettus (3,570 feet), Pentelikos (3,640), and Parnes (4,640); and by sea her position was also better both strategically and climatically. It had direct access to the open sea, with a "barrier reef" in Salamis; the long and lofty (6,000 feet) crest of Eubœa kept off the N.E. storms; and the Euripus current between the island and Attica is one of the most dangerous bits of water in the Mediterranean. It flows at *c.* 5 miles an hour through a forty-yards narrows, and may change its direction a dozen times a day; indeed, it made Philip of Macedon think Chalcis "one of the three fetters of Greece." Financially, too, the silver mines of Laurium—unique in Greece—were behind all the ship-building programmes and the wide sea trade.

If we regard Eubœa and the Morea—now actually made an island by the Corinthian Canal, as Eubœa was made a peninsula by its wooden bridge—as protective outposts to east and west, and if we prolong the fracture-

line (*cf.* p. 194) over the 25 miles from the Lamia gulf to the Amphissa, *i.e.* along the historic route from Thermopylæ to Delphi, we have isolated a subordinate peninsula between the Corinth-Ægina Gulf and the Eubœan Sea (or Atalantē Channel) that includes all the part of Classical Greece which the world knows best by name, and to which it owes so much. In the background was Cadmian Thebes, built fourteen centuries before Christ, the birthplace of Hesiod and Pindar; in the foreground was the younger Athens, the true home of Art and Literature. For in a single century between 530 and 430 B.C., the little City of the Violet Crown, with a population of only 100,000 free men, gave to the world more of its greatest names than any other city has given in all the centuries—Æschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides, Socrates and Thucydides, Pericles and Pheidias, etc. If Philip thought that "the Three Fetters of Greece" were Chalcis, Thebes (*not* Demetrias), and Corinth, *i.e.* the three towns commanding the *land* approaches on Athens from east and north and west, Classical Greece must have considered the position of Athens almost as important by land as by sea.

The torrential floods of the land made the choice of a hill site for a city a matter of health as well as of defence, for the pools and refuse left by them made nurseries of malaria; and the prodigious quantity of sand brought down choked or diverted, temporarily or permanently, stream after stream. Olympia was lost for centuries under an avalanche of mud—which preserved almost intact the Hermes of Praxiteles; and its neighbour Elis, one of the finest cities in Europe in the days of Pausanias, suffered almost as badly, earthquakes probably aiding the fury of the rivers (Alphēus and Penēus) in both cases.

For it is the alluvial areas that suffer most, especially round the south-west corner of the Patras gulf—now "the land of Currants"—where the mud-flats gave "to

Heracles " sites for a stadium and a hippodrome for the Olympian Games. Sperchēus mud, again, also abetted by earthquakes, has converted the Pass of Thermopylæ—" *Hot Gates* "—into a plain ; and the Lepanto " Gate " changes its width ¹ constantly from the deposit or the removal of masses of mud, still further complicated by earthquakes. The same subterranean forces give rise, to the north of the " Gate," to the mephitic vapour which once inspired the Priestess of Delphi, and in 1870 they destroyed the Castalian Fount, though they left its wilderness of scarlet poppies almost unharmed.


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CLIMATIC CONTROL

Behind nearly all these features and phenomena there is implicitly a climatic background, and in some cases it is explicit, *e.g.* the autumn floods ; but we may pay more attention to a control which seems to have had a very marked influence on the people. The climate is, certainly, typically Mediterranean, with winter rain and summer drought, Athens having only $3\frac{1}{2}$ " of rain between March 1st and October 1st, and not much more than 1" between June 1st and September 1st ; but it is greatly modified by the very small area, the deep articulation, and the remarkable relief. The result is a great variety of conditions, local and seasonal, altitudinal and longitudinal ; variety is a fundamental characteristic of the climate as well as of the relief. That is a reason for its having once been a nursery of the nomad herdsmen.


Obviously, Pindus is the important feature in the north. It is rather too far south to catch the " Bonifacio " track of cyclones that give 200" of rain above Ragusa, but the rainfall on its western flank is very heavy, certainly 100" ;

¹ It was about as much less (nearly 200 yards) than 1,000 yards in the time of Strabo as it is now more than 2,000 yards.



1. THE RACE HOME OF THE GREEKS.

1. For the relation of Calchis, Thebes, and Corinth to Athens, see p. 211; and for the importance of Miletus, which commanded the south-east, see p. 212; as Athens commanded the south-west, see p. 205.



2. THE ATHENIAN EMPIRE.

For the ring of hills—so often veiled in a literally violet haze,—that gave Athens her "Violet Crown," see p. 210; it is completed by Ægaleus (c. 1530 feet) and Lycabettus (c. 1100).

2. This illustrates the tendency referred to on p. 201, and suggests how easy it was—with a navy of 300 ships—to win such an empire, and how hard—with an army of only 30,000 men—to hold it.

and the great average height involves deep snow, which lies for six to nine months. The water supplies, therefore, that could be used for irrigation and for power are very great, at least for fully half the year. To leeward of the range Eastern Greece is arid and sufficiently continental to have a very short spring. South and west of the Lepanto Gulf the sea influence is very distinct, even though in Attica the actual rainfall scarcely exceeds 16"; and the whole area enjoys a wonderful daily sea-breeze, which holds from three or four hours after sunrise to one or two hours after sunset, its force rising and falling with the temperature. The land has been a paradise for the builders and users of wind-mills (and water-mills); indeed, the strong local winds ("Bora," "Vardar," etc.) are chiefly to blame for the carrying away of exposed soils.

As the area is rather south of the "Bonifacio" cyclonic track, so it is rather north of a full Trade-wind summer; but the Trades, the "Etesian Winds," usually blow for the whole of July and August, and cold north winds are quite common in spring. Indeed—and this is our point—Greece has a great deal of cold for its latitudes; and, no doubt, this was most welcome to the Achæans¹ and other Northerners. Almost everywhere relief enables one to go from winter to spring, or spring to summer, or—more happily—from summer to autumn and even winter, within an hour or two; sometimes it is only necessary to cross the street from sunshine into shade or from shade into sunshine. But the climb, when it is a climb up, is the wiser course, for you may be rewarded by the most magnificent views of sea and land.

Of course, all this is reflected in the vegetation, with oak and beech, cherry and apple, in the north and the west, and vine and olive, and even banana and date-palm, in

¹ The Statues of the Gods (*cf.* pp. 7 and 189) show almost all of these as of Nordic-Alpine type, and their Heaven was "snow-wrapt" Olympus.

the south and the east. Indeed, the variety of products was one of the main assets in the early trade, *e.g.* of Corinth and Athens; but we must remember that the trade list was, as it still is, one of luxuries rather than necessities.

The great difficulty is the complete drought of the midsummer, which is worse for man than even for plant. For it reduces the soil in many parts to a layer of dust—a cause of great discomfort in eastern Greece, even in the hotels—and many of the rivers to a string of pools. The Ilissus at Athens is in this condition all the summer, and the neighbouring Kephissus does not reach the sea; and there is a similar contraction (and expansion) of lakes and marshes, which terribly increases the ravages of malaria. The evil is greatly accentuated by the “Former” rains, which sweep the drought-loosened soil away to accumulate elsewhere, laying bare the highlands and spreading swamp and choking streams on the lowlands. As these rains come on a warm S.W. wind, the consequent humidity makes September the most unhealthy month in the whole year; but by the end of October the mountains are covered with snow, and conditions are pleasant and healthy again. Of course, weathering (both chemical and mechanical) is slow in all “Mediterranean” climates; but, though the replacement of forest by even *deciduous* brushwood greatly diminishes the deposit of humus, and increases loss of soil, there was probably little destruction of forest by goats before the immigration of the goat-loving Slavs.

Two conditions are of special importance because of their apparent influence on Greek Art. One is the presence of large quantities of dust in an area where the relative humidity undergoes great seasonal and even diurnal changes, and the other is the average day temperature.

The dust is far from being wholly of local origin, much of it coming on the real sirocco from the Barka peninsula

of Africa and some from the active volcano of Santorin. In times or at levels of low relative humidity this causes the scattering of light which produces translucency ; in times or at levels of high relative humidity it causes all the delicate atmospheric effects for which Greece is as famous as for its translucency. We must remember, too, that a limestone background has the same faculty of imparting translucency to the natural colours in a landscape as a white block has of imparting it to water-colours in a painting. One of these atmospheric effects is specially significant because it relates the dust to the relief—the rarity of a perfectly cloudless, *i.e.* a relatively *unpicturesque*, sky. It is inconceivable that the inhabitants of such a land could have failed to “ read, mark, and learn ” its lessons of outline and perspective and light, especially as all its typical colours are *cool*. Is there any other language in the world with a single separate word for “ *evening-sunlight* ” ?

The average day temperature requires to be related to the racial legacies of the Northerners. The famous Games were Northern, not Southern, Sports ; racing and leaping, boxing and wrestling, were scarcely “ natural ” or appropriate in Olympian or Pythian temperatures, and competitors could not compete clothed. Consequently, the human body *at its best* was a most familiar object, and no one could have a doubt what it should look like at rest or under strain, just as the translucent air left no one in any doubt as to the exact sky-line of a mountain or colour of a plain or curve of a coast. It is, again, inconceivable that the natives of such a land should have tolerated false forms and false colouring in their art, as Semites might have done even before Islam forbade the “ idolatrous ” representation of the human body ; and this was surely one reason for the Greeks being able and anxious to formulate principles and standards of truth—in art or

literature or life. The Parthenon is quadrangular, and yet its lines are so scrupulously related to the light that there is scarcely one geometrically straight line on any face of it.

The racial legacies are probably the key to the use made of the opportunities offered by this environment. The short, stone-using "Hamites," whether Basques or Ligurians or Pelasgians, would have had small chance of success in war against the tall, bronze-using, horse-training, "Keltic" Achæans, who invaded Greece, as their Phrygian cousins invaded the hinterland of Troy, about 1600 B.C.; but, according to Haddon, these Achæans, as Nordics who had come through the Alpines on their way south, had also added to their predominantly Nordic blood, with all its dowry of mental and physical virility, the higher culture of the (metal-using) Alpines. They were from the first more or less restricted to eastern Greece, the famous horses of Thessaly being no doubt descended from Achæan breeds; and it was a calamity that they succumbed to the iron-using Dorian infantry, who worked their way south along the mountainous west. But a land with the relief of Greece was not a horseman's terrane, even if he had been equipped with iron weapons instead of bronze.

One good result followed, which almost compensated for the final disruption of the old "Minoan" Greece; and that was the wide diffusion of the Achæanised Pelasgians, as Ionians, especially eastward, *i.e.* to Asia Minor, where they were much nearer to the Orient and Egyptian sources of civilisation. It was also an advantage that the Dorian Spartans were quite unable to make proper use of the sea, even where most favourable—though they gave the name of Naupactus, "The Dockyard," to the place where they built their rafts to take them across the Lepanto Narrows—and so were confined to the Morea; and in

the end, though Persian gold during the Peloponnesian war gave them temporary control of all Greece, it was (Æolian) Achæans of Thebes that crushed them—before all Greece came under the heel of Macedon.

There can be no question that, when these victorious Northerns—from latitudes of summer rain—first settled in eastern Greece, they must have been vitally stimulated by the bright light of the summer drought; and the energy which they brought with them, did not need to be expended on work, for the conquered did that. The two marked seasons also introduced a novel *régime*, with a clear distinction of busy days and idle days; and this offered obvious opportunities for play and plays, games and theatricals, as well as for those mischiefs which are meant “for idle hands to do,” *e.g.* to talk and to tease, the first steps to oratory and to war.

But there was always the certain danger of over stimulation by the bright light, beginning in chronic irritability and restlessness—such as to-day haunt any Nairobi tea-table—and ending in real loss of nerve. In the meantime, with a winter too mild to brace Northerns and a summer too hot for strenuous work, it was almost a foregone conclusion that the energy and the leisure would become, as so often elsewhere, a stimulus to and the basis of artistic activity.

Perhaps, we may again venture on a rough summary—of features and phenomena already discussed, in the hope of being able to isolate to some extent the precise influence of what we would call the major controls.

First, what of the sea? And here we may think specially of the sea round the Greece of our Legacies (*cf.* p. 211). For the function of a shore is to invite and facilitate intercourse between land and sea; and where else in the world is there quite such a shore in such a region? In this restricted area it is perfectly typical of Greece,

with its clear outlines, its gracious curves, its delicate colours; it almost always welcomes, and almost never threatens; and it offers some of the finest harbours in Europe, capable to-day of accommodating even our mammoth "Liners." Indeed, the Piræus has recently claimed to come next to Marseilles as a Mediterranean port, though Barcelona would not admit this. (*Cf.* p. 118.)

Then it was the only medium of easy communication, and was more or less bound to exercise, on the development of trade and of democracy, exactly the same influence as we have been trying to analyse in Norway (*cf.* p. 138). But in this case, partly as the result of location and regional relations, the individualism, though very favourable to commercial success, was going to involve more serious political failure than we found in Norway.

The position, for trade, was quite unrivalled in the ancient world. The convergence of seas, Adriatic and Ionic, Black and Ægean, on the "Mare Creticum," with the Cretan Narrows to Africa and the Cyclades Bridge to Asia, had helped to make Crete a great Power 3,000 years before Christ; and she had prepared the way for other "Greeks"—at least as far west as Sicily and as far east as Cyprus. These others soon extended those limits in both directions, and in both worked northwards to cooler latitudes, *e.g.* to Massilia and the Pontus; and they thus became "Men of the World," the men *par excellence* of their world. It was incumbent on them, therefore, if they would not learn foreign tongues, to supply foreigners with a *lingua franca*; and it was, doubtless, in this way that Greek came to be freed from all forms and formalities that hindered clearness and precision, directness and simplicity. They certainly succeeded in making themselves intelligible more easily and over a wider sphere than any of their rivals; and they left us a language at once easy to learn and yet capable of expressing all kinds

of thought, artistic and scientific, literary and philosophical, political and economic. *Cf.* p. 31.

There was, perhaps, some typical love of monopoly at work in addition to the cultural vanity; and this proved of much importance, as apparently the indirect cause of the great outburst of genius in Athens between 530 B.C. and 430 B.C. For the Greeks looked upon the sea as their medium of domestic communication, the scene of their foreign commerce, and their first line of defence; and from no point of view were they prepared to "share" it or to tolerate interference with it. When Mesopotamian tyranny reached the Levant, the Phœnicians paid tribute to it, but when Persian tyranny reached the Ægean, the Greeks fought it. This proved to be the essential impulse to the unique outburst of intellectual activity in the Athenian world under its first consciousness of victory and freedom. There had been no Greek history, only "loose" histories of separate Greek cities; but this Persian war was in the nature of a national emergency, it provoked a sense of nationality, and produced an approximation to national unity.

This was almost a miracle if we think of the character and the influence of the relief. The land is naturally one of isolated pockets, suitable homes only for clannish individualists or individualistic clans; and even these pockets, or the larger of them, were politically subdivided, *e.g.* Arcadia and Bœotia, where Plataea—at the foot of Cithæron, and so in touch with Attica—joined Athens against Sparta rather than Thebes against Athens. The whole physical net, with twenty square miles of mountain for every one square mile of lowland, was an appropriate stage for the rampant individualism. It gave a fine chance to the individual, whether fighting for himself inside a tiny City-State, or for one such State against another; and it developed local and civic responsibility, as it fostered

jealousies and strife. Its great merit was that every one was needed, and the consequent raising of human dignity may be almost measured by the importance attached to Tragedy; its great demerits were that it over-estimated the place of ingenuity in mental-power,—while despising whole-heartedly any one who could prostitute “a mind of first rank” to the invention of mechanical contrivances,—and it prematurely exhausted man-power.

The harm to Greece, however, involved some compensations to Europe. Many of the pockets were too small for more than one centre, and the proportion of tillable soil was as low as it is in Japan; and so a vigorous and prolific people soon outgrew the home supplies of food, and had to import or emigrate. Thus, in a double way Greeks or Greek ideas were widely spread; and, though Greece became very dependent on foreigners—which reacted curiously on Greek military theory and practice—all Mediterranean Europe profited thereby. At the same time, though real unity with central control was almost impossible in Greece, the whole area was so small, the conditions of life in all parts were so much alike, and there was so much community of speech and religion and games to keep alive activity and rivalry and “Hellenism,” that they did make a great “nation” and one of unique and ubiquitous influence.

These Games were one response to the climate, for that was exceedingly favourable to out-of-door life. To the typical Greek a house was only a place in which to eat and sleep; he lived in a colonnade—an open-air club, where gossip and discussion were the breath of life, especially political¹ life. This was the basis of the true democracy of Athens, and it surely helps to explain why Greek thought, unlike Hebrew thought, was neither rigid nor exclusive.

¹ When the Greek cities in Asia Minor were conquered, and forbidden to talk politics in public, they invented metaphysics!

Indeed, Christianity spread not until, and just because, it was translated into a Greek form—by a Hebrew, who was a Roman citizen, but spoke Greek—and so it became non-regional. For a similar reason Greek “socialism” was neither materialistic nor sentimental. The one was based primarily, not on an Old Testament or a Koran, but on conduct; the other was concerned, not with wages or power, but with living. Whatever its faults, Greece was not a modern theological or industrial Utopia.

Of course, this open-air life was adverse to family life, which suffered also for other reasons. The lack of pasture and the glut of rich fruit were adverse to children; and the goats swarming on the hills did more harm by destroying trees than good by supplying milk. Then, the alternation of heavy rain and accumulations of snow with a rainless summer gave great importance to irrigation, and irrigation units must be larger than a family. So there were three distinct influences working against family life, and two of them worked strongly in favour of public and political life.

Here is one reason for persistently emphasising the importance of their open-air life in any study of the Ancient Greeks. If we compare their average conditions with those of lands where the people spent the brightest and hottest hours of the day within thickly-walled and dimly-lighted rooms, and where the women of the race went veiled out-of-doors, it is obvious that every Greek was exposed to an exceptional amount of bright light; and what that means in strain may be suggested even by the failure of, *e.g.* a cotton plant in Sind or a Hereford cow in Argentina to breed true to type after long exposure to such strain. But the influence may be traced in relatively trivial as well as in positively vital details. For instance, to any one familiar with Mr. Hope Bagenal's brilliant suggestion as to the discovery of harmony, it

must seem exceedingly probable that the Greek failure to develop harmony—except so far as it was associated with long-stringed “harps”—in that music which they considered an absolute essential in all general education, was due to the normal absence of an echoing roof above the musicians.

But the climate, at least before the introduction of malaria, was favourable to adults, especially to their intellectual development and activity, and this in a double way. For the provision of leisure was an immense asset, and the typical foods were very nourishing and yet very easily assimilated. The mental reactions of barley-biscuit and olive-oil, of fruit and light wine, are vastly different from those of stout and beefsteak, of plum duff and plum-cake; and the *typical* temperature of Greece, 64° F., has been proved to be very favourable to mental activity.

But in the long run the climate was fatal to the old Northern stock, both directly through over-stimulation and indirectly through malaria; and, of course, they were decimated by wars as well as paralysed by bright light and poisoned by malaria. For “the Century of Athenian Genius” overlapped into a great Asiatic cycle of drought and progressive desiccation, during which the mental stimulus of the light and the decreasing supplies of bodily food gave rise to vast migratory movements oceanwards in western Eurasia; and the effects of the drought in Greece were to multiply and intensify the conditions most favourable to the spread of mosquitoes, *e.g.* intermittent streams, stagnant swamps, etc. This was of little importance until there were persons suffering from malaria, by whom the mosquitoes themselves could be made malarial; and there seem to have been no such persons till the middle of the fifth century (B.C.). Hesiod lived in *Boeotia* (*cf.* p. 208), and yet he has no word for malaria!

Nor do contemporary statues suggest the presence of

the disease. The marble (of Pentelikos) seems an appropriate medium—for healthy bodies with healthy minds. The sculptor was working directly from the living human body ; and, obviously, there were no anæmic and neurotic hypochondriacs, or none that were thought attractive. But the expedition to Egypt in 456 B.C. was disastrous, and disasters are always accompanied by sickness amongst the disheartened troops, as amongst disheartened Polar explorers ; and Herodotus actually says that these troops were greatly troubled by “ gnats.” So, from the patients who reached Greece again, the malaria was introduced, and rapidly became rampant.

There is abundant evidence¹—besides the lack of a name for it—that it was a new disease in Greece. For instance, it attacked adults, but in a normally malarial area those who survive to adult years may be reckoned immune. Then, again, the sculptors, working directly from the human body, begin to give us *what they saw*—not the calm, clear-cut, intellectual “ ideas ” and the correspondingly virile and healthy bodies that are suitable for expression in marble, but bodies that are obviously homes for emotional and sentimental, restless and even querulous “ ideas ” that ought to be in bronze—or even in putty or pith. The Hermes of Praxiteles is of special significance ; he is carrying a baby—true, it is Dionysus, but still as a baby—and he has a querulous under lip. Even one of the greatest of the world’s sculptors knew, as a Greek, so little about young *children* that he could not carve the baby properly, but he was evidently familiar with adults who looked as if they were just beginning or just recovering from an attack of malaria. So, too, no early sculptor would have had a female model showing the stigmata of degeneration, and have given us a Hera with arrested development of the lower jaw. Nor could

¹ See the admirable *Malaria*, by Ross, Jones and Ellett.

Pericles have believed, when addressing the 35,000 hoplites ("heavy armed") of *Athens*, that Plutarch—500 years later—would report that *all Greece* could not produce 3,000 men capable of carrying heavy arms!

But to actinism and malaria we have to add the cost of the Peloponnesian War in lives and ruin, due to those "rude Dorians" (Haddon), those "Prussians of Ancient Greece" (Russell), the Spartans. So few in numbers that they could not afford to lose men or even to let others guess how few they were, they fell back on the craft and the cruelty of their old Steppe habits. • Every city depended immediately on its home supply of food, and the land was not suited to heavy-armed; but the Spartan hoplites sat down on the arable land round a city and wasted it, and then waited till the light-armed defenders were forced to sally out for food. This did not affect Athens much as long as she commanded the sea, but it spread ruin over the little land.

So the men who built the Parthenon and broke the Persian died out, though they still speak in marble from across their wine-dark seas; but their Fall, like their Rise, was so closely linked with their geographical conditions, and yet their Zenith was so glorious, that only reckless ignorance can maintain that the human spirit, even at its best, is always and entirely superior to its narrow terrestrial home.

Historians are apt to forget that the history of every country begins with its physical history.

CHAPTER VIII

ITALY

ROAD AND RULE

THE Italian peninsula is much more like the Balkan in essentials than is suggested by the first glance at a map of Europe, though even a political map does show the fundamental duality of both. Each consists of an oblong, continental, longitudinal north, and a latitudinal, maritime, triangular south; and most of the north in each case has a more or less continental climate, while most of the south is purely "Mediterranean." At the same time, the northern area is more exposed in the Balkan peninsula than in Italy, and there is no "Rubicon" almost demarking the line between north and south.

In each there is a core of old rock flanked by young folds, though this is very small in Italy; and in each there is a very critical relationship of longitudinal and latitudinal riverways, that in the Balkan peninsula being usually considered much the more important. But this is certainly open to doubt. In its full historical continuity the relation of the Po to the Tiber has probably been more important than that of the Save-Danube to the Morava-Vardar, at least as representing the mid-rib of two areas, if not as representing two thoroughfares.

The fundamental differences between the two regions are in the distribution of relief. In each the meridional trough is strictly central; but in the one the old core is also more or less central—in the Rhodope, while in the

other it is marginal--in Etruria. In the Balkan north the plain and the great river are marginal, while in Italy they are central; in the Balkan south, the little plains are normally away from the coast and mountain-girt, while in southern Italy the interior is a continuous highland, flanked along each coast by a more or less continuous plain. The essential "controls" in Italy, therefore, seem to have been associated with a marginal plain in the south and a marginal highland in the north; and it was of great moment that the southern plain was in the same latitude as the north of the Balkan peninsula, and faced to the west instead of the east.

In the "Italy" of Ancient Rome, then, as in the Hellenic part of the Balkan peninsula, Man had to conquer or conform to conditions of adaptation to a well-marked region of summer-drought; and, as in Hellas, he began his experiment with what we may call Oasis or City-State¹ ideas, based on easy and natural isolation. But he was not in the eastern or Asiatic basin of the Mediterranean, with its maritime, gulf-girt, sub-tropical environment, but in the western or European basin, with a mountain-girt, military, warm-temperate environment. While the basis of the population, therefore, was likely to be Mediterranean (Liguro-Iberian), there was far more chance of survival for any Nordic or Alpine (Italic or Umbrian) elements; and, if so, the qualities of the leader and the worker were likely to be relatively more important than those of the thinker, especially as the area was much larger than Hellas.

Here is at once a key to much of our debt to Roman Italy. Nearly all that was typical in Roman law, organisation, military system, family life, loyalty to the state, seems to have been largely Nordic, imposed by natural leaders, even if none of it became marked until the Nordics had been spurred into activity by contact with the more

¹ Both Etruria and Magna Græcia were essentially City-State areas.

advanced thought of the Mediterranean natives. Even in the fifteenth century, when Italy was as truly the leader of Europe as Spain became in the sixteenth, and France in the seventeenth, it was a fresh Nordic element in northern Italy, spurred by contact with the Roman legacy, that produced the Renaissance. If physiognomy and colouring mean anything, Raphael and Titian, Michel Angelo and Leonardo da Vinci, were strongly Nordic. So lessons learnt from Rome may be to some extent lessons taught by "our own" type.

These (? Phrygio-Achæan) Northerners were landsmen, who came (*c.* 1500 B.C.) from that north-eastern link with the Danubian steppes about which Italy has always been very sensitive. As foresters who had become farmers, they retained the forester's skill in building—with bronze tools; and, though they built their homes on piles in the lakes for safety, they were both ready and able to fight dourly for their arable lands. In both spheres, too, they showed a strong love of order and specially of straight lines—such as are irresistibly suggested by the serried ranks of a conifer forest—as well as the forester's skill in using tools and weapons. They were natural engineers as well as architects, fighting men as well as farmers; and it is very significant that the Terremare camp—as the prototype of the Roman camp—was a measured square, with an open space (? for meetings) in the centre.

Intermarrying with the Mediterraneans, who must have been much the more numerous, these people produced the Italian "race," which moved southward in two groups, one—(? blond Nordics, from the plain), along the western lowlands, and the other—(? darker Alpines,¹ from the plateau), along the central highlands. The lowlanders, because they had settled on the broad (*latus*) plain, came to be called Latins; the highlanders were called

¹ Haddon calls them "Nordic-led Alpines," with Halstatt culture.

Umbrians (? "Dark-skins") and Sabellians (? from the *Sabulum*, or "rough ground," where they settled below the highest range of the Apennines). These Sabellians were wild shepherds, who may have been driven southwards by the much more civilised Umbrians ; but it is far more likely that they raided through "Umbria," conquering the Umbrians and imposing on them their own rude speech. This would account for the curiously rude speech of a very cultured (Villanovan) people.

But Oasis or City-State mentality was appropriate only in small areas isolated by a dangerous medium, *e.g.* wastes of sand or of sea ; and the restricted area had its obvious defects. It restricted flora and fauna, and even dwarfed the fauna (*cf.* the Malta elephants) ; and, if it tended to produce a marked type of people, it soon produced too many of the type. In any case, though the smallness tended to political coherence, it rendered the unit an easy prey to Externals.

IMMEDIATE RELATIONS OF ROME

Now, Italy is not on this small scale, nor was Rome except for a very short time. The peninsula occupies a clearly defined natural region, which is large enough—thanks to a fecund people—to maintain a Great Power in Modern Europe. It is defined by mountains and seas, both of them admirable boundaries and even barriers in early days ; Italy is reached from Europe *through* the Alps, not over them, and is one of the Sea Powers of the world. Her geographical conditions favoured an independent self-sufficiency in those early days, such as no Greek State enjoyed ; that self-sufficiency implied a relatively large amount of arable land, with its sedentary tillers ; and such a land should have a relief favourable to coherence and unity. But even when Rome was just

a City-State, enjoying "an easy and natural isolation," the fundamental conditions were of a different kind, if not also on a different scale, from those of typical City-States in Greece. The latter, as we have seen, stood on a high hill that gave a site (or slopes) for orchards as well as for the fortress-town, and the lowland near by was small; and, though the whole unit of town and territory was isolated by encircling heights, it had a sea-face, which gave it easy communications in all directions. In Etruria, with its rich mineral wealth, there was such a possibility; and the Etruscans, who were partly Pelasgic, could speak Greek, and were akin to the Greeks in their artistic and naval activities. Their typical centres were hill-top towns, *e.g.* Volaterræ (1,700 feet), and were surrounded by Cyclopean walls¹ like those at Mycenæ; but they were at some little distance inland (5-15 miles), *e.g.* Capua, probably because the Tyrrhenian Sea was a much less civilised area than the Ægean. The Greek towns in Italy, on the contrary, *e.g.* Tarentum, were on the actual coast according to the normal Greek custom.

So far as it was founded by the Etruscans and the Greeks, then, the original "Latin" civilisation was of the City-State type; and Rome had no cultural or other qualifications for spreading it except as the result of her position between the two sedentary, civilised, maritime or semi-maritime peoples. Nor could a typical City-State spread any culture widely *by land*. Rome did spread this culture, and widely—by ceasing to be a City-State and becoming "the heir of Alexander." Cf. p. 186.

But Rome had no inclination to the sea, nor did the Tyrrhenian Sea offer great possibilities; and so, until she was powerful enough to conquer corngrowers at a distance—eventually outside of Italy, and even of the Mediterranean—she was forced to conquer corngrowing neighbours.

¹ Walls were as typically Greek as roads were typically Roman.

These were to be found on the "Broad Plain" of Latium, with its rich volcanic soils, which was occupied by a number of little isolated groups, each set round—not on, at first—a hill (? the Alban piedmont), on which there was a fort for refuge in emergencies and a temple for religious gatherings. And, from the number of Pelasgic words in Latium and in "farmer's" Latin, many of these groups must have been Pelasgic. *Cf.* p. 232.

Into one of these groups, living on what was afterwards the Roman Forum, came a body of intruders, bandits or refugees and perhaps from overseas—though they could not have been travelling from Troy for two or three centuries!—but certainly fighters rather than farmers; and, probably to avoid floods as well as from their military instinct, they seized a neighbouring hillock,¹ the Palatine, which gave them a summit large enough (25 acres) for a fortified village. Eventually this Roman group became strong enough to conquer all the other Latian or Latin groups, and so to start Rome on her great career.

If we now ask what—if any—geographical advantages gave Rome an initial lever against the other little foci, we must glance at the physical history of the place. For here, as in Norway, a block of the earth's crust had fractured, and part of it foundered, and was covered with sea. The different latitude implied some regional differences, *e.g.* in the rigidity of the crust, the climate—prehistoric and historic, and the subsequent strains; and the sequel was written in fire, not in ice.

The conditions are still favourable to seismic and volcanic disturbances. Gran Sasso reaches 9,600 feet in height, and the Tyrrhenian Sea drops to at least 9,600; the Umbrian Apennines and the cyclonic storms guarantee a much heavier effective rainfall than is suggested by the

¹ Only 120 feet high (*cf.* p. 234), but high enough to have something of the lure and the enlargement of the far horizon—seaward and southward.

recorded rainfall at Rome (32"), for over 80 per cent. of it falls between September and April; and the summer-drought leaves the surface soil very loose—to be carried away wholesale by the autumn rains. Under this constant disturbance of equilibrium the pressure of the foundered block still maintains the Etna, Lipari and Vesuvius cones in activity, and this activity was once much more widely spread. Albano, Bracciano, Vico, Bolsena, are all crater lakes; some of the dead cones reach heights considerably above that of Vesuvius (4,200), *e.g.* Amiata (5,700), with its girdles of beech above and chestnut¹ below, and Cimini (7,100); and the arid plain of the Campagna is of recent volcanic origin, many Latin towns being perched on the lips of precipitous cracks in it, Virgil's *prærupta saxa*.

The same is true of the south, where the number of extinct craters near Naples won for the place its name of Campi Phlegræi—famous for the Massic and Falernian wines grown on the crater-slopes,—and where the mephitic steam from the crater lake of Avernus suggested the belief that it was the mouth of Hades. The neighbouring Lucrine lake (beloved of Imperial oyster-eaters) was partly filled up by a new cone which was pushed up from the floor of the lake as recently as A.D. 1538, and was appropriately named Monte Nuovo.

But at present we are more concerned with Etruria and the Latin area than with Campania and the Neapolitan; and we may wisely insist on being purely regional. Whoever the Etruscans were, they lived in "Etruria"; and the name is used here only in the sense of "people who lived in Etruria." They may have been Terremare people or strangers from Lydia (Haddon); they may have had an Alpine familiarity with metal-working, or acquired that

¹ The chestnut reaches 3,400 feet upwards, and stops downwards directly the trachyte area of the cone ceases to be exposed.

aptitude on the spot, though Alpine people should have shown more specialising in the keeping of live-stock and less specialising in "Oriental" culture. But the old block was stable, rich in metals—especially those that linked the Bronze Age with the Iron Age, and easily accessible to the Phœnicians and Greeks. Indeed, all parts of the coast were more or less accessible, *e.g.* the south at Caere and Cosa and the north at Pisa and Luna (the "Moon-shaped" harbour of Spezia), while in the centre Populonia, the port for the Ilva (Elba) iron, was important enough to have a coinage of its own! Sea trade, based on metals, was the key to the wealth and the culture of "the people who lived in Etruria."

The Latins, too, may have been a Terremare people, and they used iron; but they had no ports and no metals or other exchange products (salt?) to attract any foreign trade or culture. Their original "base" was probably the Alban Mount, which was actively volcanic till *c.* 1000 B.C.; and even after the activity died away, the low flats had to drain—or be drained—before they were habitable. But the fertile volcanic ash had collected in such quantities in the soft wet soil that, in spite of its small size (=Berkshire or Hertfordshire), Latium could support a dense population—with very small holdings (*Bina jugera*, "Two-thirds of an acre apiece")—while a large part of it, including all the Pomptine marshes (*c.* 30 × 8 miles), was still undrained.

Parallel with the Apennines, then, but to windward, there was a line of volcanoes¹ exposed to the full violence of the wet winds off the Mediterranean; and the rain streamed down the cones and the slopes of the mountains. It frayed out the friable cones into groups of little hills, as—to compare small things with great—rain weathered out the primitive Cumbrian dome, until we have left a

¹ Buttressed by the (older and mineralised) Sub-Apennines from the Pisa Hills to Monte Argentario.

girdle of hills—Skiddaw, Sca Fell, Old Man, etc., round our Helvellyn core; and the débris at once lowered the hills, raised the level of the plain, and filled up the gaps between the hills except where there was a very wide one.

The Apennine torrents fed by the rain worked down transverse valleys into the longitudinal trough between the folds and the line of cones; and there they united to form the Tiber, and to force their way to the sea through the largest gap. These transverse valleys became of great political importance, *e.g.* even as frontiers in the earliest days—the Nera (Nar) separating the Umbrians from the Sabines by a string of lakes and falls¹ and swamps, and the Anio, though it carried the *Via Valeria*, separating the Sabines from the Latins; and here the Tiber matured its valley inside the volcanic line, and deposited a delta outside it, the apex of the delta being actually on the line.

Here, where the sudden landward swing of the river had perhaps cut a corner off its eastern bank, and had shoaled up its bed behind the island (Tiberina) thus formed—on seven little tufa hills, 80 to 120 feet high, exactly like dozens of others on the line *except* that they stood on the brink of the yellow Tiber—with the purple Apennines rising to 7,000 feet behind it in the Sabine hills, the blue Tyrrhenian Sea in front of it, and the riverine marshes moating it round, sprang up that bandit refuge which was one day going to call itself the Eternal City.

There is a harmless touch of impudence in the claim, for it admitted, and even boasted of, having been founded by “Phrygian” refugees from Troy! It was much younger

¹ The “Marble Falls of Terni” are not at Terni, not even on the Nera, but on the Velino, where it drops—with a main leap of c. 330 feet—from a hanging valley into the Nera about four miles above Terni, the natural terminus of a total drop of fully 800 feet from above the falls; and the “marble” is a veneer of travertine over the Jurassic limestone.

than Corinth and Chalcis, still more so than Tiryns and Mycenæ, and a mere infant beside the primeval watchers that look down on Nile and Euphrates and Hwangho. It was even younger than its neighbour Alba Longa, only 15 miles away perched up 3,000 odd feet on a dead cone of the Alban Mount on a "Long White" ridge of the lip of its crater lake. But, though it was not even on the oldest "Tiber" thoroughfare—from Umbria *viâ* Præneste to Campania—which avoided the swampy seaward bend of the lower river, it was in the right place; and its influence has been world-wide, if its actual age is less than 3,000 years.

The sudden swing seaward is between the tiny Capitol and the Palatine hills: and the latter, steep on every side except where Titus built his arch, is more central than the Capitol as well as much larger (*cf.* p. 231), and has much better command of the Broad Plain. As it was still above the seaward limit of shoal, it was not directly accessible to pirates by the river; and so it came to control the land traffic, as the prehistoric *Roma quadrata* ("Rome Four-square"), and built the first bridge across the river, the Pons Sublicius.¹

The strong Janiculum, like the lonely Vatican, was a useful outpost against the Etruscans, but neither could be a serious rival of any hill inside Servius Tullius's (7 mile) wall; the head of navigation gave the sea-trade, with some danger from pirates, to the Aventine, but the Romans were landmen; and the Capitol was too small except to serve as a meeting-place, but was dominant as that. The Forum lay at its eastern foot, and the Circus Maximus to the south, while the Campus Martius stretched north-eastward from it to the Tiber and on northward to the line along which later ran Aurelian's (11 mile) wall. In any case the story said that Romulus *chose* the Palatine.

• ¹ The theory that the Aventine "seamen" built it is very unreasonable.

The reason given for his choice was curious—that the Quirinal and the Capitol were held by Sabines, and the Coelian and the Esquiline by Etruscans, so that the Roman hill was actually “younger” than at least four of the others. It is also curious that the Etruscans should be holding the two hills *farthest* from their base in the north-west, where they might naturally have been holding the Vatican and the Janiculum, or even the Quirinal and the Viminal. But two things are worth noting.

A straight line from the southern exit of the “city” (afterwards the gate to the Appian Way) to the northern exit (afterwards the gate to the Salt Way) obviously left the Etruscans on one side and the Romans and Sabines on the other, with the latter protected by the Tiber moat on their Etruscan or Tarquin flank. The Sabine highlanders were too few to alter materially the general Latin character of the group, and were culturally negligible; but they had great influence, apparently because they had come as conquerors. The Etruscans, on the contrary, were very far from negligible culturally; and they too, as Tarquins, had conquered the city. Even after they had lost it again, they still held lands that more or less encompassed it round on every side except the west. More important still it was that they were essentially artisans (in metal, especially *ornamental* work) and traders; and the two south-eastern hills gave them easy access eastward and southward to the Latin and Campanian markets (*cf.* p. 251).

The position of Rome was a potent one. The hills, though tiny, were some protection from floods and—if only as watch-towers—from foes; the Tiber itself was a similar barrier from attack from the west, whether Etrurian (*e.g.* Veii) or maritime; and the Anio blocked the Sabines, as the marshes blocked the Latians. Sea foes were hampered by the swamps, the distance up the river (*c.* 13 miles), and the great difficulty of making any permanent station

at Ostia,¹ which forced traders to go up to Rome as their port, and brought into existence Civita Vecchia. The low and flat land all round guaranteed the bandits from surprise in war (*cf.* p. 231); and the convergence of Tiber, Nera, and Anio, from north, north-east, and east, and of streams from the Alban hills on the south and south-east, practically guaranteed such constant and widely spread flood over the flats² in winter that attack then from any side was always very difficult and precarious.

In the earlier days the mosquitoes were not malarial (*cf.* p. 223), while the silt was exceedingly fertile and renewed every year; the old rock of Etruria was rich in metal; and the summer-drought guaranteed abundance of salt from the delta coast—the only local exchange product, but so important inland that it gave its name to the *Via Salaria*. *Cf.* Venice.

Into this debatable belt between Roundheaded Etruscan metal-workers and Longheaded Latin farmers, all sorts and conditions of men flocked; and, as all were at first more or less refugees, there was a marked degree of equality amongst them and especially with regard to their co-operation for organized defence. In this connexion, too, the tufa was easy to work (*cf.* the Catacombs), and timber could be easily obtained from the Sabine hills; and the Broad Plain (90 miles by 40) had a dense population which had learnt to wait patiently on Nature, as farmers must. Here was an immense moral asset, of a kind unknown to the Greeks, as to modern machine-bred people.

¹ Ancus Martius "manufactured" a harbour at Ostia, but the Tiber covered it with mud. Claudius and Trajan re-made it—with the help of an artificial island (now a mile inland!), and Trajan "manufactured" one at Centum Cellæ ("Hundred Barns"), now Civita Vecchia, in the same way, but well north of the Tiber distributaries.

² Though the Tiber drops c. 3,300 feet in the first 20 miles of its course (150 m.), the gradient for the last 100 miles is not 1 in 1,000.

INTERMEDIATE RELATIONS OF ROME

Rome was the name of a city, and we have glanced at its immediate relations. But how came a city to found an empire? What favoured her intermediate relations? What was Rome to Italy? And how far are the fundamental geographical conditions still influential? We may find that what Rome was to Italy, Italy has been to Europe; and whatever else Rome did, she did not Romanise Italy as Greeks would have Hellenised it. Perhaps, therefore, we may examine first the relation of Italy to Europe.

The Italians are a very young nation—and so may be pardoned, as a nation, for some youthful enthusiasms—but a very old¹ people; and we should, therefore, note in passing, as a source of some light on the contradiction, that Italy hung for centuries, not truly from the Alps, but from one of the two longitudinal routes round the Alps between the two great Powers, France and Austria. If the Po plain became much richer and more populous than the Bavarian plateau, Marengo and Novara are names quite as suggestive as Blenheim and Hohenlinden; and the Po, almost as clearly as the Danube, invited France downstream—eastward.

We have already noticed “the treachery of the Alps” to Italy, with the convergence of passes and the adverse gradient on the Italian side minimising the value of the system as a physical and military barrier. Northern Italy was always, as was natural, specially sensitive to this, and was inclined to safeguard itself as a whole by ties with the Holy Roman Empire, or to split into two parts, one drawn westward to France and the other eastward to Austria. But it was precisely in the Trentino that “the

¹ In discarding the representative principle recently, Italy was curiously in touch with Ancient Rome, where the democracy asserted itself by directly electing its executive officers, but was indifferent to representation.

treachery was worst," for the pass¹ is low and easy; and the frontier here recently was along minor crests, Austria possessing major crests northwards and eastwards, while to the south and to the west Italy had only lowlands.

The natural result, apart from any belief in "The Latin Sisterhood," was inclination towards France rather than Austria. Cavour sent Piedmont help to the Allies in the Crimean War, and so Italy was invited to join the Council of Europe in the Paris Congress; and it was Savoy, from her strategic saddle across the Alpine crest above Piedmont, that gave unity to Modern Italy, as Rome had given it to Ancient Italy. Sardinia sent material support to Lombardy and Venice against Austria in 1848, and the Vienna Congress allowed Genoa to link Savoy to Sardinia.

But there is another aspect of this "Treachery." Even climatically it had its merits—in bracing influences on the Lombard plain; and the easy transit encouraged human movement across the system, in trade and otherwise, several thousands of years ago. The barrier was sufficient to be a useful check on large or premature movements, *e.g.* the northward expansion of Roman Italy or the claims of the Holy Roman Empire in the Middle Ages; and the small bodies of northern intruders who did cross, gave a stimulus without creating much disturbance, and were easily absorbed or assimilated. Indeed, one of the marked phenomena of the Po basin is the complete Italianisation, in speech and even in type, of all the various foreign elements. It speaks for the virility of the "race," and for a very un-Teutonic power of assimilating such elements; but it also suggests how small the various bodies of intruders were.

There was, perhaps, another cause at work from the very earliest times. For when the lake-dwellers at the

¹ There is a delusion prevalent that the railway goes literally *over* the pass; but there are actually twenty-six tunnels.

southern foot of the range became too numerous, and had to emigrate, they seem to have moved at first, not into the forested swamps in front of them, but up to the real *alps* behind them ; and it was almost certainly these alps, with a type of forage too good to be “wasted” on sheep and goats, that attracted the Vituli, “Cattlemen,”¹ who eventually settled at what came to be called Augusta *Taurinorum* (Turin), and probably gave their name to Northern Italy. But the Greeks gave the name Italia, “Cattleland,” to a little portion of Calabria (Magna Græcia), and it is generally believed that Augustus extended the Greek name northward and not the “Phrygio-Achæan” name southward. No doubt, to the Greeks, any valley that would support a score of cows, and had no goats, might seem a “Cattleland.”

The convergence of the passes on Turin, as on Milan and Venice, was eventually invaluable from the economic point of view ; and the development of the water-power has made the steepness of the Italian face of the system a direct asset, though it brings another complication into the use of mountains as a political frontier (*cf.* p. 37). Nor is this the only illustration of the interesting changes in the relative value of geographical features when viewed from a modern economic standpoint instead of from an old political one.

One other consideration is pertinent in this connexion, for it throws light on a fundamental difference between the Latin and the Greek, the Roman and the Macedonian. The instinct of the Hellene was to spread, that of the Latin to concentrate. The former had such an easy medium of expansion in his encircling sea that he never thought of any other—still less of *preparing* another—to distribute himself and his ideas ; and thin drift in obedience to topo-

¹ The untillable glacial gravels round the edge of the plain are still cattle grounds, and produce the Gorgonzola cheese.

graphy meant no power to control, while the concentrated drive in obedience to the needs of the State was based on a paved road which ignored obstacles, kept pace with expansion, and maintained an eternal link with Rome.

THE GREAT ROADS

What, then, were the essential geographical factors with which Rome was faced? They were primarily those of shape and size, which even the worst political map must betray; and it may be helpful to invert what is probably the right order, and glance at the size first—which is now just the same as that of the British Isles (120,000 square miles). Are we to regard it as small or as large?

Compared with some historic lands, *e.g.* Egypt and Greece and Palestine, it is huge; compared with the other Great Powers to-day, it is small, and until yesterday was still smaller, for the War has increased it by 10 per cent. The vital fact is that it seems to be just large enough for a Great Power both by land and by sea; but it would scarcely be so if the people were not fecund, and if Savoy and Sardinia had not given them freedom by land and by sea as well as unity. The land area in itself was sufficient for strength without the danger of incoherence, and it gave fairly similar conditions¹ of experience over the whole. Relief, certainly, interfered, and tended to split it up into regions the regionalism of which has been almost indestructible; but Rome provided what was—at the time in Europe—a unique medium of intercourse between the regions and herself, if not also between themselves.

It is scarcely rash to suggest that, if the region of immediate contact had been of the size and the shape of, *e.g.* Russia, Rome would never have thought of the particular medium at all. But the size was comprehensible,

¹ The 30" isohyet runs across the Po plain from west to east, and then right down the peninsula into Sicily.

and the shape was both disconcerting and suggestive ; for it is longer than Great Britain and yet narrower, it has no linking " Nile," and it is naturally split from top to toe by the Apennines. How was it to be conquered and ruled ? Even if the Romans had been seamen, the coast is very inarticulate except in the extreme south (where the Greeks supplied transport by sea)—so much so that the one small protrusion in 300 miles of the east coast was actually called Ancona, " The Elbow " ! The rivers have impossible ¹ gradients and seasonal rains, and in flood they were dreadfully difficult to cross ; they were even difficult to approach—through permanent marsh left by seasonal floods. Obviously, they had to be bridged, and it is significant that the Latin word *pons* was used of " a road raised on arches " even when it was not actually across a river.


These bridges and their approaches were, as suggested by the name of the first, *Pons Sublicius*, of wood, and that particular bridge was wooden down to the time of Augustus, though the difficulty of hewing them down (*cf.* the story of Horatius) caused some changes to be made in the actual method of construction. But stone was better suited to the climate, the régime of the rivers, and the marshy ² approaches ; and it was everywhere abundant. Indeed, in most parts it was much too abundant ; and still in southern Italy houses are built by the peasants of the stones " cleared " off what is to be the garden or allotment.

The bridges were important before the roads, the Pontifex Maximus (" Chief Bridge-builder ") being the head of the oldest order of priests in Rome ; and they were definitely military works, *e.g.* the *Pons Sublicius* linking

¹ The Arno drops 3,300 feet in its first half-dozen miles. *Cf.* p. 237.

² But in swampy areas even the great roads at their best were built up between parallel lines of *piles* (*cf.* the Terremare, p. 228) about 14 feet apart. The word *sublicius* means " on piles."

the city—for Garibaldi as well as Horatius!—to the Janiculum fortress. There were, too, early roads of earth and then of gravel. But, as soon as Rome and her Latin subject-allies began the conquest of Italy (c. 370—270 B.C.), they realised the imperious need for easy, safe,



ROMAN ROADS IN PENINSULAR ITALY.

permanent roads; and for that purpose the roads had to be "built," *strata* ("streets"). The campaign was begun with an attack on the most *southerly* of the Sabellians, the Samnites, and two roads were built from the Porta Capena, one along the coast (V. Appia) and the other landward (V. Latina), to the strongest strategical centre in the

extreme *south* of the Samnite territory. This was *Male-ventum*, which the victors renamed *Bene-ventum*, and from there they ran a single road on to the east coast at Brundisium.

The Appian Way, which they called "the Queen of Ways," and which became "the Great South Road," ran through the Pomptine marshes, where the conditions left no choice about the construction of the road; and the experience seemed to have left upon the Romans the conviction that *all* roads must be similarly "built," even when they ran over a whin sill at a height of 1,000 feet in the Pennines. It is no wonder that these roads lived, on their past constitution, unrepaired for 1,000 years and more—indeed, till the bad-weather cycle of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, and some of them for 2,000 years.

North of the Samnite territory the Via Salaria went east by the lower Tiber to the Sabine territory, while "the Great North Road," the Via Flaminia,¹ went west of it to the southern end of the Umbrian territory, at Narina (Nar=Nera), and then through the heart of Umbria past the great fortress of Spoleto to Ancona, where it met the Salt Way. Thus, great roads—duplicated for most or all of the distance—linked Rome *viâ* Samnite Beneventum to the south-east coast, and *viâ* Umbrian Spoleto to the north-east coast. Both Hannibal and the Vandals thought Spoleto² of great importance, mainly from the strategic standpoint, but partly because of the Clitumnus pastures—with their "milk-white steers"; and the Lombards made both centres the capitals of Duchies.

The version that all the roads led to Rome is relatively

¹ The military importance of the Flaminian Way was due to its tapping, from the most easterly bend of the Tiber near Perugia, the Scheggia Pass, *i.e.* the lowest pass (*c.* 375 feet) across the Central Apennines. *Cf.* the battles of the Metaurus (207 B.C.) and Gualdo Tadino (A.D. 552).

² Spoleto still preserves the record of its gallant resistance to Hannibal (217 B.C.) in a *Porta d'Annibale*.

modern ; the genetic fact was that they all led *from* Rome, and Roman power was strong as long as a spirit of strength radiated from Rome along them. As soon as the spirit became weak, Italy became a mere geographical expression ; the north might be Etruscan or Gallic or Lombard, and the south might be Greek or Byzantine or Bourbon. No doubt, this incoherence was partly due to the absence of cross-roads ; but no military power could tolerate conditions favourable to flank attacks, and the general scheme was thoroughly sound. They carried the Via Salaria round the north end of the Gran Sasso mass, and the Via Valaria—up the Anio valley—round the south end ; the Appian Way was continued along the west coast as the Aurelian to Pisa, where the Julian took it on to Luna (Spezia) for Gaul ; and the Æmilian crossed the Rubicon from Ariminum (Rimini), linking the Flaminian *viâ* Bononia with Placentia, and so duplicating routes to Gaul.

The importance of the river-valleys is obvious, especially those of the Liris (Garigliano) and Volturnus, the Anio and the Nera, and above all the Tiber. Rome stands roughly on the central parallel and the central meridian of Italy to-day, and at all stages of her history was roughly central in the more densely peopled half of the peninsula ; and it was this centrality that gave it more chance of controlling the vital Apennine foreland than Etruscan Fiesole (on its 970-foot hill), or Greek Cumæ (300 years older than Rome), with a crater citadel the trachyte walls of which made a good port. The modern representatives of these two, Florence and Naples, were relatively late arrivals. There could be no Florence at all until the “Ombrone” (Pistoia-Ripoli) lake was drained, and no “flourishing” city till Trans-Apennine trade became important ; and Naples (Neapolis, “New City”) had too many older rivals close at hand, *e.g.* Cumæ and Capua, though it is now just the largest city in Italy (966,000 in 1928 *v.* Milan=962,000).

The peninsula, of course, lies distinctly N.W.—S.E.; Roman Italy stretched over only 6 degrees of latitude, but more than 8 degrees of longitude; and the Tiber valley is the one due N.—S. feature in the area. There is a very marked tendency for all the rivers between the Apennines and the Sub-Apennines, unlike those east of the Apennines, to be longitudinal, not transverse, *e.g.* both the upper and the middle Arno, the Chiana and the Serchio, both the Ombrones, the Pesa and the Paglia, etc.; but the Tiber is very remarkable. The river rises *farther west* than its mouth, even Perugia (12.4° E.) being in practically the same longitude as Rome (12.3° E.), while Ravenna is only 12.2° E. This is the real background of the whole Historical Geography of the Papal States from 755 to 1870.

For the valley was the natural link between Rome and Ravenna, the Po marshes and the Pontine; the States began in a gift from the Exarch of Ravenna to the Pope of Rome; and, on the capture of Rome by the Huns, Ravenna became the heir of Imperial Rome—for 350 years. Unfortunately, this enabled Papal influence to cut the north of Italy from the south rather as the Apennines cut the east from the west; and the Popes even played off the north (Bologna, Modena, Ferrara) against the south on the principle of *Divide et Impera*. This was a great misfortune, because, as their own base was to the south, they reaped the advantages of the strong rule exercised there by Saracens and Norse, especially in “Naples” and “Sicily” (The Two Sicilies), which in early days put the south as far ahead of the north as the Bourbon afterwards put it behind the north. The change began in 1735.

But the success of both Church and State was wrapped up in the roads. Rome was never mercantile, but she made one unique contribution to trade, and so to our civilisation, in her paved roads, and another in her use of

those roads to enforce the *Pax Romana*, under which the trade was safe as well as speedy. The Church influence crept along these roads behind the *Pax Romana*, and found its work relatively easy; for most of the roads were in western Europe, and western Europe was pagan, while the east was heretical. It was natural, therefore, that the Church should follow—in both senses—the organisation of the State, and have roughly the same sort of divisions; and that seems to supply one reason for it never being really strong and stable where old Rome had not been present in some force.

Political as well as religious influences spread along the roads, as they have spread along the Trans-Siberian railway; for they had made Rome the Mother of Empire from Britain to Armenia, and they did not wear out. So the world got its ideas and ideals of government from Rome, and became closely linked with what was typically Roman. This, again, played directly into the hands of the Church. For the Barbarians, when they overthrew the Politicals in western Europe, retained the Ecclesiastics—if only for their clerical value, for they were *clerks*, even if in Holy Orders—and so Roman organisation and Etrusco-Greek culture were perpetuated. The one trouble was that Barbarian influences made Rome forget her old practice of discipline without undue tyranny; and, as the Church grew up under this later influence, she suffered as Rome had suffered.

It was probably this intrusion of tyranny that ruined the Empire. Italy became the sport of centuries, between land and sea, between Goths, Lombards, and the Holy Roman Empire from the north, and Vandals, Saracens, and Norse, from the south. A Vandal fleet even sailed up the Tiber, and sacked Rome in 455; and when the capital was moved nearer to the main source of danger, the Barbarians ignored Constantinople, and sacked Rome by land.

THE GREAT "CROSS ROADS"

There was a clear geographical background to the story. In the first place, Rome, though a good centre for the Republic and even for early Italy, was a bad centre for the Empire and worse still for Europe. For the Empire, like the Mediterranean round which it grew, lay N.W.—S.E., and its flanks were on the south-west and the north-east. Since the fall of Carthage there had been no real danger from the south-west, *i.e.* Africa, and there was none from the Atlantic, and not much from forested northern Europe; but there was constant and real danger from the grasslands in the north-east, especially when Rome had forgotten how to defend herself, and when the exhaustion of Mediterranean Africa had increased the importance of Mediterranean Asia. Cf. p. 228.

Perhaps, most danger came really from the "Provincial" emperors. Till about 300 A.D. all the emperors, even though "Africans" or "Illyrians," had respected Rome as the source of their power and the seat of empire; but, when war called them again and again to the ends of the great roads, they not only carried their power with them, but realised also how their absence from Rome weakened the power of the Senate and so strengthened their own. And so the policy began of establishing the Court elsewhere—a policy which again played into the hands of the Pope. This was true even in details. For instance, the pagan Diocletian, confirmed by the Christian Constantine, "raised Rome beyond the Alps"—at Trèves, as commanding the direct (Moselle) route of the Barbarians from the Prussian plain to the Lorraine Gate; and out of this sprang the importance of the town as an ecclesiastical and administrative centre.

Indeed, the decline of the Empire went more or less parallel with the rise of the Papacy, especially when

Barbarians such as Odoacer and Theodoric¹ ruled in Italy as viceroys of Byzantium, and still more when Justinian turned out the Goths only to let in the Lombards, *i.e.* rude pagans, who soon reduced the link between Byzantium and Ravenna to a mere sham. For when Ravenna became powerless to help "Italy," let alone defend Rome, the Pope had his opportunity; and Gregory the Great won his spurs against the Lombards, as Leo the Great had against Attila. Indeed, a comparison of the immediate and the ultimate hinterlands of Rome and Constantinople suggests that it was inevitable geographically that the Roman Empire should be absorbed by the Papacy, but that the Greek Church should be absorbed in the Byzantine Empire.

It may be granted at once that Rome had become too far from her frontiers, too republican in spirit, too pagan in life, and that it was wise and sound to move the capital to Milan, if not to Trèves—to Constantinople, if not to Nicomedia (Ismid). The latter, like Troy, was even in Asia, and was naturally an outpost against the north-west rather than against either the north-east or the south-east.

But Rome was safe and the right capital as long as Roman agriculture prospered, as long as Italy was healthy, and as long as the middle class was not taxed out of existence. Agriculture, however, steadily deteriorated, the soil was dreadfully impoverished, and the increasing drought of the third and fourth centuries increased the ravages of malaria as much as it decreased the yield of crops.

At the same time the empire was the work of Rome, not of a single² Roman "Alexander"; and she could not cease to be Rome and to exercise the influence of Rome simply because she ceased to be the nominal capital. So the Barbarians were entirely right in ignoring Constanti-

¹ Theodoric complicated matters by being a heretic (Arian).

² Appius Claudius, who built the first road and the first aqueduct, was almost the only early Roman (? a Sabine) with any apparent personality.

nople, and by sacking Rome they broke the one real link between the west and the east of the empire. This left a gap for a Greek Church between Roman Law and Greek Philosophy; but, as a Church, it was likely to be less intellectual and less well organised than the Roman, even if, as "Oriental," it was likely to be more spiritual and perhaps more spectacular.

It is almost impossible to over-emphasise the influence of Rome, as distinct from Italy, in all this; and it must be worth while trying to estimate the value of any geographical elements which may be behind that influence. Obviously, the road-system radiated Roman influence, whether of Republic or Empire or Church; and the Church inherited the momentum of the Empire, as the Empire had inherited that of the Republic. But what gave this influence to the Roman in the first instance?

We may venture the suggestion that, so far as geography was concerned, position was an active factor in it. When the "World" was so small that the Mediterranean might fairly be called its centre, the Midland Sea, it must have mattered that, in the centre of the populated part of the central peninsula in this central sea, there was a focus where Northerners coming by land down the Tiber valley and Southerners coming by sea up the Tiber waterway met naturally. Here the River-culture from the far south-east, transformed by the Hellenes into a Sea-culture, came up against racial elements from the north—Keltic, Teutonic, Slavic, represented later by Piedmont, Lombardy, Venetia—and was passed on by land to form the basis of an Ocean-culture in the far north-west. The outflow of this culture into western Europe was the sequel to the inflow of peoples from eastern Europe and western Asia.

But on the way this culture had received a Roman aspect that made it more suitable for the hardier peoples to whom it went. The Greeks had occupied not only

Magna Græcia, but all the "best" of the west coast of Italy; and just because Rome was less favoured in its natural advantages than, *e.g.* Cumæ, Capua,¹ or Neapolis, she had to make more effort. She stood, too, not inside the Greek sphere of influence, where she would inevitably have been Hellenised, but between the Etruscan and the Greek spheres, *i.e.* open to the stimulation of rival cultures and free from domination by either; and the lessons that she learnt from her two more civilised neighbours formed one of her great weapons.

She had a second, which was almost equally valuable. The hungry fighting men of the Seven Hills first conquered the farmers of the Broad Plain, who could supply them with food, and then used the man-power of the well-fed farmers against the more civilised peoples of Etruria and Campania. But the farmers were largely akin to the bandits; they were themselves stubborn, if less mobile, fighters—as "robust" as the oaks (*robur*) amongst which they lived; and they were of real use, when conquered, both as farmers and as fighters.

The result was fateful. For the Romans, unlike, *e.g.* the Carthaginians and the later Holy Roman Empire, realised the folly of treating these kinsmen, even when beaten, as inferiors; and out of this seems to have sprung their fixed habit of not treating the conquered with unpardonable insolence. It was the inability to understand and copy this attitude of mind that prevented the Holy Roman Empire—in all its phases, Papal or Reformation (Hapsburg) or Revolution (Hohenzollern)—from ever being either Roman or Imperial.

We have still to ask how far it is true that what Rome was to Italy, Italy has been to Europe; and to answer that question we must first ask what exactly Rome meant to, and did for, Italy. The Roman must have had abundance

¹ Capua was Etruscan, as the whole of Campania had been. Cf. p. 236.

of grit and gumption, and the farmer's patient waiting on nature may have shown itself in the caution which insisted, *e.g.* on being in control of the whole Apennine foreland before venturing into Cis-Alpine Gaul; but the mere fact that part of Italy could be called "Gaul" suggests that Roman progress could scarcely fail to be slow and difficult.

The name of Rome was certainly not, as has been asserted, from the Greek *Romē* ("Strength"), and probably not from *Sruma* ("River-Camp," a sort of "Dorchester"), but from *Groma* ("Cross-roads"), from the great crossing of roads where the earliest settlers lived—near what was afterwards the Forum. Here from the very first was the germ of that centralisation which has been at once the pride and the plague of the Romance nations; for such centralising machinery prepares the way for forms of representation, but ends usually by vitiating the essence of it. This is specially likely to occur where relief, climate, and other geographical factors tend to make an area rather incoherent, even when it is not very large.

REGIONAL CONTRASTS

In this case we have a major division into continental plain and mountainous peninsula, with essentially different climates; and in each case there is a marked variety of detail—of structure, relief, exposure to climate and to outside influences, etc. The northern plain is fenced by mountains which reach a summit of 15,000 feet, though the whole area is not 20,000 square miles; and the southern mountains are flanked by plain to east and to west. Variety of environment, of decentralising isolation, of external influence—French or Austrian, Semitic or Greek—is the rule.

This somewhat incoherent variety is what we expect to find in areas typically peninsular in form and in relief; and we are prepared to associate it with marginal and

terminal antagonisms (*cf.* the still independent San Marino) and with general disunity. But the natural isolation should favour a general tendency to unity against the outside world, as inbreeding should produce a marked type of a fair uniformity over the whole of the small area ; and there is a certain geographical unity. The northern plain has its fringe of coast as well as its flanking mountains, and the southern highlands have their flanking plains as well as their fringe of coast. Everywhere, so to speak, you are within easy reach of highlander and lowlander, seaman and landsman, farmer and—once—forester ; and even in the extreme south the climate allows you to think with a view to immediate action.

The terminal antagonisms tend to be partly racial and partly climatic in origin, while the marginal ones tend to be associated with the relief ; and the former are the more important in themselves and in view of the small population eastward of the Apennines. The 600 miles of latitude here mean a complete difference of climate, especially of mid-winter temperatures (Milan, Jan. mean = 32° F.) and seasonal rainfall ; and this must involve differences of products, which may be useful, but also of interests and habits, which may encourage misunderstanding and discontent.

On the varied economic base we expect to find at different times a similar variety of political superstructure in the form of numerous political units—Lombard, Venetian, Tuscan, Roman, with a diversity of type—monarchical, republican, clerical, even foreign. When a popular story of Boccaccio's has been " translated " into some *seven hundred* dialects, it is no wonder that the land was a Bourbon paradise, already so much divided that even a Bourbon could try to rule it. And much of the earliest tendency to this confusion was due to the peninsularity, as in Greece, leading to marginal settlement, which

exposed the coastal sites to piracy; and so the little pockets of population were hidden away in corners or high up on inaccessible crags.

Amongst the various units the Po plain has been the most significant next to Latium. It was the focus of the most important avenues of intrusion, and—once the forest was cleared, and some of the marsh was drained—an area of habitual colonisation; and the late start, due to the forest and marsh, was not wholly a drawback, and has been more than made good, especially since the development of the Alpine water-power. It had the inestimable blessing of freedom from the worst of the Bourbon poison, and it lacked the geographical facilities for local isolations that made a mosaic of southern Italy.

The basin is not only a clearly marked natural region but much the largest (15 p.c.) unit in Italy and still more significant in view of its population (40 p.c.); but it has been typically Italian in its historic lack of political unity. The population has always been distributed in rather disconnected longitudinal belts—a fairly dense and continuous belt on the high plain where the main Alpine valleys debouch, offering important trading centres,—a thin and discontinuous belt similarly related to the main Apennine valleys—and a dense and continuous belt on the arable lands along the Po, the towns related to river-crossings just above confluences. And, as agriculture is the dominant occupation everywhere except in the highly industrialised area of Lombardy, the population is distributed evenly.

But the rivers have always been a difficulty. As a number of parallel and transverse streams combine in the longitudinal Tiber, so they do in the Po; and they have been a serious obstacle to east-and-west movement in peace or war, as illustrated in the battles of Lodi (Adda), Novara and Magenta (Ticino), Solferino (Mincio), Arcole,

Castiglione, Castozza (Adige). Indeed, the plain has been meticulously divided into *twenty-seven* anthropogeographical districts based on "river compartments"! Further, the external influences have imposed cultural differences on this chaos; for Turin is French, and Milan is cosmopolitan, while Verona is at the exit from the Alps of the most easterly river that is at once perennial and deep and also associated with the easiest pass. The town is, therefore, essentially a frontier town—liable to be suspected of exposure to Teutonic influences.

The Po has made the position worse by the difficulty of navigation and the still greater difficulty of crossing it. It does receive enough water for some navigation at all seasons, for the Apennines send down extra supplies in spring and winter, and the Alps do the same in summer and autumn; boats drawing 6 feet can reach the Ticino confluence for about 150 days in the year. The gradient, too, is not steep. But the volume of "the whirling Po" under full flood is three or four times the mean, and bars are a perpetual nuisance; and the raising of the bed, which at Ferrara is *above* the level of the town, has kept the riverine lands in such a state of perpetual saturation that the river has formed a real divide between the north and the south of the plain. It is this saturation eastward that explains the westward location of the rice lands, with their annual production of some 450,000 tons of "Super-Carolina." Cf. p 59.

At the same time, there is much less difference between the Alpine and the Apennine sections of the plain than between the whole plain and peninsular Italy. Economic development has done much to obliterate political and ecclesiastical boundaries and barriers, and conscription and actual war have taught north and south to know something about each other and to unite against a common foe; but there are still divergent interests and cultural

contrasts, and the plain has been inclined to behave as if it was still Cis-Alpine Gaul. There is as much difference still between the north and the south as there is in Ireland, and it is rather of the same kind. The Piedmont (of Savoy) did begin the political regeneration and the economic revival that were so typical of the nineteenth century; but Milan or even Turin is more like Lyons or even Sheffield in some ways than like Naples, and the bounties that have made the northern industries prosperous have been partly at the expense of the south.

For the south is mainly rugged and mountainous, with chaotic relief, poor water-supply, and bad transport; it has only winter rains, and so is very malarial; and it has only Mediterranean products, which are exposed to the competition of happier lands, *e.g.* California for oranges. It is, therefore, as much depressed as it is overtaxed—not to mention the absence of French and Swiss stimulus to industries and the presence of Bourbon legacies, political, economic, and even sanitary.

With its fertility, its great water-power, its easy communications, its dense population, the north must be industrial; but for the same reasons it should bear the burdens of the south, and so keep the southerners from living in misery or having to emigrate. Immense strides have been made in the last eight years, *e.g.* in the reclamation of waste land, the abolition of malaria, the production of food crops, the development of hydro-electric power—for industries and transport; and there has been some slowing-down of the birthrate. But it seems improbable that agriculture can expand enough to feed the dense population, or industries enough to pay for the import of the necessary food; and there is no obvious objective for free emigration.

Hope lies with Dante's Tuscany, the one area which by position and character has most possibilities. For

Italy, like Scotland and unlike Ireland, has a real link between north and south in this land of old culture and pure speech. In the meantime, the Tuscan is the nearest approach to a typical Italian. Probably, the least typical Italian is the Roman, though almost the whole of Italian history has been linked with the one city; for always in the foreground, almost hiding the geographical background, is the great Roman administrator—or his works—the road-builder, the law-maker, the precept-monger.

That road-building law-maker served his day and generation—and ours—so well that he left behind him very few *suī generis*; but the unity of modern Italy and her recent problems have been associated directly with the two provinces of the Roman Empire which were in actual contact with Italy, the Gallic one, wholly Latinised, and the Pannonian, hardly Latinised at all. Indirectly, the unity was aided, in both material and non-material ways, by the reaction towards Italy along the roads that led to Rome through Latinised Gaul; and the dangers have come mainly through the un-Latinised Pannonia, as they were coming 1,500 years before Christ. Cf. p. 248.

Even a political map of a peninsula related to its continent by a great arc of young folded mountains suggests that political unity within it is almost inevitable in the long run; and Rome, with her roads, gave such unity early—only for it to be lost. It was again suggested by the Corsican, and again given by Savoy and Sardinia. Napoleon's suggestion of it almost seemed to be based on the close geographical relations—*viâ Elba*!—of Corsica and Tuscany; for, in trampling out minor jealousies, he included the whole Grand Duchy of Tuscany and both its flanks—from the Savoy buttress of Piedmont to the Latian extremity of the Patrimony—in the French Empire, thus cutting the Papal States in two. All the rest of the north and the eastern flank of the Umbrian Apennines

became the kingdom of *Italy*; and the remainder of the peninsula became the Kingdom of Naples, Sicily being separated from the old kingdom of "The Two Sicilies." Throughout his campaigns his methods were typically Roman, based on bridge and road.

ITALY AND EUROPE

That cult of bridge and road had, for 1,000 years and more, made Western Europe the pupil of Rome and then of Italy. Thus we had learned what they had to teach anew, or to pass on, by roads that ran through Florence and Genoa, Venice and Bologna, Milan and Turin; and, though the old fountain dried up, its inspiration lingered on. And so Western Europe, especially England, tried to pay a cultural debt with a political cheque. For Rome was dead. She had become so accustomed to thinking of herself as the centre of the world that she had become wholly self-centred, lacking chivalry and even sympathy, living in the past—even in her hobby of archæology, and yet letting memories die, *e.g.* of a "March of Verona," that had belonged to Germany, of its centre moving eastward till it became a "March of Treviso," of its merging in a Republic of Venice—only to become part of an Austrian Empire. She grudged the new help from the north-west, and glossed over the old dangers from the north-east—largely because the Church was really anti-Italian, specifically Austrian. The ideals and the patriotism of Mazzini and Garibaldi, the courage and the statecraft of Cavour and Victor Emanuel, were not Roman; all four were men from the northern mountains, Giuseppe Mazzini and Giuseppe Garibaldi also from beside the northern sea—in sight of Corsica.

But unity as a Power involved an army and a navy, and so such heavy taxes on the poverty-stricken farmers

that they emigrated in thousands ; and out of this sprang " the Mediterranean policy "—to keep Italians at or near home. But this meant trouble with France in the Mediterranean and with Austria beyond the Adriatic. Further, as the youngest, smallest, poorest, weakest of the Powers, and as greatly needing minerals and munitions, she was drawn naturally to Germany, just unified by the expansion of Prussia, and beginning to recall the Holy Roman Empire. But the great enemy of France was very anxious to have the Adriatic quite free from Slav domination, and so Italy could be useful to her ; and, as Germany and Austria came closer together, Italy could feel more safe on that vital north-eastern frontier, while she could not forget the French " theft " of her Savoy. Suddenly, however, Germany embarked on a Berlin-Belgrade-Baghdad railway *viâ* Turkey, and Italy became at once much less useful.

But, as a young nation with the memories of an old people, Italy was irked by her debt to the north-west, and preferred danger from the north-east to servitude, economic as well as political, to the north. Annunzio's hysterical outburst was Young Italy proclaiming—" We are not a museum, an hotel, a summer resort, an horizon painted in Prussian-blue for international honeymooners ! " And so, at her own time and on her own conditions, she chose war. Geographically, she had two problems, a relatively simple one in " the March of Treviso " and a very difficult one on the Slav margin.

The critical area of this Treviso March is a lowland (c. 100 × 40 miles), between the Venetian Alps and the Venetian Gulf, with the young folds rising from 4,000 to 7,000 feet and trenched by the valleys of the Tagliamento, Piave, Brenta, etc. These are all typical torrents,¹ mere trickles just after midwinter and just

¹ The Tagliamento can increase itself by 200 per cent. in two days.

before mid-summer, but wide and fierce in flood—needing the long bridges that these “Sons of Rome” can build so well—and fringed by deep marshes in their lower courses, *i.e.* south of the railway from Venice to Gorizia. The Piave, as having the largest basin, is the least torrential, but brings down enough silt to have kept its coastal strip free from lagoons; and the vital centre in the background is Trent. It is on the Adige, *i.e.* the large perennial artery (*cf.* p. 255), the valley of which gives access to and from the Brenner; but it has easy access also westward to the Mincio Valley (Lake Garda) and westward again to the Giudicaria valley, and eastward to the Brenta valley *viâ* the Val Sugana, by which the Levant traffic of Venice in the Middle Ages reached Trent.

If the geographical conditions have been most difficult in Friuli¹ because of the open “steppe” country, of the distance from Livy’s historic base at Padua, and of the absence of ice-fed and lake-regulated rivers, politico-strategic conditions have been most difficult at the exit of the Brenner route; and these may be related to the history and the distribution of the famous Quadrilateral fortresses. The general position where the great N.—S. Brenner route and the great E.—W. Semmering route meet, is marked by the most southerly reach of the Alps and by the last northerly bend of the Po; the Mincio and the Adige make moats to west and east, with “outworks” forward in the volcanic heights of the Euganean (1,900 feet) and Bernician (1,300) hills to the north-east and the Po-Adige swamps to the south-east.

Inside this frame the particular distribution reminds one of other,² less famous Quadrilaterals, two fortresses being on each river-moat. The “Queen” here, Verona,

¹ Aquileia was for long “the strongest fortress in the Roman Empire.”

² The Belgian—Namur, Liège (Maastricht), Louvain—relates the Sambre-Meuse gorge to the parallel route over the open plain from Ghent *viâ* Brussels to Aix; and the Bulgarian—Ruschuk, Silistria, Shumla, Varna

(where Odoacer was defeated by Theodoric), stands in a loop of the Adige at the actual mouth of the valley (11° E.), commanding the approach from the east just north of the Euganean hills; at Mantua, the home of Virgil, the Mincio forms crescent lakes round two islands; Peschiera is on another island where the Mincio leaves Lake Garda, itself a great protection; and Legnago, which commands the approach from the east just south of the Euganean Hills, stands where the Adige is flanked by marshes often 50 feet in depth, a greater protection than even Lake Garda.

THE SLAV MARGIN

The problem of the Slav margin was made very difficult not only by its political domination by Austria, but also by the full reactions of the position of Italy herself. For, as an Adriatic Power, she was involved directly with both Austria and Servia, and indirectly with both Germany and Russia; as a Mediterranean Power, she had to consult both France and Britain; as a North African Power, she was encroaching on Turkish and French spheres; later still, as a West Asiatic Power—through unwise expansion—she was interfering directly with the plans of Turkey and Germany; and, as a West European Power, she was again associated with at least Britain, France, and Germany.

The task here, then, was to balance geographical and ethnic against historic and purely strategic factors, so far as these two can be separated from their geographical background. There was an obvious defect in the Italian frontier. The Adige Basin, like the Ticino, was very largely Italian—in speech and “race,” in culture and industries; but, while the people in the Ticino Basin were —relates the Danube to the parallel route over the open plateau from Trajan’s Wall to Trajan’s Gate.

content to be Swiss, the mass of those in the Trentino were not content to be Austrian. The Peace Congress decided that the physical and strategic conditions here were more important than the "race" and speech of the population in the upper valley; but the best claim of Italy seemed not to be pressed at all—that she can assimilate aliens, which the Teuton cannot. But, while Austria had no real claim to any part of the Isonzo Basin, Italy had none eastward of that basin, *i.e.* east of the waterparting from the Julian Alps along the crest of the Karst to the south-east of Istria. She had no economic need for Trieste and no right whatever to monopolise the southward access of Central Europe to the Adriatic by holding Fiume. Yugoslavia greatly needed the outlet, and her possession of it would have prevented the Italian monopoly. The only excuse is that this has been the route of enemies into Italy for 3,000 years. Even so Ancient Rome placed her frontier at Cape Fianona! It is only fair to add that part of the difficulty was due to the fact that the whole Trentino-Dalmatian line had been Austrian, two problems being involved in the one frontier.

The Dalmatian problem in itself was quite distinct and different in most of its features, and had points of interest from almost every geographical standpoint. It was, of course, a naval problem; it involved the relations of coast and core, of land and sea; and one of its fundamental details has already come into our Balkan survey.

The prime fact in the relations of coast and core is the duality of relief and climate. A very highly articulated coast, with a purely marine and partly Mediterranean climate, is backed by a lofty core which is simply continental in both respects, and which is cut off from the coast by an exceedingly difficult scarp—that has to be negotiated by rack-and-pinion railway—and by a belt of wild Karst desert. Rome was 250 years in reducing the area

(Dinarica), and in the end had to take it in the rear by working round the two ends, while trying to keep a partial and precarious watch on the coast. When at last she succeeded, she placed her two most important naval stations in the Adriatic at Pola and Salonae (renamed Spalato after Diocletian had built his famous "palace" there), and chose four great emperors from the Illyrian hinterland—Diocletian and Aurelian, Constantine and Justinian.

Even now the only natural link between coast and core is economic—the exchange of grain and forest products (including pigs) for fruit and sea products; and this has not been strong enough historically to encourage any political cohesion. Indeed, the easy political links for the coast have been with Italy and with the Ionian islands.

For this coastland is 300 miles long, but only from one mile to ten miles wide; and it is in itself so incoherent in structure and relief that the Romans knew of 342 separate Dalmatian "clans." Some of the centres were immensely strong hill-top, water-side fortresses. Queen Teuta, whose piracies first provoked Roman interference in Dalmatia (230 B.C.), had her headquarters at Scodra (Skutari), a castle-hill 500 feet high, and her training ground for her fleet of one hundred "Liburnian" ships was Lake Skutari. When outflanked here, she found complete safety in the "Three Straits" ¹ Bocche di Cattaro. Ragusa (1,140 feet), though voluntarily putting itself under the protection of Venice, required a terrible earthquake (A.D. 1667) to shake its power; and it was a place of great culture, with a Children's Hospital, even in the days of Richard the Lion-Hearted.

But such an area could have no united history or uniform culture of its own or even political cohesion, for the pirates—as mercenaries—might be fighting on opposite sides. It could borrow no culture from the interior, if

¹ The straits are respectively 1 mile, $\frac{1}{2}$ mile, and $\frac{1}{4}$ mile wide

accessible, for there was none there ; it could only borrow by sea—a *lingua franca* from Venice and a culture from Ravenna—and that sea was the Sea of Adria (now 14 miles from the coast !) or the Gulf of Venice. These are not Teutonic names, nor yet Slav, except so far as the Venetians were originally Wends.

There was no difficulty about the borrowing, for the insistence on the Slavs here having “ become natural seamen ” is far from the mark. The mass of the early inhabitants were Phœnicians and Greeks, and that blend has been the basis of the population ever since ; but, no doubt, any Slavs who were tempted down from the hinterland—no one was tempted up !—were made into fair seamen. In fact, the wonderful coast was a perfect nursery for seamen, and almost made a unit as a base for a single Sea Power. Queen Teuta remained unconquered ; Liburnian ships decided the battle of Actium ; the Uskob corsairs of Zengg were the terror of half the Mediterranean seaboard in the sixteenth century. In each case they would have been still more formidable if only they had had—what they lacked—a hinterland capable of supplying both food and man-power.

This Pirate coast, with its coves and caves, its watch-towered cliffs, its hill-top fortresses, its complete command of the narrow Adriatic for fully 300 miles, ends at the mouth of the Drin (or Boyana), *i.e.* practically at Scutari. There the N.W.–S.E. concordant coast gives way to 100 miles of N.–S. coast that is really transverse to the lower Drin Valley (*cf.* p. 196), and is marked by typical lagoons and mud-flats.

The west coast is divided in exactly the same way and in exactly the same proportions, but with three important differences of detail. The 100 miles of N.–S. coast between the mouths of the Piave and the Rubicon, though a series of mud-flats and lagoons, are transverse to an open plain,

not to a cramped defile ; and the N.W.-S.E. concordant coast, though most of its hinterland is very narrow and very difficult, has not a single natural harbour along its whole length. The fine old harbour of Ravenna, which once served the northern end of this, is now half a dozen miles inland, and survives only as part of the moat of marsh which defended the harbour so safely on the landward side. Above all, the arrangement of the transverse and the concordant is exactly opposite to that on the east coast, for the transverse is to the north ; and this means that on the west side surface rivers fill the northern waters with silt, while on the east the Karst rivers flow largely underground, and carry no silt—one reason for the fine growth of sponges off the Dalmatian coast.

That is the geographical setting of our problem ; and it suggests that, as we tried to see Greek problems as *Ægean*, here we ought to try to see Italian problems as *Adriatic*. But, while admitting that the Italians have been sufficiently maritime to settle round a sea (*cf.* p. 201) or round a peninsula, we must inquire carefully whether they have any more claim to the hinterland *all* round the Adriatic than the Greeks had to that all round *Ægean*. We may even add that, ideally—if the ideal can penetrate Political Geography—such a sea should “belong” by preference to a Power too weak at sea to be able to make the particular sea a private lake.

If the aborigines of Dalmatia were Aryan-tongued “Illyrians,” they were certainly dominated by the Phœnicians and the Greeks, who were respectively, or perhaps alternatively, traders and pirates ; and they were reinforced by “Venetian” Gauls when Rome began her long crusade against piracy in general and the Dalmatian pirates in particular. After the fall of the Western Empire Byzantium claimed the sovereignty of the area, and actually did exercise some authority *viâ* Ravenna

while Venice occupied the western islands. Croats had invaded it in the seventh century, and in the eleventh it became temporarily a Croat kingdom; but Hungary conquered most of it about 1100, and then Hungary and Venice fought over it for 400 years—till the Turks baffled both of them (1669). When the Turks failed in 1718, Venice took possession of the whole, but lost it to Austria in 1797 by the Peace of Campo Formio; and a few years later Napoleon again adopted an old Roman line of action, and incorporated it in Illyria.

For historic reasons, then, as well as economic, the Italian language was dominant in 1914, at all events in all the towns of Dalmatia; but the non-Italian population, though greatly indebted to Italy in many ways, was fully a dozen times as large as the Italian, and was acutely conscious of its Slavdom. In these days, too, a dozen cannot be sacrificed to one, even if they are much less cultured; and the alleged ineffectiveness of Slavs in Dalmatia was due largely to the Teutonic "railway policy" (*cf.* p. 197). Even from the utilitarian standpoint there was nothing for Italy to fear from a people only one-third of their numbers and notoriously non-maritime, and Serbia had officially accepted Italy's hegemony of the Adriatic. If coast and core had been united, more trade would have come to the coast—to the great advantage of Italy; and it would have been a further advantage to her to have had these Slavs entirely friendly and even grateful. This optimism was blocked by the Italian refugees from Dalmatia, who had been for years deliberately encouraged in criminal hostility to their Slav fellow-subjects by the Austrian Government.

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Unfortunately, there was a very serious—and purely geographical—naval problem, about which the War had left no room for doubt. For, though both Brindisi and

Venice were nominally naval stations, and were used as such, they were proved to have little strategic value for the defence of the Italian Adriatic; they are 400 miles apart, and neither is central with regard to either Italy or the Adriatic. Any Dalmatian harbour from Zara to Spalato was central from both points of view, and could be made an effective naval station by Austria; and the distance from Zara to Ancona is well under 100 miles, and even that from Ragusa to the Gargano promontory is not much over 100, *i.e.* only a quarter of the distance from Brindisi to Venicê.

But a base which has little strategic value, may have considerable tactical value. Here, however, this is not the case; for neither port has more than one main entrance, so that a fleet *must* come out always on one and the same line, and neither has a peripheral relief which can hide the harbour itself, or can give a wide prospect seaward. Even if both of them had several fairways and a bulwark of hills and islands, neither of them is large enough to accommodate the whole Italian fleet; and so that fleet in the Adriatic had to be divided, and the two divisions had to be 400 miles apart, while the enemy's fleet could all be concentrated at one central point within 100 miles of the Italian coast.

This immense asset to the eastern coast is due to the wonderful series of L and T gulfs with their "skerry-guard"; but while the coast makes a single unit longitudinally, it makes a double one latitudinally, the Quarnero-Spalato (Split) section being morphologically very much more important than the Brazza-Cattaro section. For south of the Zara-Split peninsula, behind which the Dinaric folds are concave to the sea, they become convex to it, swinging eastwards towards Shlieb as the northern wall of the Albanian Gap. This means that the whole system tends to a more W.-E. lie, and that there is more strain on the

outer folds. With approach to the total submersion of the folds, the proportion of the upfolds left above sea-level steadily decreases, while the size of the flooded area and the depth of the water steadily increase. This ruins the tactical value of this southern section. For the islands are fewer and farther apart; they tend to lie W.-E., not N.-S., and so do not overlap; and, as they are no longer in several parallel lines, they have little protection from either observation or storms from the open sea, while the wide straits between them allow free observation from seaward of any N.-S. movements in the inner waters.

In almost every particular this complex of disadvantages is contradicted in the north. There the islands are very numerous and in several parallel lines; they systematically overlap, and are separated by very narrow¹ straits; and, quite apart from famous harbours such as those of Split and Sebenico, there are literally scores of bays where a large fleet can anchor safe from weather and from observation, or where docks and depots are equally safe, and from which the fleet can find a "secret" exit at any desired point in a front of fully 150 miles.

If we relate these conditions to the currents and tides of the sea and to the transverse coast of the Po Basin, the position is seen to be still more difficult.

In many attacks from the east soon after dawn the Italians had to face the level sunrise, and themselves made a well-lit objective, while the Austrians were still in deep shadow. Then, the Bora, which is often very strong in winter, leaves the waters immediately in the lee of the eastern scarp unruffled, while it churns up those to the west, where the depth is never more than 20 fathoms. At the same time it drives the mud from all the Venetian torrents southwards along the Italian coast, thus making

¹ The narrowness at Cape Fianona probably influenced the Romans in their choice (*cf.* p. 262) of it as a frontier.

the detection of mines, whether anchored or floating, almost impossible; and the laying of mines gave no trouble to the Austrians. For both the tide and the prevailing currents work up the east coast, then westward—till the tide may be crushed up to a height of 3 feet against the Po delta—and then southward; and they carried the mines automatically with them! On the contrary, in the eastern waters, with their typical Mediterranean transparency, anchored mines were easily detected, while floating mines could be allowed to move on to the Italian coast.

It remains to glance at the most important of the larger islands. From the time when oars went out of use, until that when steam came in, Lissa—which we took possession of in 1808—was, in Nelson's judgment, the key to the inner Adriatic (Valona being the key to the outer); but, of course, to-day it could not be kept in touch with Pola or Venice past this northern section of Dalmatia, or perhaps even with Brindisi through the Gargano-Ragusa Narrows and past Cattaro.

Some parts or points of Dalmatia, then, seem to be necessary in the meantime for the safety of Italy from mines and submarines, aeroplanes and cruisers; and the Rapallo Treaty rightly gave her Cherso and Lussin (but not Veglia and Pago), Zara—to control the Ancona-Zara Narrows, and Lagosta and Pelagosa ("Open-Sea Island")—to control the Gargano-Ragusa Narrows. She had no right to any area north-east of Monte Maggiore, especially against a purely land people such as the Yugoslavs; but, obviously, the Dalmatian problem was very difficult, and one which no conceivable ingenuity—political, historic, or racial—can divorce from its legitimate geographical base.

CHAPTER IX

THE DEVOLUTION OF ROME

PIRATES AND PARTITION

DALMATIA was not the only Pirate Coast which troubled Rome. The great sea-lanes of her western trade ran between the Alpine coast of Liguria and the Balearic-Corsica chain or between the Atlas coast of Barbary and the Balearic-Sardinia chain. In the same way her eastern trade had to run the gauntlet of the Taurus coast of Cilicia (Trachæa, "The Rugged") and the Lebanon coast of Phœnicia.

From these mountain coasts, poor in everything except shipbuilding timber, hungry seamen preyed on neighbouring food-producing plains and on passing vessels. Even the Greeks and the Tuscans had scarcely distinguished between trade and piracy; this, too, remained the normal attitude of Mediterranean seamen for centuries; and the configuration of the sea was very favourable to their operations, especially round the two great foci of the Sicilian and the Cretan Narrows. Indeed, the pirates called the latter "the Golden Sea"; it is a very lonely stretch of water, and yet was fairly near slave-markets where captured crews could be profitably sold.

It had a further great advantage over the Sicilian focus in being free from dangerous rapids or whirlpools such as those of Scylla ("The Render") and Charybdis (? "The Toothed"), which are far from being "the

credulous creations of superstition." The narrowness of the Messina Strait (with a minimum of *c.* $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles),—the presence, at the narrower northern end, of a submarine ridge, rising about 400 feet above the surrounding sea-floor and reaching to within about 400 feet of the surface,—the pace of the tidal current, which may approach 12 miles an hour,—its great variations in pace (from under 3 miles to over 11), and its 6-hour changes, all combine to make navigation really dangerous even in fine weather for small sailing vessels.

Charybdis, off Messina, is the worst of the whirlpools, because the long granite "tooth" which protects the harbour on the south and the east, and which gave the town its older name of Zangle, "The Sickie," adds a further and abrupt obstruction in the rapidly narrowing strait. The gneiss rock of Scylla scarcely deserves, however, to stand next to the Charybdis whirlpool in evil reputation, because the real trouble here is due to the Faro rapids, which have often torn small vessels from their anchorage, and driven them across the strait on to Scylla before they could be brought under control.

Maximum danger, then, is along the north-west strip of coast, off and between Messina and Faro; and the reason is obvious. For the strait not only narrows (from *c.* 12 miles) northwards, but also is seriously exposed to wind only from the south-east; and when a strong south-east wind blows up the funnel during a spring tide, even the (small) coasting steamers may be in trouble.

These details seem to justify the choice of a route which was also notoriously unsafe, but only from understandable causes; and the choice implies that the main cause of the piracy was poverty and not ferocity. Certainly there was little or none of the cruelty and bestiality that defiled medieval piracy, though the Vandals presented us with the word "Vandalism."

The pirates were willing to work or to fight, especially the Balearic ("Slingers") slingers and the Cretan archers. When any sea was strongly held, by Rhodes or Crete, Athens or Rome, potential pirates served as mercenaries, military or mercantile; when there was no such strong control, they became free-lance buccaneers, such as those who provoked for the Romans from Queen Teuta excuses almost worthy of Queen Elizabeth herself.

Even in the days of the Republic sea trade was more or less a new departure; it was in no sense inter-national, and—except for slaves and timber.(for Egypt)—was confined to business of small bulk. Nowhere was trade, by land or by sea, the main activity; and when it was first firmly established—by the Phœnicians, it was based on their own home industries (textiles, glass, metal), for which they had generally to import the raw materials. This, no doubt, drew their attention to the value of "Factories" at foci that were important from the navigating or the marketing point of view; and when the Greeks ousted the Phœnicians, the old Phœnician factories in the west, especially those of Gades and Carthage, remained in the hands of their Phœnician colonists.

The Greeks were in much the same position, and copied the Phœnicians in many ways, *e.g.* the founding of factories; but these were generally along the northern, not the southern, coast of the "Mediterranean," *e.g.* in the Black Sea. Athens was almost as dependent on imported wheat as London is to-day, and even Rome was going to have a very similar problem; and the fate of the empire was going to depend largely on the way in which she grappled with the problem.

The Phœnicians, directly and indirectly, and the Greeks, then, had more or less prepared the way for the Romans as a Land Power complementary of their Sea Power; and along both the north and the south of the

Great Sea they had left her all the necessities for commerce, including these old-established trading-posts. But the Romans had little commercial instinct ; and, though Rome became forced to import huge quantities of food and other necessities, she had nothing to export in exchange, and never became a great commercial centre. At the same time in almost all parts of the Mediterranean there were numbers of these trained seamen, able and willing to carry on the old trade in the old way, even continuing to call the Pole star by the title of " the Phœnician Star."

The one contribution which Rome made to commerce, as we have seen, was in the form of good and safe roads ; but, as long as they remained Roman, these roads were more or less specialised, if not actually reserved, for military use. Rome had somewhat the same attitude even to rivers, at least rivers on or near frontiers ; they had fleets on them, but only in the shape of flotillas, *e.g.* on the Save (with an admiral's command centred at Mitrovitsa). This not only tended to throw a great proportion of normal trade on to the sea routes, especially the Mediterranean ; but also, in doing that, it gave the Vandals an opportunity of striking a fatal blow at Rome, suggested perhaps by their traditional memories of her own practice on the Danube.

Of course, the Romans were facing the difficulty so often referred to above, that, while there was not much in southern Europe to tempt people from the distant south-east, there was a good deal to tempt them from the near north-east ; the maximum attraction was felt just in the direction from which there was otherwise maximum danger. Of course, the Romans never thought " in continents "—even if Asia or Africa had been, to them, the name of a continent, nor even as the Greeks thought of Barbarians and the Jews of Gentiles. This may be counted to them now for righteousness morally and

geographically, but it was not an unmixed advantage at the time.

For the Roman power was *Urbis et Orbis*, the power of the City and of her Circuit of Lands (round the Mediterranean). The great roads made it possible to extend this *Orbis Terrarum* from Antonine's Wall to Armenia, but the distances were too great both in space and in time. The very excellence of the roads and the little traffic on them tempted the emperors to travel too far along them, with a consequent prolonged absence from Rome. The senate became "a venerable but useless monument of antiquity"; the emperors forgot the origin and the nature of their legal powers; and the Bishop of Rome had great opportunities for making himself, with Teutonic support, Burgomaster as well as Bishop. Cf. p. 249.

And meantime the seaways were more or less ignored, or grossly undervalued. There had always been trouble from pirates, and from time to time Rome had roused herself to deal with them; she had commissioned Pompey to sweep the western basin of the Mediterranean clear of them, and he had done so. The trouble had recurred, and would always be apt to do so; but the Mediterranean was *all* Roman, and the pirates were a costly nuisance rather than a deadly danger.

But, when the Barbarians invaded the empire *viâ* western Europe, and retained the ecclesiastical officers while removing the political, a further complication was introduced. The Barbarians were everywhere relatively few amongst the old subjects of Rome, and it was easy for Roman culture and organisation to be perpetuated inside *natural* units and under the ecclesiastical supervision; but the political danger led to various changes of capital, especially after A.D. 300, and these changes contained the germ of disintegration, even inside the natural unit of the Mediterranean basin.

Though it was not easy for a non-maritime people to realise the truth, Rome should, at all costs, have been retained as the capital, for the greatest danger of all was likely to come from the Barbary coast in the form of Vandal piracy ; and, as Gaiseric (Genseric) was the only one of the Teutonic invaders of the empire to build a pirate fleet, it is worth noting two phases in the earlier history of his people.

In the early days (c. 410 A.D.), during the Vandal invasion of Iberia, one branch of the invaders worked along the Cantabrians into Galicia, “that Land of Rias.” When they were eventually driven southward by the Goths into Vandalusia, they intermarried there with the remnants of the *Turan* Alans ; and then the Eurasian blend migrated bodily (80,000 strong) into North Africa, where the Barbary coast completed their conversion into pirates, with a wide field for the gratification of Turan instincts, nomadic and otherwise. Under Gaiseric they not only sacked Rome (carrying off the sacred vessels which Titus had brought from the Temple in Jerusalem), but seized the Balearic islands ; and then, with Port Mahon as a magnificent G.H.Q., they cut the sea-lanes of the empire, as their friends were cutting the great roads.

A century later Justinian avenged this by utterly destroying the Vandal kingdom in Africa ; but that only facilitated the progress of the Saracens westward, without repairing the harm done to the empire by the severing, even temporarily, of the seaways. Indeed, this was probably—from the purely geographical standpoint—the heaviest single blow that the empire suffered, for the seaways were at once the really economic routes of the empire, the great food-routes, and much the strongest ties between the extreme east and the extreme west of the empire as framing the Great Sea.

This severance was bound to be felt most where there

was the most natural division of the sea. Such a line was always likely to be a north-and-south line,—to have its southern end where North Africa was divided into two inhabited belts by an intervening blank, where the stark Sahara reached the actual coast,—and to have its northern end at the southern extremity of Latin Dalmatia, where in later centuries the Greek and the Roman Churches met against a tongue of Islam. The distance between these two ends is the longest due north-and-south line that can be drawn across the Mediterranean, and most of it runs through an islandless sea. Along this harbourless line over the lonely leagues of the Golden Sea, as a natural divide, the great Land Empire split. *Cf.* p. 271.

But, though this was essentially a Land Empire, its northern frontier at the time of the Barbarian inroads was nominally a water line—from fully 40° E. to nearly 10° W.—The Pontus, Danube, Rhine, North Sea, Atlantic ; and its European front southwards was definitely maritime, with its actual centre in the Adriatic on the meridian of Zara. West of this line, within obviously natural boundaries, insular and peninsular, four Nation-States sprang up—Italian, “ Iberian,” French and English.

They were all Latinised in various degrees, the southern peninsula most and the northern island least, while France was intermediate in all senses ; but all inherited from Rome enough of her special gifts to be able in their different ways to carry on her work and in some ways to extend it and improve on it. Probably, France could have done most for the world ; but the eradicable “ homing ” instinct was adverse to emigration, and she seldom had even enough farmers to make her fertile land quite self-sufficing. The Iberian nations were at the other extreme, stripping themselves of man-power, and creating “ nations ” thereby beyond the seas ; but Portugal was too weak and too small to do much, though the economic base of what

she did made her a good pioneer, instructing and elevating, amongst very backward peoples.

Spain was in a difficult position. She was the first of our units to learn the Roman lessons, as also the first—outside Italy—to imbibe the Renaissance; and, as we have seen, she became too Roman, trying to behave as a maritime Rome with a fanatic's mission. She was exclusive, not catholic; she had been exploited for gold and silver, and she hated pirates of all sorts; and her love of the gospel was apt to be a loathing of heretics. So she was always fighting near home with heretics and pirates—English and Dutch and Turks, English and Germans and Flemings; and in the New World, though she did create nations, the gospel gave place to glory and to gold.

England, perhaps, came nearest to Rome in her story, at least to early Rome, with seaways for roads. What she did was the result of the general qualities of a people, curiously devoid of any particular ambitions of individuals; her army was never really adequate to protect her far-flung frontier, still less was it used with preconceived designs. Like early Rome, she expanded reluctantly and almost on compulsion; and, unlike Spain, she was almost never steadily intolerant. *Cf.* p. 104.

Beyond the Rhine, with no natural boundaries east or west, with no real Latin tradition, with no direct maritime connexion, a fifth unit sprang up in Germany. She was brought into the Latin circle by Papal, not by Imperial, Rome; and no doubt, in defending herself from militant Asiatics, she automatically defended the whole Latin circle. But the difference between the one and the rest was the difference between core and circumference, continental and coastal; and it was the articulation that was vital.

For with them Rome had in each case a comprehensible area to deal with, clearly defined and fairly compact. She

set herself to conquer it, conquered it thoroughly, and then organised it thoroughly—with roads that led to Rome as well as from Rome, and could carry foes as well as friends. Eventually, in each of these natural areas a strong nation sprang up, able to throw off the Roman yoke and to curb the steppe and the desert hordes, but willing to accept Roman Christianity and so to continue much of the work and the influence of the Eternal City. Thus Rome devolved.

It is obvious, then, that the rise of the free cities, bishoprics, etc. (p. 34), in the Middle Rhine basin between the Roman and the non-Roman spheres was the result—not, as Germans argue, the cause—of the incoherence of the whole basin from north to south, and of its buffer position between east and west.

In the south-east geographical conditions were far less favourable; there were no natural divisions, no thorough conquest by Rome, no national fruit from efficient pruning. The Turk was able to overwhelm the whole area, bring in a patriarchal Asiatic tyranny, and finally—in the Great War—share in the attempt to push such tyranny into the nation States of the Western Empire. The attempt was bound to fail sooner or later, for it was an attempt to impose the continental and the Asiatic on the peninsular and the European; and you cannot do that any more successfully than you can do the reverse. In this case, however, the initial impulse was not consciously Asiatic, but the fatal resurrection of the dead Imperial dream; and it failed sooner and not later, because the methods used were not Roman, still less Holy, but those of an ante-diluvian Tatarism.

If one may use French, of all languages, in this delicate connexion :

Ce moyen, c'est l'homme même.

CHAPTER X

A POLITICAL MAP OF EUROPE

(A.D. 1648)

SHAPES AND SIZES

ANY analysis of a political map of Europe in 1648 must be largely in terms of Historical Geography, with stress on the geographical rather than the historic, because our precise need is to recognise the geographical features and factors behind the political or historic "record"—with a view to interpreting them. Such a book as Freeman's "Historical Geography," like all Historical Atlases which give no physical features, is simply a record; and, as such, it has—from the narrowest geographical standpoint—not very much more value than a record of what Queen Elizabeth had for breakfast on January 16th some 300 years ago, or what Princess Elizabeth had this morning.

Our present analysis is of Europe as a whole, as a peninsula of Asia, rather than as a group of subordinate peninsulas; and we must not confine our attention merely to the obviously peninsular parts. We want to analyse the general influence exercised on Man in Europe, especially *outside* the subordinate peninsulas already discussed in detail, by the significant geographical phenomena of his environment; and these, *e.g.* climate, the distribution of steppe, the easy access from Asia, etc., are not local, even if his response and his reaction differ from region to region.

But the moment that we begin to analyse Europe as a whole, as a single and distinct peninsula of Asia, we ought to pay special attention to that axial wing of the parent continent which now makes the core of our sub-continent, and therefore occupies a position of exceptional opportunities and responsibilities (*cf.* pp. 19, 20 and 21). The most important single factor affecting the possibility of any easy or early evolution of such a desirable political unit as the United States of Europe was bound to be the character of this core—both in its physique and in its human note.

As to the physical conditions, they have been on the whole very favourable to easy intercourse between the core and all its flanks. Westward and eastward you can travel by train from the Atlantic to the Ural river without going through a single tunnel or ever being 600 feet above sea-level. The age and the importance of the Amber Routes (*cf.* p. 151) are equally significant as to ease of movement between the Baltic and the Mediterranean. When they were diverted from sea to land, *c.* 1800 B.C., the main channel for 1,000 years ran through this core by the Elbe-Moldau-Inn-Adige route, even if the trade—both in the amber and in the great exchange product, Bohemian bronze—was done by water in the north, and probably done by the “Angles,” *i.e.* the people who lived in “Angeln”; and the first supplementary route, by the Oder and the March (*c.* 1000 B.C.), was still a core route. The Alpine system, too, is not of sierra type; and, in a “peak-and-pass” sky-line, the pass *ipso facto* strikes a human note at once—and therefore should have far more interest for, and attention from, geographers than any peak. The whole story of “The Treachery of the Alps” depends directly on this “peak-and-pass” sky-line.

Nothing, then, in the physical setting of this core was really adverse; but we cannot deduce this from a political

map—except so far as adverse conditions might depend on latitude ; and even on the best physical map we have to impose the human note.

But, while the real value of the political or historic map depends on its relation to the geographical map behind it, and so it has little or no value until it is interpreted geographically, even a political map has geographical value if regarded from a geographical standpoint ; for it shows us at least the shape, the size, the space-relations of political units. Thus, from any political map, it is obvious that fully half of Europe is unlike, and barely half is like, the parent continent. The obvious divide is the Baltic-Black Sea isthmus ; or—if we are emphasising the ease with which the really peninsular parts can be reached, and linked together, by sea—we may draw another line. It, too, is a transverse, cross-grain line, roughly parallel with the isthmian line, but running—as the arc of a circle with its centre in the Ural-Caspian Gap—from the north-west corner of the Bothnian Gulf (touching Luleå and Umeå, Upsala and Stockholm) to the north-east corner of the Ægean Sea ; and it seems to differentiate more accurately than the isthmian line, though that has obvious merits in its shortness and its clearness.

We must, of course, make due allowance for differences of racial aptitude and administrative values, *e.g.* German, Austrian, Russian, in Little Poland, Congress Poland, Great Poland ; but it gives us some confidence in our line to find that it puts western Poland on the peninsular or “ European ” side of the divide, and eastern Poland on the continental or “ Asiatic ” side. In the west of Poland, the yield (in bushels per acre) of wheat is very nearly double (100 *v.* 52), and the yield of barley more than double (100 *v.* 40), that in the east ; and the consumption of both sugar and clothing (cotton and woollen) in the west is more than three times that in the east (100 *v.* 30).

Historically, the peninsular unity¹ of the ocean half has been cemented by a common Christianity, distributed mainly from Rome, while the continental unity of the landward half has been cemented by a common Christianity, distributed mainly from Byzantium; and Roman Christianity has been as much identified with Africa and the western basin of the Mediterranean, as Greek Christianity has been with Asia and the eastern basin. But the Roman Church seems never to have been quite "happy" where Rome had no hold as republic or empire; and there was once a clear hiatus—or the legacy of one—between the Roman and the Greek spheres of influence in Central Europe. *Cf.* p. 103.

This debateable country may be marked off eastward by our differentiating transverse line, and westward by a line drawn where the influence of the Atlantic becomes too weak to keep the January temperature above 32° F. This frost line can be roughly represented by concrete features in the Rhine–Danube frontier of the Roman Empire, as an empire based on mild Mediterranean winters, or, still more accurately, by the westward limit of the Bavarian conifer forest between Frankfort and Ratisbon, which was the real boundary.

Central Europe, as thus defined, was never under Republican or Imperial Rome, nor under the Greek Church, nor yet under the Roman Church until Christianity had lost its early vigour and purity; and so it was for centuries far behind Western Europe in culture and civilisation, even when it was masquerading as a Holy Roman Empire. Moreover, the great superiority of Western Europe was due more to the fact that there Nation-States developed, than to the fact that it became the special sphere of the Roman Church.

¹ The word "unity" can be used here literally only of the geographical aspect, and must be interpreted loosely of the religious aspect even down to the end of the Crusades.

In 1648 three of the largest States in Europe are seen spanning the continent from north to south actually along our Bothnian-Ægean line. But in the west France is also spanning Europe from north to south, with a monopoly of opportunities which in the east are shared by Sweden, Poland, and Turkey, and which depended on structure and relief, location and climate, as well as on the monopoly. A brief survey of the three Isthmian Powers will throw light on this.

In the case of Sweden we must be careful not to over-emphasise the apparent size. A very large proportion of the area was forested, much was very far from being fertile, and the whole was well within our frost line. The population could not be dense ; and forests and coasts frozen in winter were bound to limit mobility as well as man-power. Even so, the naturally small population had been decimated in the Thirty Years' War. If any one thing could be certain, then, it surely was that, even if the Baltic was frozen completely over, and Gustavus Adolphus could march his armies across it on foot, such a country should not be trying to hold widely-spread lands, especially over-seas, and least of all inside the natural frontier of the Holy Roman Empire, where she could not avoid provoking another Protestant Power, Prussia.

The piece of the map allotted to Poland only represents so many square miles cut out of the major natural region of the European plain ; it is not really a separate region, scarcely even a minor one, and it has no geographical features to mark it off as a natural political unit. It has, however, two geographical advantages ; it includes no relief features which might lead to disunion or disintegration, though forest and marsh might be troublesome ; and it does include the whole basin of the Vistula. Moreover, in and round that basin there had developed a combination of racial and religious unity. Poland, though

Slav, was not Greek in creed ; she was the eastward vanguard of Rome.

The Turk, of course, was purely Asiatic, alien in race and creed and culture, like the Moor ; but, as a natural product of Asia, he had a perfect right in an Asiatic peninsula. Only he might be uncomfortable, especially as he is obviously—for a purely continental type—the wrong side of our differentiating line ; and he is there only because Eastern Europe had been swept into weakness by plague in the fifteenth century, and made still more impotent by political and other jealousies. To the north of his realm, where he was farthest from his real base in Asia Minor, we find three territories—Wallachia, Moldavia, Transylvania—which are Christian ; and we may comfort ourselves—prematurely, as things actually went—by the inference that his position, both internally and externally, must be precarious.

When we look at the centre of the map, we see no evidence of the existence of such a vital geographical entity as the Alpine system. Almost equally startling is the kaleidoscopic chaos of political colouring, though much of it could be related to variety of structure and relief. It is obvious that both the North Central and the South Central “ units ” are incoherent in both physical base and political superstructure ; both, too, are transitional, neither freely maritime and Western nor frankly continental and Eastern. We infer that both must be unstable “ Geographical Expressions ”—between France spanning Europe, at its narrowest, from north to south as a single unit in the west, and the Isthmian States doing the same as three units to the east, but with Russia as another single unit beyond them, still spanning the continent—from north to south—at its widest, and where least “ European.”

Obviously, the terminal peninsula of France can only expand by land, *i.e.* eastward, and expansion eastward

should be easy over the great plain and into political incoherence ; and the Isthmian States should find expansion westward equally easy for the same reasons. Certainly, they should find that much easier than expansion eastward against the vast single unit of Russia, largely protected by forest and swamp and by the possession of inexhaustible resources of man-power.

As we have already spent a great deal of time on the southern area, we may now confine our attention to the northern, *i.e.* what most German geographers like to call Central Europe, which is roughly the old Holy Roman Empire. But simply calling the area Central Europe does not make it a natural unit physically or politically. It never was a single natural region, it had no unity of relief or climate, of race or economic interest ; and for that reason any political unity which it might achieve, was likely to be artificial and unstable. At the same time, one strong, large province of it might be able, as Prussia proved, to force political unity on the whole.

The area is one of unusual interest. While fairly central in Europe, it includes the terminus of the great steppes of Asia ; but this is still girdled, as it once was covered, by forest. Where this tongue of old forest has died out—really, dried out—there we have two interesting contrasts repeated (*cf.* p. 184). The one is between the two associations of the short-lived grass and the many-wintered forest-tree, and the other is between the difficult movement in forest and the easy movement over steppe. There has been for centuries a continual ooze of population into or out of the forest ; and there have been floods of population over the steppe from time to time. Indeed, it was the miraculous mobility of the steppe that first gave rise to the absurd delusion that poor pastoral land could ever support a dense population capable of sending out “ ceaseless thousands of raiders to flood the plains of Europe.”

This was quite impossible. But no forester believed that a body of fighting men could move 100 miles in one day, and so they assumed that, if two villages 100 miles apart were burnt on two successive days, it must have been the work of two separate bodies of raiders.

Centrality here, then, involved the area in a great mixture of race, owing to slow infiltration of forest types on three sides; but on the fourth side there was one dominant type owing to floods of steppe raiders. The foresters would have a particularist background and an economic base, and the raiders would have a patriarchal background and a military base. But, when we investigate the distance which this tongue of steppe runs westward, we find that it runs right across the heart of the Prussian plain up to the Lüneburg Heath; and this is not a late phenomenon. All pre-historic settlements, except along the coast, have been proved to be associated with steppe flora; and this means that the basal and primitive type of man here was Asiatic, and would be true to the type of the parent continent, which has always stood for the group, while its European peninsula has stood for the individual.

But, besides this northern plain, with its uniformity, its barren sands and heaths, its patches of forest and marsh, there is a parallel belt of southern plateau, an old block as rich in metals as it is poor in soil, and broken into sections by deep, fertile, sheltered valleys. It is set in a frame of slightly younger rocks, which are rich in fuel and in salt; and where this frame touched the older rocks, its softer strata were worn away, by the carbonated water off the impervious blocks, into depressions which made natural lines of movement. Here were the opportunities and the temptations—fuel, facilities for transport, metal, salt. The vital controls here, then, were going to be physical history and prehistoric climate, with their legacies of

mineral wealth and plant association ; and the character of the human note was going to vary with the human type.

On the plateau steppe pure Alpines were attracted by, and made a wonderful use of, the metallic wealth ; in the early Middle Ages, this South Germany was famous throughout Christendom for its beautiful metal work, *e.g.* bronze gates, as it became famous last century for its surgical, mathematical, and musical instruments. On the lowland steppe "the Arch-Grand Sandbox" of the Brandenburg Mark—as a Frederick of Hohenzollern described it to the Emperor *before* offering to buy it—left on the Tatarised Prussian only the conviction that an exposed March must be scientifically defended, and barren sands must be scientifically improved.

When one attaches such a significant epithet as Tatarised to the name of a recognised European people, one is under an obligation to defend it, especially if one wishes to suggest that the influence of the particular people has been alien to Europe. And the defence does not involve any kind of criticism of De Quatrefages or Virchow or any one else—except for a protest against such a fugitive factor as colour being made a serious test of "race"—but is based on the importance of accumulated trifles as modifying one's interpretation of such a valuable touchstone as, *e.g.* a cephalic index.

Here is a wavy-haired group in which the typical individual is essentially bullet-headed ; but he shows a number of special details of characterisation. They are generally slight, and they are seldom all combined in a single individual ; but they are otherwise constant, and their accumulative significance ought to be accepted, because they are certainly *not* European. The skull bulges slightly at the base, the ears tend to be fleshy and a trifle prominent, the cheek-bones are high, the nostrils show a distinct tendency to "gape," the upper lip seems to

be "swollen"—like that of steppe children who drink "upwards" from the teats of their milch animals—and the skin on the neck is apt to look and almost to feel like parchment. The rest of the body conforms to this picture; the fingers are apt to be splayed, and the legs to be thick and rather bowed; and the arms are short. This would have been a dreadful handicap to foresters, and the short-armed would have died out long ago; but it is little handicap to a rider provided with a long lance—unless presently he finds himself forced to fight *on foot* and against a long-armed forester or highlander equipped with a bayonet.

The picture still misses its most significant detail—a slightly oblique eye. In the case of a man, this is not always very obvious, especially if he wears moustachios with fiercely upturned ends, as your eye is diverted from the slight angle by the abrupt one; but, if you can find a full-face photograph, and cover the lower part of the face, the upper part betrays the truth—the Tatarisation, *i.e.* something that suggests the bane of steppe mentality through the boon of steppe mobility.

This was the dominant and dominating type in the only natural region in the whole area where a general uniformity of structure and relief, climate and occupations, gave real facilities for the evolution of a single, large, political unit; and even so, the marked longitudinal and meagre latitudinal expansion of the plain meant that political unity would not be easily or rapidly achieved, certainly not until the forest had been cleared and the marsh drained.

Nor would that make the evolution quite simple. The narrowness of Europe certainly put the plain into easy relations, especially along the Amber routes, with both the northern and the southern seas; and the river system should have given close relations with the northern seas, and so made Prussia the natural heir of the Hanseatic

League. Of course, it did eventually decide the position of the Prussian capital, "between" the great eastward bend of the Lower Elbe and the great westward bend of the Lower Oder, where the natural line of the Upper Oder emerges in the actual line of the Lower Elbe; but the Prussians were purely military and devoid of all maritime instincts, and the southward "pull" was too strong. For the Empire was Roman and Holy, and the Orient wealth came over the Alps; and the only permanent, and therefore invaluable, unifying influence amid all the geographical, racial, and linguistic confusion was the persistence of the Imperial Dream.

That was precisely why the diversion of the Orient trade from the direct trans-Alpine route to the circuitous sea route was such a paralysing blow. The consequent poverty of the petty princelings made it impossible to continue the payment of Papal dues, and even suggested the easiest method of recuperation, *i.e.* seizing the rich possessions of the Church; and the absence of wide traditions from Imperial Rome facilitated the revolt from Ecclesiastical Rome, especially because it meant that Germany had missed Rome's two great lessons, the sanctity of the written or given word and—though this was of less importance at the time—some elastic freedom of individuality to subjects. *Cf.* p. 105.

While the change enriched, and magnified the importance of, the princelings, it introduced a new element of chaos, especially into South Germany, *i.e.* where the geographical incoherence was most pronounced; and the sequel was the reduction of the whole into a scene of fierce inter-tribal antagonisms, political and religious—amongst 368 separate "States"—which were ultimately fatal. They were fatal because presently the need for organisation became imperious; no serious thinker in any of the separate units could fail to recognise it; help, apparently,

must come from outside, and organisation could be hoped for only from a stronger group; and these stronger groups in Germany had, and have, been always and progressively of a barbarous type—Franks, Saxons, Swabians, Hapsburgs, Hohenzollerns. Unfortunately, the humble and humorous artist of the Alpine plateau realised that his individualism hindered political unity and coherence, and was eventually willing to accept organisation from one large and strong unit, devoid alike of humility and humour.

Again, behind the opportunity and the power to use it we may see the geographical control. If we look at a political map of the Prussian plain, showing no geographical feature except rivers and seas, and if we ask what is the one striking feature of the unit, we must say “extension in longitude”; and this has been the decisive factor.

For this east-and-west extension took Prussia into longitudes where she must come into relations with the two Powers which spanned Europe from north to south; and these relations would be, *more Prussico*, made opportunities for showing—though, admittedly, in a much modified form—primitive steppe mentality, with its perfectly logical ideas (*cf.* p. 189). This mentality here was so decisive that we may venture to repeat. If neither of two contiguous “spheres” of steppe pasture can do more than feed the people on it, and if one of them cannot even do that, it is useless for the hungry just to conquer their neighbours, for the few mouths killed will soon be replaced; but if the conquerors butcher the conquered—except, perhaps, the young women—then there will be more food for the survivors.

But in this eastward and westward expansion Prussia came into fertile lowlands drained by great rivers, with basins highly mineralised; and, from the double source of wealth, impecunious Prussia could be at length financed. The wealth in the west involved relations with the most

civilised country in Europe and with the most important river in Europe, both of them intimately associated with Rome ; but it had been " Frontier " Rome, *i.e.* Rome in her most military attitude and mood. Eastward the Brandenburg Mark was an outpost against the Barbarians, especially Asiatics ; survival depended on military strength ; the foe was always fierce and uncivilised ; and the warfare was always savage. So, successful defence left the conquerors with a conviction of their own immense " superiority " as military machine and as human type ; and thereby has hung a very long tale.

It was a foregone conclusion that such a Power would, in the long run, dominate and then organise the rest of the Holy Roman region ; but both geographical variety and varied human type made the material intractable, and the unity was slow in maturing. The variety was going to be a great asset once the unity was secured ; and the late development enabled a Prussianised Germany to start, economically, with the best machinery and many other advantages, " borrowed " from the experience of older nations who were handicapped by having much valuable machinery that ought to have been scrapped.

And the fundamentals were admirable facilities, natural and artificial, for transporting metal and salt to fuel and *vice versâ* ; and so the Rhineland steel and chemical industries came to be prostituted to the mania of an All Highest War Lord. Any chemical industry that is fully equipped to serve agriculture, dyeing, and medicine, can be, as this was, at once diverted to chemical warfare. Whether it will be diverted, and whether it would be at a time when the nations had agreed *not* to use such weapons in war, depends, and depended, on the type of man that is dominant. Here it was the Prussian type.

All this is implicitly behind the political map of Europe in 1648 ; for the Peace of Westphalia, though only a peace

of exhaustion, formed Modern Europe, giving the western Nation-States approximately their present shape, size, and inter-relations, and actually outlining our modern problems, *e.g.* the relations of France and Germany along the Rhine, of France and Spain in the Mediterranean, of Prussia and Sweden, and Prussia and Poland along the Baltic, and of Prussia and Austria in the Danube and Oder basins.

What did a "peace of exhaustion" mean? Between 1631 and 1649 Germany lost 90 per cent. of her total population—an appalling and incredible holocaust, which left her industries and commerce in chaos except for enough tillage to keep alive the tiny 10 per cent. remnant; and this was just when French industries were reaping the benefit of Colbert's finance, and English commerce had Cromwell behind it in Hanseatic and Levantine waters. Even when German industries revived—and the Prussian obsession about agriculture dates from this crisis—the political disunity meant different codes of law and new customs¹ every few miles in every direction. The treaty, by recognising the disunity, encouraged and perpetuated it; and so the Holy Roman Empire lost territory to Externals, especially France, and lost prestige to Internals, especially Prussia, until the whole sham dissolved under the pressure of the French Revolution and Napoleon.

The failure of the Hapsburgs, then, to unite artificially and politically what was naturally and geographically disunited, had two vital consequences, one internal and the other external. France became dominant in peninsular Europe, and the bulk of the Hapsburg lands outside the Empire went to French Bourbons, *e.g.* in Spain and Italy; and, inside the Empire, Prussia became dominant under a dynasty with bases east and west, north and south.

Its original home in the double principality of

¹ The 1919 settlement added 10,000 miles of customs barriers to Europe!

Hohenzollern was in the Roman corner of old Germania, on the waterparting between Rhine and Danube, an inspiring and significant base. Presently the younger branch of the family established itself where the natural link between Rhine and Danube, Alpine passes and North Sea, made Nürnberg a very important financial centre. Surplus wealth accumulated here made it presently possible to buy another important link between river and river, mountain and sea, the link between Oder and Elbe, the Eastern Alps and the Baltic. In the extreme north-eastern corner of the Baltic coastland, the Military Order of *Teutonic* Knights was established—in poverty because sectional, and was “open to offers” because so poor. Here, another Hohenzollern, who “never saw his way until he became religious,” contrived to be elected Grand Master in the age of Martin Luther; he saw the error of his ways, and became a Protestant, and—secularised the territories of the Order as a Hereditary Duchy in the House of Hohenzollern. And so the mailed fist stretched across the whole land from west to east, and south to north.

While Hohenzollern power pivoted on the Brandenburg March and Berlin, the Hapsburgs found compensation in lands nearer to Rome in both location and sympathy, *i.e.* the Austrian March, with its pivot at Vienna; and the parallel emphasis eastward obviously threatened the Isthmian States, which were also being threatened from the east by Peter the Great. Most danger was to be anticipated by Poland, which was threatened from all three points simultaneously, Berlin, Vienna, and Moscow; and Vienna was least to be feared because the Austrian lands were incoherent, they had no real link except the Crown, and there was no sense of nationality except in Hungary, which had its own religious question to solve, and the brunt of Ottoman pressure to bear.

The fate of the Isthmian States, then, might have been

easily forecast by any geographer who could have studied the first map that showed the Westphalian settlement.

Clearly Sweden might keep the part of Norway-Denmark that flanked the Cattegat, and in 1658 she did acquire the whole Scanian shore of the Sound; but how was she going to hold the Gulf of Finland against Russia, and Pomerania—not to mention Bremen—against Prussia? Surely she would have to confine herself to Scandinavia. For similar reasons Poland, unless very strong in internal unity and in man-power, would scarcely have any chance of success against either of her two largest neighbours; and the very name¹ (*Polen*, “the Plains”), when properly interpreted, suggests a main cause of the fundamental difficulty, the absence of natural features eastward or westward. Indeed, in 1920–21 the best “features” available for the purpose of delimiting the new frontier were, in several places, the German trenches dug during the War!

One great opportunity was lost to the south, and the loss of it shows how far apart in essentials Austria and Hungary were, and how little Austria felt conscious of her debt to Poland for salvation from the Turks. For after the defeat at Mohacs, the Turks might have been swept entirely, not only out of the Danube basin, but out of Europe; but the Emperor was still “Roman” and diverted his forces and his common sense to “Roman” causes, *e.g.* to prevent Spain from taking or retaking old Italian lands.

Except for this grave omission, the main interest of the settlement, outside of the Empire, must be looked for on the ocean coast, especially in the Franco-Iberian peninsula. In the east Peter the Great fully realised the value of the western outlook, and had studied it on the spot; but he was trying to do what could not be done—to peninsularise

¹ “Pole-land” is a stupid attempt to suggest an entirely false etymology.

the continental. Of course, the possession of ports is a great economic asset—Poland in 1929 handled nearly 3,000,000 tons of trade at Gdynia—but it does not convert landmen into seamen even in typical occupations, still less in temperament and attitude of mind.

The one real advantage of Russia was that, like England outside the Empire and Prussia inside it, she was—from the European standpoint—a new Power, with a new dynasty; and it was as a new Power that she was looking westward to a new career. But to her this looking westward was really still looking over land, not over sea; and, as she spanned Europe from north to south, it meant bringing her into contact with Sweden and Turkey as well as Poland. As her densest population was in the Don Cossack region, from which she recruited—for they were never conscripted—her incomparable cavalry, it would seem to her easier to deal with Poland and Turkey than with Sweden; but, though easier in itself, it was bound to involve her ultimately with both Prussia and Austria. Besides, her new capital was at St. Petersburg, not Moscow, still less Kiev.

Though England, like Russia, was looking mainly westward, friendly relations with other Protestant Powers forced her also to look eastward, and unfriendly relations with Roman Catholic Powers forced her also to look southward; but in all these directions she was looking over seas. In other words, as one would expect in the case of an Island Power, she was interested in all the seas round peninsular Europe and in the Atlantic link between them; and, therefore, in every future war, especially with France or Spain, we would anticipate that much of the fighting would be on or over seas.

But, from this point of view, we must distinguish in the meantime between the two natural divisions of the Franco-Iberian peninsula. For the Treaty had left Spain,

as Austria, much poorer in power and in prestige ; and it was wholly inappropriate, from a geographical standpoint, that either Spain or Austria should have outlying territory on the Narrow Seas. To the extreme north-east of the great peninsula, the United Provinces had secured enough of Flanders and Brabant to hold both banks of the Scheldt, and so neutralise Antwerp ; and to the extreme south-west of it, Portugal was free, and—though she had lost her Ceuta territory to Spain—she would be a most valuable ally to any Power, especially a Sea Power, in any war against France or Spain, especially one that involved fighting against France in Spain.

This possibility of fighting against France in Spain must be kept in close relation to the probability that much of any fighting with either Power would be on or over seas. For, if the prowess and the patriotism of the Spaniards in the Peninsular War were worthy of far more credit than they have sometimes received, the opportunities for using both virtues effectively depended on our possession of ocean bases in Portugal and Minorca. We were thus able to compel every French regiment that entered Iberia to do so by land, and to prevent the French from making any use of the Basque (and the Catalan) genius for the sea.

That was bad enough for them, but it was not all the story. Some 150 miles of *gave* ravines on the north and of parallel sierras and cirques on the south forced even Napoleon on to the terminal passes of the Pyrenees, reproducing rather the same tactical difficulties that we have met with on the Italian coast of the Adriatic (p. 268) ; and he was not even really free to choose between the two termini, for the easy Col de Perthus was marginal to Spain (*cf.* p. 113),—it did not defend or threaten Madrid,—and it was flanked by Port Mahon. However much, then, it had facilitated the entrance of Rome or the Barbarians

into Spain or the exit of Hannibal and the Moors from Spain, it was relatively useless to Napoleon. Even now the mass of the Franco-Spanish trade is done by sea.

The necessity for making most use, therefore, of the Biscayan passes involved him in a climatic difficulty—possibly, the fatal obstacle to Roland—which did not become obvious so long as his troops were on the forested coastal roads in the Atlantic climate. In the east the Mediterranean climate, with its olive and vine response, extends right across the range and over the south-east of France; and so neither Rome nor Carthage in crossing the Pyrenees was conscious of any change of climate and foods.¹ Indeed, this is the one excuse for the Moors not realising that Africa ended at the Pyrenees.

The question remains: Is there any hint of all this in the position of France on the 1648 map? She is on the Rhine, with a bridgehead at Breisach comparable with that at Kehl now; she has a firm grip on what must be to her the critical part of the Moselle valley; Bresse and Pinerolo give her approaches from north-west and south-west on the Savoy saddle of the Alps; and by 1659 no foreign control is left within the Pyrenees-Alps-Vosges circuit. As this meant that she held vital approaches to the Ebro, Po, and Rhine basins, Richelieu could concentrate on internal unity, associated with "tyranny" at home, and external empire, associated with the acquisition of their New World possessions from the Hapsburgs of Spain and their Old World title from the Hapsburgs of Austria. In all their successes, however, Richelieu and Mazarin seemed to forget that Prussia might be a residuary legatee of Austria, as England might be of Spain; and the

¹ If the "Atlantic" base and its familiar response, *e.g.* the "bacon and eggs" of the Minho valley, were a real asset to our troops (*cf.* p. 109), the French trouble from the unfamiliar has had many parallels, *e.g.* after the transference of Suleiman's troops from the Montenegrin coast to the Shipka Pass during the Plevna Campaign (*cf.* p. 196).

result suggests the importance of not neglecting the geographical background in dealing with political problems. For Prussia was nearer than Austria, and the *English* Channel was less of a barrier than the Pyrenees, even to a France with a pre-Revolution navy (*cf.* p. 33).

A peaceful issue could scarcely be expected. And, however offensive the steppe mentality may seem, we must remember the position as Bismarck saw it (pp. 20-21). The centrality did give circumferal peoples means and opportunities for impeding and even encroaching on the core-land; and so a Central Europe State, whatever its dominating racial character, was forced to be able to defend itself by arms or by a bewildering series of treaties and alliances. Prussia took both courses.

If we now compare the 1648 map of Europe with the 1913 one, we see that the Westphalian settlement gave the first push to the old north-and-south line of Great Powers (Swede, Polish, and Ottoman) between East and West Europe, which ended in its swinging round into an east-and-west line between North and South Europe. England and France belonged geographically to both North Europe and West Europe, and were, therefore, both interested in the change; and a geographer who could have foreseen it, would have risked a double forecast: that France, spanning Europe from north to south, should see more clearly what was going to happen, especially in Central Europe; that England, with more perspective and less distraction, should be better able to take advantage of what did happen, especially over seas.

Out of this new orientation many interesting surprises have sprung. For instance, in political questions arising in the Near East, the two western Powers have been found fighting side by side, as in the Crimean War and the Great War; in a commercial question affecting the northern seas the two Northern Powers might combine, as they did

to buy from Denmark the right of levying dues on the Sound, and so secure free navigation between London and St. Petersburg. This had a sequel of immense interest and importance, for the transaction was cemented by the marriage of the heirs of the two crowns to two princesses of Denmark—one of them, of course, our Queen Alexandra, of happy memory; and so the old enemies—England and France, and England and Russia—were found fighting side by side in the Great War against the Unholy Roman Empire of our own day. It was Unholy, though (Austro-) Roman, because the link was no longer with Latin Rome and Christianity, but with Byzantine Rôum and Islam.

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¹ Owing to the selection of details from both ancient and modern times, there are often several forms of the same word, e.g. Cadiz, Gades, Gadeira.

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